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ABSTRACT 
Against the backdrop of a contested neoliberal global regime, this thesis inquires into the 
theoretical and practical underpinnings of ‘African development’ using Blair’s Commission for 
Africa and Eritrea as case studies. The thesis critically reviews the British Government 
sponsored enquiry Our Common Interest: Report of the Commission for Africa (2005) as an 
embodiment of the belief that neoliberal economic policies and liberal democratic reform can 
offset adverse developmental conditions across sub-Saharan Africa. The thesis contrasts 
how African states, socialist Eritrea as a specific example, get around the neoliberal global 
order heralded by the Blair Commission. ‘Development’ holds different meaning for specific 
actors because of underlying and often contradictory interests; dominant and subaltern 
groups rationalise development differently through their respective discourses. To map a 
consistent approach to African development, the thesis weighs specific questions about the 
basic character of development. The thesis therefore interrogates the link between the 
particular type of development discourse, social reality and practical change insofar as 
external prescriptive and internal voluntaristic approaches to development go.   
 
Understanding the politics of development through the dichotomous examples of the Blair 
Commission and Eritrean State policies is important to consider a kind of development 
congruent with the African realities. Dominant discourses of development like Blair’s 
proposal for Africa engender powerful narratives that don’t necessarily reflect how the 
subjects of development perceive themselves, their conditions and their future. The thesis 
utilises a comparative historical analysis to explain how different groups account for 
development according to particular historical experience and political interests and 
objectives.  
 
The thesis argues that the monolithic approach defining the Blair Commission’s development 
blueprint has a tendency to contradict any popular organic quality that the (African) 
development process may have. The thesis takes issue with the Blair Commission’s 
presentation of its development paradigm as of universal validity while unmasking its 
underlying ideological underpinnings. It argues that the Commission’s mix of assumptions, 
methods and conclusions endorse a free market development model and representative 
democracy for the region. The initiative could be perceived largely as a vehicle for the 
cultivation of material interests on behalf of a very tiny minority of transnational elites, not the 
African masses. Despite its problems, Eritrea’s historical materialist conception of 
development through struggle reflects an alternative way of thinking about and practicing 
2 
 
development in the region. The Eritrean experiment of independent national development is 
examined as a contrasting model of sub-Saharan Africa development.   
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INTRODUCTION 
You cannot develop people. You must allow people to develop themselves.  
- Julius Nyerere 
 
In a speech given to the first post-apartheid South African parliament, the acclaimed African 
statesman, Julius Kambarage Nyerere, recounts his experience of being patronised at the 
hands of European officials. He spoke of being asked, during his travels abroad as a 
Tanzanian public figure, by Western officials to explain national events in the other African 
states. Following is an excerpt, as shared with the parliamentarians, of what Nyerere had to 
say in response to those officials’ questions that were clearly outside his formal capacity:  
 
Here I am former president of my country. No problems in Tanzania, we 
never had these problems that they have, but I am an African and they see 
me, then they ask me about the problems of Rwanda. But I don’t come from 
Rwanda. But you come from Africa …. If Blair were to come to Dar es 
Salaam, I don’t ask him what is happening in … in Bosnia. It never occurs to 
me [to] ask Blair what is happening to you Europeans because of what is 
happening in Bosnia. If president Kohl was to come somewhere, I don’t ask 
him what is happening in … Chechnya. Kohl could say why are you asking 
me anything about Chechnya? I don’t know what is happening in Chechnya. 
But this is not true about Africa … [emphasis added].   
                                     (Nyerere 1997)1                               
               
 
As an African—and as a human being—I find it problematic to think of the continual physical 
and symbolic violence perpetrated against the African continent and its peoples from 
without. For centuries, and unlike perhaps any other part of the world, Africa has been 
regarded as the tabula rasa on which outside actors could inscribe almost everything they 
willed.2 Obstructing by different means the African peoples’ desires and efforts to self-
                                                          
1
 Cited in Leadersoftanzania (Oct 12, 2011), ‘Remembering Julius Nyerere - First President of 
Tanzania - 3 of 3’, [Video File], https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wBnOdfTU5Gw &t=86s  
2
 For Joseph Conrad, Africa represented a ‘heart of darkness’ as his classic work of the same title 
confirms, and, in the case of George Hegel, Africa came to denote a ‘land of perpetual childhood’ 
whose people lacked culture and couldn’t thus develop. And as Chinua Achebe’s incisive twin essays 
Colonialist Criticism and Home and Exile make clear, this particular European habit of maligning 
Africa appears to have found its way into the postcolonial period. So, the stereotyping of the African 
continent and its populations may not only be a historical fact but also a contemporary one.     
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represent and to decide their own future development course has been a significant feature 
of the modern world system dominated by the Western capitalist powers. Specifically, the 
architects of the postwar development project figure prominently. Tony Blair’s 2005-2015 
Africa Commission provides their most recent and possibly final manifesto. They approach 
Africa as a homogenous social and geographical space with little acknowledgement of the 
continent’s diversity or agency. Nyerere’s distinctly mature and indeed abiding words 
couldn’t have rung truer in terms of their unhelpful imaginations of Africa.  
 
Having disseminated constructs of Africa as traditional, underdeveloped or developing, 
Northern development planners commonly proceed to draw blanket policies on behalf of the 
entire continent in a bid to ‘modernise’ its countries; not only do such (exogenous) policies 
tend to be largely unsuited to Africa, but also presumably involve a questionable motive in 
the form of undeclared self-interest. Nevertheless, their strategies of essentialising and 
otherwise misrepresenting Africa and her peoples apparently in pursuit of a dominant 
politico-economic agenda have not gone unchallenged at different points. It seems that the 
resistance of the African peoples against foreign colonists and their local abettors has come 
to be a source of inspiration for the majority of Africans today. Indeed, it may be suggested 
that it is this form of popular democratic politics and on-going struggle which commonly 
resonates with the mass of the African peoples as they continue to weigh their future. 
 
The historical and present-day struggle of the African peoples for sovereign political and 
economic development symbolises the dialectical state in which those two mutually opposed 
trends unfold. As a child coming of age in a politically vibrant late 20th century Africa and 
today as a student of African society and politics, the question of how these antithetical 
forces impact social change in Africa has never been far from my consciousness and life. My 
decision to focus on the Blair Commission for Africa and the Eritrean development model as 
entirely topical examples is a function of this enduring personal interest. I sense in the 
respective approaches of the Commission for Africa and the Eritrean Government a perfect 
engenderment of the dialectic of external domination and indigenous self-determination. The 
Blair Commission’s carefully elaborated and nuanced plan sums up the policies and practical 
concerns that seemingly are necessary to guarantee capitalist expansion in the current 
(neoliberal) phase of its historical development. In contrast, the Eritrean Government’s fairly 
unconventional development approach aligns, albeit loosely, with the global anti-capitalist 
drive toward what could be described as better (socialist?) alternative to the status quo.  
 
The main concern about studying alongside and against each other the Blair Commission’s 
policies and the Eritrean approach to development itself involves a quest to come to grips 
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with what lasting African development may really imply—how it can be facilitated and/or 
impeded in a theoretical as well as practical sense. The issues worth sorting out 
consequently centre around the fundamental description of the type of development implied, 
likely vehicle or force for delivering such development and locale at which the anticipated 
development may take place.  
 
Through a comparative study of the Blair Commission and the Eritrean development model, 
the argument is made for a vision of change that is both organic and transcultural whilst 
rebutting dominant models as reactive/ reactionary ideology. The thesis thus analyses 
concepts of 'African development' deployed in those two contexts to tell apart credible 
development from fallacious proposals. I suggest that the principle of local knowledge, 
exemplified by the case of Eritrean development and by definition heterogeneous, is 
universally applicable in African development contexts. At the same time, I argue that 
capitalist development, despite the Commission's assumptions to the contrary, is not 
universal, but instead contingent and provisional and indeed incongruous in the African 
context. Accordingly, the Eritrean Government’s indigenous approach, which is predicated 
on local-cum-universal knowledge, may offer, even if curtailed in some way, a significant 
practical model for African development.  
 
In choosing the present topic, prospects and problems of African development in the light of 
the Blair Commission and the Eritrean example, I have in mind the pursuit of a principle in 
the form of a humane and just world for all. I give such weight to this ideal that my tendency 
is to seek self-validation in what I do. In addition, the inherently contentious description of 
‘African development’ means a reflexive posture is likely to lead to better insight. 
Accordingly, the inquiry into African development is meant to benefit from both subjective 
and objective input.3 Or, we could be warranted in envisaging African development based on 
our specific experiences and concerns as members of society. Also, in being guided by our 
own individual tendencies, still we ought to think and act within the boundaries of scholarly 
knowledge. Ultimately, the imperative of seeking change in the interests of the impoverished 
majorities of the continent seems to justify this sort of furcated policy.   
 
This positionality accords with my experiences as former colonial subject and my sensitivity 
to current indirect subtler forms of control over Africa. My past and contemporary experience 
                                                          
3
 In any case, those involved in development studies pursue their activity in a highly charged 
environment that it is not perhaps unusual to take a position in favour or against certain forms of 
‘development’. Yet ‘subjectivity’ in the case of specific types of research (for example feminist) cannot 
be an impediment to scholarly discourse.   
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is such that I can’t possibly endorse what in effect could be a neocolonial agenda of the Blair 
Commission. Neocolonialism can be understood as another (more contemporary) term for 
imperialism—the military, political, economic and cultural domination of the world by great 
powers.4 According to Nkrumah (1965:ix) who coined the term, neocolonialism describes a 
situation wherein “the State which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the 
outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its 
political policy is directed from outside.” As a label, neocolonialism seems to aptly 
summarise Africa’s subordinate incorporation into the global political economy in the wake of 
formal political independence. And because, as Nkrumah explains, the “methods and form of 
this direction” comes in different guise, the theory of neocolonialism thus sounds particularly 
explanatory from the point of view of the present study. Precisely because of its distinct 
reach, I shall be privileging the concept to study the relationship between the Blair 
Commission and sub-Saharan Africa, including Eritrea.  
 
On the other hand, the fact that I find myself gravitating towards the forces resisting capitalist 
global domination possibly comes as natural. It is out of this elemental disposition that I have 
been willing to also undertake a systematic study of what the Eritrean Government has set 
itself to accomplishing: national development in opposition to the North’s apparently 
neocolonial designs for the region. Again, what seems to play a decisive role in all of this is 
the way my personal biographical background (together with the skills of critical inquiry I 
acquired as part of my formal academic training) has helped shape my eventual outlook. 
For, in the Africa of the late 1970s and 1980s I lived through a momentous social milieu 
wherein the call for national liberation, pan-Africanism, anti-imperialist world revolution and 
social and economic progress had resonated with so many among my generation. It is a 
cause for which the peoples of Africa have fought and sacrificed a great deal. This quest for 
the continent’s emancipation remains unfulfilled despite the subsequent changes in the 
international political system. A direct legacy of such politics, whose core message 
emphasised the right of self-determination for the African peoples, seems to explain my on-
going deep identification with the subaltern’s cause vis-à-vis hegemonic power. I thus tend to 
look at Eritrea (country and society) as an imperfect David of sorts whose will to independent 
development has pitted it against the Goliath that the global capitalist juggernaut represents. 
So, I see it as worthwhile to consider the significance of this basic question at a deeper level, 
and my wish is for the present study to be a small step in that direction. 
 
                                                          
4
 The terms ‘Dependency’, ‘Semi-colony’ and ‘Underdevelopment’ are sometimes also used in lieu to 
the concept of neocolonialism.  
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During my formative years I have frequently been encouraged to think independently and 
critically which I have tried to continually work on in the light of subsequent theoretical 
education. A distinctive impression about critical philosophical thought and radical social 
practice as sound and strategic underlies the approach I follow in this study. Meantime, I 
reiterate my concern with the topic of African development has an academic and a practical 
or real-world aspect about it. Incidentally, I share a great deal of lived experience with the 
subjects of ‘development’ in whose name I write; like sizeable segments of the African 
populations, I have endured violent conflict and dislocation and I have gone through the 
vicissitudes of life as a refugee in a hostile foreign environment. I can relate first-hand to 
what it is like to experience hardship and deprivation, to suffer from preventable diseases 
such as malaria, to survive on limited staple food5 and to feel generally insecure and in limbo 
about one’s future.6  
 
So, in the case of peoples subjected to colonial rule, involuntary displacement and flight, the 
force of history can defy the language of abstraction; historicity tends to weigh in very real 
ways in the life of many Africans, the present author included. At the same time, it is 
essential to perhaps not think of this whole saga as being exclusively about trials and 
tribulations, or else one misses a very important dimension that is integral to this form of 
collective experience. Specifically, I would like to believe my life story has instilled in me 
humanistic virtues (ethics of solidarity, empathy, cooperation, sharing) which I may otherwise 
not have cultivated. These values continue to guide my thinking and action, and undoubtedly 
play a central role in shaping the course/ tone of the present study. Yet, in a truly exceptional 
kind of way, on the other hand, I do consider myself somewhat fortunate in that I had access 
to proper education, a privilege not readily available to the average African.7 I therefore feel 
duty-bound in some way to speak on behalf of those who, for reasons not of their own fault, 
may lack the wherewithal to do so.   
 
                                                          
5
 Day in day out I had to consume beans back then—whether that was a meal of fuul (broad beans), 
fasulia (kidney beans) or a’des (lentil). Meat, milk and most fruits on the other hand were unaffordable 
luxury foodstuffs. 
6 This is not to blame external causes only for the problems the continent of Africa has faced and 
continues to face today. Yet, while numerous factors tend to be responsible for Africa’s regression in 
recent times, it is hard to ignore the crucial role played by colonialism and imperialism in that.  
7
 I completed my high school at a United Nations-sponsored school for refugees in the eastern 
Sudanese town of Kassala. The academic curriculum at this school was modelled on the University of 
London’s Overseas Board education program, the General Certificate of Education (Ordinary Level). 
My formative education in Sudan laid the foundation upon which I could subsequently build my 
academic learning.     
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The Commission for Africa and the ‘rising Africa’ meme 
Upon sensing signs of apparent recovery following decades of economic and political 
stagnation, in February 2004 the British Government initiated a commission to promote 
African development. A year later, the Commission for Africa (the Commission) published its 
analysis and recommendation as Our Common Interest: Report of the Commission for Africa 
(the Report). By urging the African states to continue the progress they were registering, the 
Commissioners foresaw the continent’s total transformation in a decade’s time. The 
Commission for Africa thus has been a key force in kindling the latest narrative of a rising 
African continent.  
 
The Commission’s blueprint epitomises the development agenda that evolved over the 
decades of Africa’s economic and political regression. The Report’s key features—good 
governance, growth through private investment, foreign aid, trade and debt reforms—echo 
the enduring terms of debate and action. The rhetoric is that of donor governments and 
multilateral institutions.8 The Commission’s approach encapsulates the dominant core-
centric discourse, sanctioning a free market development model and multi-party 
representative democracy. Its mandate covers the entire sub-Saharan Africa region and 
involves many of the major international players. Sub-Saharan Africa has been the focus 
apparently because of its incomparable experience of stalled development fairly shortly after 
its countries achieved political independence. 
 
It should be noted that since the initial Report was launched other documents have been 
published that audit progress and propose further changes in relation to African 
development. These include, Still Our Common Interest (2010) by the Commission for 
Africa, and a series of yearly reports by the Africa Progress Panel, the Commission and G8’s 
delegated monitoring body. These reports all focus on tracking the original plan of action 
captured in Our Common Interest and there has been no major departure or review of this 
original development agenda.  
 
Place and time seemed to matter exceptionally so far as the Commission’s potential to 
generate change is in question. For the then-British Prime Minister and Chair of the Africa 
Commission, Tony Blair, 2005 was an important milestone; that same year marked Blair’s 
accession to the helms of the European Union (EU) and the Group of Eight most 
industrialised nations’ (G8) summit in Gleneagles, Scotland. In view of the Prime Minister’s 
dual mandate at the EU and G8, and in light of his open pledge to work hard to “implement 
                                                          
8 For example, OECD member states, the UN, EU, G8, the IMF and World Bank. 
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all of the recommendations contained within” the Report (Williams 2005:529), the 
Commission for Africa elicited disparate interests and expectations. As such, it provides 
appropriate ground to revisit the current state of development theory, policy and action in 
relation to sub-Saharan Africa. Perhaps, Commission for Africa and its Report ought to be 
approached from the vantage point of neoliberalism in its twilight. It makes sense 
accordingly to see the Commission for Africa and its findings as a last-ditch effort by the 
globalist cabal to map Africa’s future—before maybe China in particular among the emerging 
economies takes over completely.  
 
Eritrea: subalternity and the intricacies of nation-building 
Eritrea, located in the Horn of Africa region, provides an interesting counter-balance to the 
articulation of development represented by laissez-faire capitalism and embodied in the 
Commission for Africa Report. The present-day land of Eritrea has been the target of foreign 
colonial expansion for much of its modern history. As a nation-state, Eritrea formally gained 
independence from Ethiopia in 1993 following a protracted struggle for statehood. Beginning 
in 1961, Eritreans fought against successive Ethiopian governments backed in turn by the 
United States and its Western allies and the former Soviet Union and its satellites. In the 
case of this country, a long history of foreign occupation and exploitation coupled with near-
total absence of external support for Eritrean self-determination has arguably precipitated a 
distinct collective experience among the population. Eritrean social and political 
consciousness has evolved to value national unity and sovereignty exceedingly while 
resolutely resisting the intrusions of outsiders (cf. Connell 2003). The Eritrean Government 
actively fosters a strong ethic of self-help and patriotic national pride. Billboards emblazoned 
with phrases such as “I am an Eritrean …. I am proud” are common sight along some of 
Asmara’s major thoroughfares.9 The images captured in these billboards show the (happy) 
faces of Eritreans from the country’s different ethno-linguistic groups and regions. This sort 
of collective self-affirmation at the same time intersects with another Eritrean sentiment in 
the shape of perceptions of victimhood and distrust of the intentions of powerful foreign 
actors (cf. Allo 2018; Vltcheck 2014; Wrong 2005; Reid 2005). Through the medium of 
‘national culture’, the Eritrean Government routinely disseminates specific ideological and 
political messages to induce/ force the population to partake in its economic and social 
development agenda.  
 
                                                          
9 To get a sense of this, the reader can consult McCarthy (2013)  
http://www.eyemagazine.com/blog/post/Pride-and-posters-in-Eritrea  
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The nation-building and development trajectory that post-independence Eritrea has 
embarked on stands at odds to the free market development model endorsed in the 
Commission for Africa Report. The Eritrean State, not the private, multilateral or non-
government sectors, is overwhelmingly the overseer of national development in Eritrea. The 
one-party authoritarian Eritrean Government and the pursuit of a centralised command 
economy seem to contravene the Report’s precepts regarding governance and economic 
growth. Neither Eritrean politics nor its economic policy appears to comply with the Report’s 
recommendations of political pluralism and a free market capitalist road to development. 
Indeed, the Eritrean Government has ordered the majority of international NGOs working in 
the development field, including USAID, out of the country so it might forge ahead with its 
own brand of (statist) development. There is minimal or no engagement by the Eritrean 
Government with (self-centred) donors and the government has routinely refused tied aid 
and financial loans for fear of falling into a debt trap.   
 
Yet, going against the reigning policy or status quo may not be all there is to the Eritrean 
story of pursuing alternate development. From the other side of the tracks, things seem to 
stand differently—both for a greater number of Eritreans themselves and for non-Eritreans. 
Of late, the Eritrean Government’s behaviour came under scrutiny from the United Nations 
Security Council which decided to censure it apparently for various misdemeanours. On 
more than one occasion, the Security Council voted to impose economic and other sanctions 
on Eritrea for its perceived role in destabilising the Horn of Africa region.10 For its part, in 
2015 and again in 2016 the Human Rights Council also filed two critical reports about 
Eritrea’s domestic human rights record. And both Canada (2013) and the Netherland (2018) 
have declared Eritrea’s ambassadors to their countries persona non grata. Eritrea appears 
to be increasingly isolated internationally at the same time as it is facing growing domestic 
discontent. The absence of a Constitution and national elections, the jailing by the Eritrean 
Government of political opponents and journalists without due process, the failed January 
2013 army mutiny and the steady flight of the country’s youth due mainly to the policy of 
indefinite draft11 are some obvious examples of on-going internal discontent. Unless 
                                                          
10 Refer to UN News (2011) 
https://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=40628&Cr=eritrea&Cr1. Interestingly, the sanctions 
against Eritrea were lifted in November 2018, coinciding with the completion of this project which is 
partly also about Eritrea.   
11
 Up until July 2018, the Eritrean Government routinely cited the on-going state of ‘no-war no-peace’ 
with its neighbour Ethiopia following their border conflict of 1998-2000 as the main reason for the 
continuation of this policy. Officially, for the last two decades Eritrea saw Ethiopia as a much larger 
and more populous country intent on reversing its independence. Besides, the Eritrean Government 
considered itself technically at war with Ethiopia for, despite the signing of a peace deal, the latter has 
refused to relinquish Eritrean land it seized after their last war. With the recent changes that took 
11 
 
somehow mitigated, these internal and external challenges have the potential to make 
Eritrea’s development process slow and difficult to say the least. 
 
At the same time, Eritrea has progressed in a number of key development indicators. 
According to the World Bank World Development Indicators: the infant mortality rate in 
Eritrea has fallen from 151 in the mid-1990s to 45 in 2016; life expectancy at birth has 
continually increased for both men and women; fertility rates are dropping; the percentage of 
the rural population with access to improved water sources has increased from 47% in the 
1990s to 58% in 2016; immunisation for children aged 12-23 months stands at 93% for 
measles and DPT (diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus) compared to a low of 34% in 1995; and 
the participation rates of females in education has improved noticeably.12 And as Eritrea 
specialist Thomas C Mountain (2011) states, Eritrea is one of a handful of countries in the 
world that is bound to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) in a number of key 
areas.13 All this raises questions about what lessons can be drawn from the Eritrean model 
of development and how this can be compared and contrasted to the corresponding 
framework outlined by the Commission for Africa. 
 
The Blair Commission and the Eritrean story in perspective   
Despite my life experience and any personal and political considerations, it is possible to 
study in detail the two approaches to development in order to outline meaningful African 
development. For one thing, I accept the stipulation that as much as possible scholarship 
ought to be pursued away from overt polemicising. So, when analysing the Blair Commission 
and the Eritrean Government’s policies, this implies particularly resisting any tendency to 
take at face value their respective claims about development. A practical way to ensure that 
the research properly deals with this concern is to say at the outset what is and what is not 
typical about the Commission for Africa and the Eritrean development experiment.  
 
There are a number of things about the Commission for Africa and the Eritrean story of 
development that come to light following a skimming (re)assessment of each. In the first 
place, we could say that what commonly underlies the Commission for Africa and the 
Eritrean development project is the concept of ‘progress’ in its broad sense. Both the 
Commission for Africa and the Eritrean Government’s mandate appear sustained in their 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
place in Ethiopia following the assumption of office by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali, there are initial 
signs that Ethiopia may be about to reconsider its stance.  
12 See http://data.worldbank.org/country/eritrea  
13 See http://www.counterpunch.org/2011/08/09/an-island-in-the-famine/  
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own distinct ways by visions of a modern society which radically differs economically, 
politically and socially from a preceding ‘traditional’ type. In each case, we can notice it has 
been assumed that ‘change’ is positive and must be embraced by all peoples; advances in 
science and technology and in the way society can be reordered efficiently enhance the 
quality of human life. Beyond this quite general feature, neither the Commission for Africa 
nor the Eritrean Government’s development strategy can be pronounced analogous or 
complete.  
 
To understand what the two models may mean, it is important to clarify how in each instance 
historical fact and ideological necessity play a key role in the conceptualisation and practical 
pursuit of ‘development’. In the Commission’s as well as the Eritrean Government’s case, 
there is a set of underlying historical circumstances and belief systems about society and its 
mechanisms that seem to justify the form of development. We need to think of this 
background influence in terms of the capitalist version of modernisation and the Marxist 
model of social change respectively.  
 
For the Commission, development appears legitimised by the sense that capitalism 
automatically engenders a democratic political order, an auspicious thing in and of itself. 
Correspondingly, the framework for Eritrean development is provided by the Marxist 
approach to economic and political modernisation involving the eradication of private 
property, exploitation, inequality and ultimately conflict. The sort of history and ideological 
thinking informing the Eritrean Government’s current broadly socialist development and that 
heralding ‘neoliberalism’ tend to thus be entirely unrelated. While the impetus for the Eritrean 
Government’s current development policy seems to derive from a national anti-colonial 
struggle, the background to (the rise of) neoliberalism can be explained in terms of 
conjunctural disturbances affecting the global capitalist order beginning in the early 1970s. 
Furthermore, the radically independent and collectivist spirit that was suited to the Eritrean 
peoples’ struggle for self-determination is what one locates as at the centre of this country’s 
post-independence development thinking and practice, becoming its salient feature. On the 
other hand, the rupture with past ways that was to accompany the advent of neoliberalism 
saw the taking particularly of the ideology of individualism and rule of the market to another 
(more acute) level. In order to deepen our understanding of the Commission for Africa and 
the Eritrean case and the implication for meaningful (socially and environmentally balanced) 
development, we need to foreground this variation in historical and ideological lines of 
evolution.  
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And just as revealing about the Commission’s model and the Eritrean approach to 
development too seems to be that each has its pros and cons depending on the individual’s 
perspective. In general, the two models of development are likely to cater for the interests of 
different classes of people while equally being discriminatory against others. Or, considering 
the prevalence of plural stakes within society, both initiatives may be contested differently. 
The Commission’s blueprint is likely to find support, in addition to the North’s business and 
political elites, among Africa’s petty bourgeoisie. Meanwhile, the Eritrean approach 
(assuming unity between ideal and practice, to say nothing of a conducive external climate) 
may prove popular with the continent’s grassroots in that the aim apparently is to guarantee 
such basic human needs/ rights as education and health services for the poor. In practical 
term, their engendered weaknesses may run into excesses even as each purports to be 
benefiting all members of society—through ‘trickle down’ or enforced wealth redistribution. 
Be it despotic political systems and practices, social and economic misery and rights 
violations cannot be ruled out from both examples of development. I have to note this upfront 
to ensure as much as possible a sense of independence in the end.   
 
Research objectives and questions  
This thesis reviews the Commission for Africa and its Report a decade after its inception, 
coinciding with the due date for the Commission’s objectives to translate into concrete result. 
The analysis doesn’t seek to verify actual outcomes of development in the sub-Saharan 
Africa region over the span of 2005-2015 and beyond. Nor is the concern with any practical 
role as such that the Commission for Africa might have had. It is almost impossible to know 
what the link, if any, would be between the incidence of real development in all those (40-
plus) states and the Commission’s blueprint.  
 
Instead, the thesis focuses on the Commission for Africa to provide a considered response 
whether unchecked globalisation means there is no choice but a capitalist future before 
Africa—and the world for that matter. The thesis also aims to explore alternate development 
prospects by looking at the case of one African country, Eritrea, as it pursues a development 
agenda that seemingly runs counter to that of the Commission for Africa. Despite the 
universalising discourse anticipating neoliberal development across sub-Saharan Africa, the 
Eritrean example gives occasion to mull a different approach to African development. The 
Eritrean model of development appears useful ultimately for checking whether the present 
global system signifies historical finality, or else there continues to be scope for basic 
change. As such, this study focuses on the contested nature of African development in the 
shape of the tensions characterising both externally-designed (the Commission for Africa) 
14 
 
and internally-inspired visions of change (the case of Eritrea). So, in effect, the study is 
about the implications for Africa of rival development discourses and their relation to reality. 
And in that very sense, the underlying aim is to outline a sustainable course of development 
so far as sub-Saharan Africa (if not the world) is concerned.    
 
Much of the literature on the Commission for Africa appears limited in scope to the 
Commission’s problem-driven and -solving strategies, and there is distinctly little or no 
sustained discussion in the totality of the literature of alternatives to its vision of change. 
Overall, the literature tends to either underrate or override ‘local’ experience as a driving 
force of development. The question of ‘diversity’ and of alternate paths to development as 
overseen by sovereign self-directing actors has been seldom explored as is the role of 
‘culture’ in development. Also missing from the relevant literature seemingly is a discussion 
of the relationship, theoretical and practical, between what goes on locally and its universal 
signification. This research aims to fill a gap in the literature by analysing how the 
Commission for Africa conceptualises sub-Saharan Africa development compared with the 
Eritrean approach to national development, and by considering the implications thereof. So, 
in a step which could diverge from standard approaches to African underdevelopment, 
rather, the present inquiry seeks to consolidate materialist and symbolic analyses within a 
single framework. This carefully balanced approach is designed to help resolve the error of 
dealing with development in African contexts at either a political economy level or within the 
domain of abstract discourse, instead of inclusively.    
 
I will be supplementing my personal experience of contemporary African realities as derives 
by virtue of tracing my descent to the continent. I was born in Eritrea (formerly Ethiopia) and 
lived in Sudan for a number of years and, although I currently reside outside the continent, I 
have not severed my ties with Africa completely.  I intend to combine text-based knowledge 
with what you might call the personal dimension to enhance the findings of this research. 
Finally, besides enriching our knowledge-base by pluralising the available source material, 
the project’s general design is conceived in such a way as to underline the researcher’s 
personal and scholarly interests.  
 
This thesis addresses the following principal question: In light of Blair’s Africa 
Commission and the Eritrean case, how should we go about reconceptualising a 
realistic approach to future African development? Put another way, what must the 
essential development framework entail, theoretically and practically, to be viable 
over the long-run? This question paves the way to other corollary questions about the 
significance of the Commission and the Eritrean case: Does the Commission for Africa 
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provide a blueprint for real change or a continuation of the status quo? And what lessons 
can be drawn for sub-Saharan Africa from alternate development plans such as that 
articulated by the Eritrean Government? These questions can in turn be extended into a 
series of interrelated and mutually-reinforcing imperatives:     
 
 How coherent is the Commission’s formulation of African development in theory and 
practice? Or, what are the Commission’s implicit and explicit assumptions and 
methods leading to its recommendations? And what can a careful deliberation on the 
Commission for Africa Report’s manifest and subterranean features ultimately reveal 
about its status?  
 Is the Commission’s Report internally consistent regarding the rhetoric and reality?  
 In what ways does the Report’s perspective on ‘culture’ and the ramifications for 
African development bring to light its doctrinal-ideological underpinnings and, 
ultimately, its construction of a particular set of solutions? 
 Does its remit signal the foreclosure of alternate collective projects?    
 
Assuming that underdetermination is at the heart of social history;   
 
 How might the Eritrean case facilitate our understanding of ‘development’ in the 
context of sub-Saharan Africa?  
 On what grounds can it be argued that Eritrea’s consolidation of its national historical 
experience of struggle contradicts the Commission’s prescript for the region?  
 Are there any lessons that can be learned from the Eritrean focus on ‘national 
culture’ and self-determination?  
 What, if any, is the justification to think that this country’s choice could have 
implication for radical African development in the current conjuncture? and finally,  
 What legitimising claims can be made for the Eritrean domestic experiment in view of 
the wider struggle against neocolonialism in the global South (and neoliberal 
capitalism in the North itself)? 
 
The conceptual and analytical framework  
Concerning the question of research approach, the composite makeup of the thesis which 
draws together the Blair Commission and the Eritrean case calls for a distinctive 
methodological policy to accommodate that quality. Likewise, the relevant approach 
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anticipates renderings of development that can be borne out by this researcher’s personal 
experience of African realities on the ground.  
 
Following the Commission and the Eritrean Government’s disparate conceptions, it is helpful 
to analyse the two approaches to ‘African development’ from a comparative historical angle. 
I find it apt in this case to draw on aspects of the model of comparative analysis outlined by 
Kerry Walk. As Walk (1998) points out, there are two ways in which researchers can engage 
in comparative analysis; the “classic” approach and the “lens” or “keyhole” method. The 
classic approach, commonly used to compare and contrast two similar things, accords equal 
weight to each object. The lens option, specifically adapted for this study, instead compares 
and contrasts A (Eritrea) and B (Commission for Africa) by weighting “A less heavily than B” 
and in which case A becomes a lens for scrutinising B. So, apart from simply alerting us to 
the possibility of a different form of development, the Eritrean model hence is not intended to 
be the real object. Instead, the Commission and its development text remain the focal point. 
Again, what seems to contribute to the effectiveness of the approach as far as my own 
interest goes has to be the factoring of historical reality into the analysis. In the words of 
Walk (1998)14 herself, “often, lens comparisons take time into account: earlier texts, events, 
or historical figures may illuminate later ones, and vice versa”. Consequently, in subscribing 
to this analytical technique, my idea is to use the Eritrean development experiment (despite 
its imperfections) as a base-line from which to launch a critical review of the Commission. 
The overriding concern thus is to demystify and otherwise question the Commission’s truth 
claims by calling attention to the radical implications for development inherent in the Eritrean 
example. As Walk (1998)15 has explained the point in some detail and clarity:  
 
Just as looking through a pair of glasses changes the way you 
see an object, using A as a framework for understanding B 
changes the way you see B … Lens comparisons are useful for 
illuminating, critiquing, or challenging the stability of a thing that, 
before the analysis, seemed perfectly understood. 
 
And that essentially is the underlying assumption on my part about how it is that I intend to 
present the development texts obtaining from the Commission for Africa and the Eritrean 
Government.    
 
                                                          
14
 See Walk (1998) https://writingcenter.fas.harvard.edu/pages/how-write-comparative-analysis  
15
 Ibid  
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Meanwhile, in terms of practically applying this policy, the required analysis of ‘African 
development’ is intended to follow at two distinct but mutually-augmenting levels. On the one 
hand, a methodological stand which is explicitly social, historical and political in orientation 
appears necessary to understand the logic behind the Eritrean Government’s conception of 
development. In accordance with this choice, the Eritrean development ‘discourse’ should be 
read as the immediately intelligible spontaneous expression of its source point. Using such a 
standard system of reading, it is possible to convey the significance of the Eritrean 
development discourse from the literal language. And so, instead of unnecessarily perhaps 
trying to dig out any buried or ambiguous subtext that may not be there, the real task 
involves presenting the already known meaning of the Eritrean development discourse. Or, 
apparently, since what you read in the Eritrean development text is what you simply get, this 
unique strategy sounds especially effectual. It makes us see that ‘language’ in this instance 
represents the immediate actuality of the Eritrean nation’s consciousness which is itself a 
product of social conflict. I shall accordingly be closely adhering to such an approach in the 
parts of the thesis where the focus is on the Eritrean case. Some of the principles and 
techniques associated with this particular research method, considered invaluable for 
appreciating Eritrea’s development policy, contribute to the agenda of committed history 
writing. There is an obvious rationale to (partially) employing this mode of inquiry; it places 
the researcher in a good position to give voice to disempowered subject peoples and to 
address the question of social change—its potential agents and site. With reference to the 
development policies and practices of the Eritrean Government, that implies distrusting 
standard imperial history and representations of African development. It also necessitates 
that the researcher attempts to present Eritrea’s contrapuntal development approach whose 
aim presumably is to improve the social conditions of the mass of the people. Finally, 
besides its popular character, the approach remains just as influential in spurning vulgar 
historical revisionism, a pitfall I need to guard against for my own sake.  
 
On the other hand, the idea of including an additional tier to the methodology is to facilitate 
the analysis of the Commission’s initiative. Since the latter tends to be about peddling a 
hegemonic discourse of development (which is different from social development in its 
amorphous and materialist sense), it becomes imperative that the researcher tailors his/her 
tools of analysis in accordance. At the heart of this component of the thesis is the question of 
the influence of power on knowledge and the concomitant need to unpick any agenda 
attending to that interrelation using discursive methods. I have thus set myself the task of 
closely ‘reading’ the narrative of African development featured in the Commission’s Report 
with the view to unmasking the underlying ideology. This calls for refocussing the inquiry 
onto the blind spots in the Commission’s discourse—to uncover not only what may have 
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simply been excluded, but also what cannot, as a rule, be incorporated into its text. The 
techniques employed in certain post-foundational modes of critical inquiry, such as critical 
discourse analysis, are then considered especially relevant in this connection.  
 
As I explain, the reason for presenting in close association the Commission and the Eritrean 
case is the sense of polarity underlying the two approaches to African development. The 
Commission and the Eritrean story of development represent competing claims about not 
only the nature, but also the legitimacy of change. The entire study’s thrust hence is to 
render coherent the significance of this mutual irreconcilability with reference to the wider 
process of African development. Moreover, my main methodological means for analysing the 
dichotomous formulations of development characteristic of the topic draws on the 
assumption that: people can and do make something of themselves other than that which 
the historical process has turned them into if and when their consciousness is raised 
considering the role dominant ideology plays in obscuring their real conditions. In other 
words, I see the essence of African development as a tussle involving agency and structure 
which the Eritrean case and the Blair Commission are seemingly all about. And it is here that 
culture as well as language (as facilitator or staller of economic and political change) turns 
into a valuable analytical device in learning about this whole process.  
 
And finally, in terms of theoretical grid or map, I have found it appropriate to use social 
conflict theory. Given the dynamics of a global political economy characterised by unequal 
power relations favouring the Northern states and the multinationals they serve at the 
expense of the populations in the South (and in the North for that matter), the theory of 
social conflict has, I think, unique potential to further our senses of ‘African development’. It 
helps us recognise how the interest of dominant powers (for which arguably the Commission 
stands as vehicle) dictates that the status quo be upheld by all means possible against any 
counter-hegemonic effort coming from those outside the capitalist system, like Eritrea for 
example. In addition, the theory can be of benefit for discussing local struggles within the 
global context of the discourse of resistance. 
 
Thesis structure 
Chapter one presents a review of the literature on the Commission, both mainstream and 
radical, whilst pointing to some unaddressed concerns. The chapter also assesses some of 
the secondary material on Eritrea’s nation-building and development experiment and 
discusses its scope and limitations. Furthermore, the chapter considers the implications for 
sub-Saharan Africa development of failure to identify gaps in the respective literatures.  
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Chapter two explores the methodological question in depth. To meet the objectives of the 
project and to adequately address the research questions, the chapter integrates a historical 
materialist line of inquiry and discourse analysis. This hybrid design is used to analyse both 
Eritrea’s recent socio-political history and its relation to national development and the 
ideological underpinnings of the Commission and its development model.  
 
Chapter three looks into the Commission and the Eritrean case in further detail, providing 
background reading while setting the general context informing the Commission’s mandate 
and the Eritrean Government’s development outlook. The chapter proceeds to highlight the 
centrality of ‘culture’ to the Commission for Africa and the Eritrean Government’s ultimate 
agendas. The idea is to get an original sense of where both the Commission and the 
Eritrean Government are coming from in respect to ‘development’. I realise this by closely 
scrutinising the Commission’s theoretical statements on culture and by noting how the 
Commission consequently pitches its narratives of African development. Or, more precisely, 
considering the paramount requirement placed by the Commission for cultural understanding 
(to promote Africa’s development), the discussion in this chapter shows how this all-
encompassing idea of culture governs all other details. The core objective in chapter three is 
to specify whether the Commission succeeds in satisfying the precondition it has set itself.  
 
Chapter four, Eritrea: Historical Experience, Endogenous Development provides an overview 
of the country’s modern socio-political history, connecting the current drive to national 
development with the earlier experience of collective self-determination. The chapter aims to 
highlight the agency of the state in a sub-Saharan Africa development context. 
 
Chapter five, The Commission and the Neoliberal Construction of ‘African Development’, 
explores the assumptions and methods which underlie the Commission’s development 
policy and action. The chapter focuses on the implication of the Commission’s development 
blueprint for the sub-Saharan Africa region. Specifically, it inquires into whether the 
Commission for Africa signifies a new approach to African development and assesses what 
its potential might thus be.  
 
In chapter six, The Broad Design of a ‘Heterodox’ Development Theory, I continue with the 
analysis based on evaluations of the Commission’s and the Eritrean Government’s 
development policies and practices. This final chapter aims to outline a development theory 
and practice which could go with the realities of the continent in the contemporary period.  
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Chapter seven, the Conclusion, summarises the significance of what the research found out 
and completes the framing of the thesis. The chapter recapulates that ‘African development’ 
is a strongly contested prospect, that ideology explains how the continent’s development 
problem has been approached differently within the relevant accounts. The Conclusion also 
underlines that reflexivity, in contrast to a passive tendency, affords the African peoples 
greater insight into the continent’s development problem and any likely ways out.  
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1.  THE COMMISSION FOR AFRICA AND ERITREA’S 
SELF-DEVELOPMENT APPROACH: THE LITERATURE AND 
ITS SCOPE 
Prior to and following the launch of Our Common Interest in March 2005, Blair’s Africa 
initiative drew attention from a gamut of commentators interested in Africa’s future and the 
potential of the Commission to bring about meaningful and sustainable change. The 
Commission and its Report have generated contrasting responses, from those highly critical 
to those who largely endorse the Commission’s objectives.  
 
The detractors of the Commission for Africa appear motivated by irreconcilable differences 
with the Blair plan as a whole (Bush 2004; Cammack 2005; Hoogvelt 2006; Hurt 2007; Miller 
ed. 2005), whereas those who generally agree with its vision of development tend not to 
have any intrinsic objections (Booth 2005; Brown 2006; Clapham 2005; Franks 2005; 
Gallagher 2009; Geldof 2004; Jackson 2005; Maxwell 2005; Mistry 2005; Morrissey 2005; 
Plaut 2004; Porteous 2005; Sandbrook 2005; Taylor 2005; Ware 2006; Williams 2005; 
Woods 2005). Individual interpretations on each side diverge greatly with respect to their 
scope and the focus point of their analyses. Those who seem to subscribe to the 
development model engendered in the Blair initiative may be circumspect about its 
implementation out of what they perceive to be a lingering gap between specific policies and 
evidence relating to African (and occasionally Northern) realities. Theirs are, in the main, 
conformist internal arguments typified by a concern to help revamp the model in front of 
them. The radically interrogatory commentary, conversely, approaches (African) 
development from outside the structures and systemic tendencies of free market 
globalisation. Some of the critique in this last grouping goes as far as to equate Blair’s 
posture with expediency, describing the move as an imposition on the continent of a foreign 
agenda in the guise of British national and global capitalist interests (Bush 2004; Cammack 
2005). These commentators reject the Commission’s blueprint, however their focus does not 
lend itself to exploring in any depth the relation underlying dominant Africanist development 
discourse and alternate ways of being and knowing.     
 
The state of the existing literature points to a general lack of focus onto the conceptual and 
practical underpinnings of the Commission and its Report as the embodiment of a 
hegemonic discourse of development. Furthermore, the literature appears devoid of 
alternate and competing visions of development and a due exploration of the role of Africans 
in bringing about social, economic and political change on their own account. It turns out 
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much of the literature shares a certain reluctance to approach the history and politics of 
African development from an angle that can corroborate the African peoples’ cultural and 
historical experiences. As such, there appears to be a need to look at development not only 
discursively (as a social construct designed to embed oppressive power relations), but also 
concretely as an open-ended social process of transformation in the manner of Diamond 
(1998) and Rodney (2012) for example. The perceived shortfall in the literature of a serious 
consideration of social, political and especially cultural forces in development misses the 
African peoples’ agency.16  
 
This thesis seeks to redress this gap by providing a fresh perspective on African 
development that could enhance our understanding of the subject. The objective in this case 
is to reconfigure the question of power in development back into the hands of Africans as 
subjects of their own development, further elaborating and building on the work of selected 
postcolonial and subaltern scholars such as Ngũgĩ wa Thiongo (1993, 1986), Edward Said 
(1994) and Ranajit Guha (1983). ‘Culture’ as idea and praxis in achieving the goal of African 
social, political and economic transformation is an area warranting particular focus and the 
case study of Eritrea provides a basis for contributing to the development literature in this 
regard.  
 
1.1   Mainstream deliberations on the Commission for Africa 
Considering the exceptional ambition and scope of the Commission for Africa, it is 
unsurprising that a debate centred on the plan’s signification and viability has ensued among 
the Commission’s otherwise sympathetic interlocutors. Typically, these mainstream 
exchanges with the Commission focus on the evolution of Britain’s Africa policy under New 
Labour, whether or not African society is in a position to undergo the required change and 
the appropriateness of specific donor policies. 
 
The United Kingdom and Africa: Contextualising the Commission for Africa 
Julia Gallagher (2009), Tom Porteous (2005) and Zoe Ware’s (2005) responses to the 
Commission for Africa describe the origin and evolution of New Labour’s Africa policy, 
providing important context into the Commission for Africa as a product of British foreign 
policy. Together, their commentary details the background to Blair’s decision to sponsor an 
African development commission, elaborating both the domestic and the international setting 
that helped influence the policy shift. These commentators all assume that the New Labour 
                                                          
16
 Miller ed. (2005) can be considered as an exception to that trend. 
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policy represents a uniquely British approach to African development, as a project that is 
fundamentally ethical and righteous. For these commentators, it is other, wider influences 
stemming from attempts by the multilateral financial institutions, the UN and OECD to 
overhaul existing policies, that are cited as the external impetus for the shift in policy (see 
Porteous 2005:282). In looking at solutions, they focus on the extent of the practical 
applicability of the Commission’s plan of development, whilst overlooking the African nations’ 
own capacity for self-development.  
 
While providing important context, Porteous and Ware’s characterisation of the British 
government’s motivation tends to be conveyed in personalising terms, focusing on the role of 
Tony Blair himself and some of the then-key members of his cabinet. The individual thoughts 
and actions of British politicians—of Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and (the late) Robin Cook—
are given precedence. These public servants are spoken of in approbatory fashion for their 
leadership in elevating the needs of Africa. The changeover to an ‘ethical’ foreign policy 
under the Foreign Ministership of Robin Cook, for example, is evoked as a watershed 
moment. We also learn how Blair’s charisma and his gradual conversion to view politics from 
a moral angle meshes in with Cook’s seminal measures in the evolution of the British 
Government’s Africa policy. Porteous and Ware’s assumptions about the importance of 
donor country leaders fails to acknowledge the systemic forces at play. Or, in other words, 
they appear to be neglectful of how the logic of capitalist accumulation can potentially 
undercut any good intention on the individual level.  
 
Gallagher, on the other hand, appears more discerning in explaining this same context while 
acknowledging some of the elements of hegemonic discourse, identifying the British 
establishment’s paternalistic representations of Africa as a “hapless” or “wretched” region. 
Gallagher intimates that the entire Africa Commission is based on a system of “idealisation” 
of Africa and of the role that the British government can and should have in the continent’s 
affairs (Gallagher 2009:438). Gallagher’s thesis helps alert the reader to a defining attribute 
of official British interest in Africa: that the concern with Africa finds ground less in lived 
African reality as on a mythologised version of it. Gallagher argues that Africa’s idealisation 
is maintained through negative perceptions of the continent whose roots go back to colonial 
attitudes and through constructing myths of African people as morally superior (that is, 
Africans as habitually optimistic even in the face of adversity). Gallagher’s mapping of the 
mode by which Africa is idealised and its reciprocal impact on British policy and action 
provides a useful perspective on some of the motivations underlying the Commission for 
Africa. 
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While Gallagher touches on the very important theme of official British policy discourse vis-a-
vis sub-Saharan Africa, she seems to do so within a narrower frame of reference that 
excludes African experiences and perspectives on development and on the negative role of 
the British government in Africa. The commentary lacks reflexivity since, in the eyes of many 
Africans, not only is Britain a former colonial power that has sown division and strife in many 
parts of the continent, it is also the country perceived as seeking a neocolonial agenda in 
Africa in the contemporary period.17  
 
Conversely, Porteous and Ware convey the African crisis of underdevelopment as 
predominantly a moral conundrum, with the solutions put forward delegating responsibility 
for African development almost exclusively to external players. The contradictions they 
outline, and which the UK Africa policy must somehow surmount, stem from this elementary 
persuasion. For example: 
 
For one reason or another ... a large number of African states 
are problematic for Western policy-makers because they are 
either unable or unwilling to implement the political and 
economic reforms that donors [prescribe them]. The challenge is 
how to get ... them to the development starting line ... One option 
is to ignore problem states ... Another is to contain them ... A 
third is engagement ...  
                                                                       (Porteous 2005:290) 
 
Whether making reference to issues of weak or failed states, the extent of Britain’s influence 
in Africa, or the tension between ideal and reality, both Porteous and Ware share the same 
analytical terrain that decidedly ignores a political-structural account, not to mention history, 
of African development or underdevelopment. The question of power in development 
illustrated in post-development literature (for example, Escobar 1995) is overlooked entirely 
in Porteous and Ware’s analyses. By bounding their explanatory scope within the terms of 
reference set in the Commission’s development strategy, ultimately their mission becomes 
synonymous with working out the technicalities of implementing a set agenda without 
reflecting on the nature of the agenda itself. 
                                                          
17 As one commentator, Yao Graham, has said about the Chairperson of the Commission for Africa: 
Just as he did for Iraq, in February 2004 Blair cobbled together a ‘coalition of the willing’ when he 
invited a small group of ‘reliable Africans’ well-schooled in IMF/ World Bank economics to give ‘African 
ownership’ of his Africa Commission. Be warned. When Western leaders talk about developing 
country ‘ownership’ of economic development, they don’t mean democratic control. Instead Western 
governments, IFIs and multinationals first determine African policies and then exhort Africa’s peoples 
to make them their own (Graham, in Miller ed. 2005:11).    
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The Commission, the North, Africa: Development and its complex features  
As, according to the Commission, African development is said to follow from donor-recipient 
cooperation, the areas in which reciprocal input is required—of trade, aid, debt, and political 
administration—sustains much of the debate. Here, reform of the global political economy 
and enhanced governance are thought to be the responsibilities that Northern donors and 
African states must each grapple with in order to kick start the “big push”. Donor policy 
towards Africa, including the British government’s policy of increased aid flows, has come 
under scrutiny for a variety of reasons. Whereas some of the commentary affirms the need 
to transfer resources to spur African development (Williams 2005; Woods 2005), others 
criticise the gesture as vain and as a mischaracterisation of the problem (Mistry 2005; Taylor 
2005).  
 
Generally, advocates of external aid to Africa contend additional resources are necessary for 
promoting development across the continent. It is argued that the African crisis is so 
entrenched that only a massive increase of foreign aid could reverse it (cf. Moss 2011:138). 
Williams (2005) and Woods’ (2005) tacit recognition of the need to scale up aid for Africa 
seems to be made on the basis of such reasoning. While granting the role of foreign aid in 
impacting development positively, Williams and Woods express quandary as to whether and 
how donors could deliver the proposed aid increases to Africa, citing potentially clashing 
donor priorities. Williams’ references to aid are rendered as part of a protracted treatment of 
the meaning of the Commission for Africa to British policy, which contrasts to Woods’ 
singular focus on the issue of aid.  
 
Williams’ analysis focuses on the necessity of dealing with “central problems” brought forth 
by the Commission’s Report but not adequately addressed (Williams 2005:530). According 
to Williams, the Commission’s ambiguities tend to undercut the UK’s Africa policy and have 
the potential to be counter-productive. Williams traces the source of the problem to the 
cumulative impact of various factors, including: the distinct membership make-up of the 
Commission and its Secretariat; security versus development imperatives, and; the political 
economy and governance settings. His discussion draws links between the recruitment of 
the individual Commissioners and Secretariat members and the adoption of a market-led 
development blueprint. Similarly, Williams argues that security-related concerns pose their 
own set of difficulties for African development and poverty alleviation policy. Williams argues 
that British arms exports to the continent, priorities associated with the so-called “war on 
terror” and Africa’s general lack of resources for conflict prevention and peacekeeping, are 
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key issues that can’t be ignored. Regarding aid allocation and its links to governance, 
Williams highlights the tenuous principles on which the Commission’s plan is premised, such 
as the “relative balance between emergency and development aid, who should receive aid, 
for what purpose, and with what strings, if any, attached” (Williams 2005:535). Seen from 
this perspective, the challenge for the Commission lies in how to formulate the most effective 
plan of action that would simultaneously address governance issues and fulfil the humanistic 
desire to mitigate (eradicate?) poverty. Williams does not, however, appear to question 
whether a neoliberal development agenda is the right answer for Africa’s development 
challenges. At no point does the narrative envisage alternative models or bring African 
perspectives into the debate.  
 
According to Williams (2005:535), the real predicament for the British government and, 
presumably other donor states, is that “giving aid to states that do not meet its preferred 
standards of ‘good governance’ will line the pockets of corrupt bureaucrats, [but] not giving 
aid to these ‘bad’ states will leave the poor within them without a lifeline”. Again, the 
Commission’s position comes under fire for failing to articulate what constitutes “good 
governance”. Williams’ contribution does, however, shed light on how the Commission 
determines which states follow principles of “good governance” and which don’t, revealing 
underlying geostrategic interests. What is not explored is how appraisals of governance 
ultimately involve narrow ideological assumptions. Williams implies that tackling poverty and 
pursuing liberal economic and political formations may not be mutually inclusive despite the 
Commission’s stated intention to have it both ways. Williams concludes that given the 
unequal priorities placed on the issue of governance and poverty alleviation, the UK 
government could restrict an effective continent-wide plan of action. In all of this, Williams 
does not venture alternatives to foreign-led intervention.  
 
While Williams provides a useful discussion of the dilemmas and choices made in regards to 
foreign aid, Woods (2005) carries further the discussion, highlighting the susceptibility of 
foreign aid flows to changing international politics. Specifically, Woods’ analysis centres on 
the way the new post-9/11 global security agenda has impacted the prospect of foreign aid, 
enumerating the challenges to the quantity and quality of foreign aid posed by the “war on 
terror” and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Woods argues that the net outcome of 
recent shifts in the international political context is the displacement of the “goal of aid” from 
tackling poverty through development to security-related ends, diminished aid budgets due 
to the increasing costs of wars, and inefficiency in the delivery of aid as donor states become 
prone to following a security-informed unilateralist approach (Woods 2005:393). In this 
regard, Woods makes a significant contribution to revealing the undercurrents and politics of 
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aid. In the case of UK aid policy, for example, Woods highlights the strain on the overseas 
development budget due to the new security agenda. This does not seem to bode well for 
some of the African states which rely on Official Development Assistance (ODA) to achieve 
development goals. More specifically, given the securitisation of development aid, the 
prospect for African development as heralded by the Commission for Africa may not be that 
easy to execute.  
 
Woods does not, however, explore in depth the interrelationship between foreign aid and 
development. That is, is external aid indispensable to the achievement of development 
goals? According to Keet, for example, foreign aid is rarely, if ever, entirely disinterested:  
 
It is always utilised tactically by the donors, however indirectly, 
and it is inherently more advantageous to the aid provider. Even 
where it is—hypothetically—given with the best of intentions, aid 
reflects and reinforces the objective power relations, the hard 
realities—and political psychology—of dependence in the 
recipients. Aid can only be justified if it is conceived and shaped 
as a short term transitional measure to overcome specific 
hurdles or reach specific targets; and if it is explicitly designed to 
change the nature of the relationships and end the very need for 
aid.  
                                                                                   (Keet in Miller ed. 2005:6) 
 
While Williams and Woods problematise foreign aid, they do not reject its potential outright. 
Mistry (2005) and Taylor (2005), on the other hand, are critical of the significance of foreign 
aid. Mistry interprets the broader history of post-independence Africa as an odyssey in which 
failure to achieve development is the predominant feature. He argues that the transfer of 
significant amounts of foreign aid to the continent over decades has not and will not help 
break the cycle of underdevelopment. Mistry raises some pointed and necessary questions 
of the Commission for Africa, G8 and donors more broadly about the instrumentality of aid in 
stimulating African development. He asks whether “false hopes [are] being raised again 
about the development of sub-Saharan Africa being revived with more aid” and whether 
“more aid [will] help or hinder Africa?” (Mistry 2005:665). Indeed, Mistry apportions a 
measure of blame to foreign aid for Africa’s development problems. Beyond handing out aid, 
Mistry argues that donors must look into other issues to understand the causes of the 
current African development impasse.  
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Mistry’s invitation to entertain alternative reasons for Africa’s continuing crises provides an 
opportunity to revisit the debate about the essence of African development and the way 
forward, including the place of aid in that. However, the characterisation and remedy which 
Mistry puts forward seems to raise more questions than it answers. In ostensibly identifying 
the African development crisis as being constituted by a crisis in “human, social and 
institutional capital”, and then recommending Africa imports from abroad the very resources 
it lacks, Mistry provides an inadequate alternative. His approach does not help explain but 
rather explains away the question of African development—by swapping the symptoms of 
underdevelopment (human, social and institutional capital deficit) for its causes. Mistry’s 
distinctively tautological style ultimately hobbles and indeed defeats his purposes.   
 
Mistry provides a parallel rationalisation to bolster his main argument for objecting to the 
policy of increased foreign aid, arguing that it is a misconception that Africa lacks financial 
resources and that the continent has already received ample levels of aid. His focus on 
human resources leads him to propose African states enact what are effectively skilled 
migration programs to acquire the necessary human and social capital, similar to the 
migration programs in Australia, Brazil, Canada, Europe and the US. Mistry does not, 
however, acknowledge the obvious differences between economically poor African states 
and these more developed countries, including: power imbalances in favour of migrants and 
the fact that none of the countries which Mistry mentions had ‘commissions for development’ 
authorised by outsiders as part of their development experience. Besides failing to see that 
sub-Saharan Africa’s foreign debt servicing outstrips what the region gets in aid from the 
outside world, the real shortcoming in Mistry’s argument is the propensity to wrest away from 
the continent the quest for autonomous development.  
 
In the same vein as Mistry, Africa specialist Ian Taylor critiques the UK Africa policy and the 
Commission for the overemphasis on aid as key to African development (Taylor 2005). 
Taylor faults the donor assumption that “a lack of aid has somehow produced or at least 
exacerbated Africa’s situation” (2005:300). According to Taylor, it is a misperception that 
Africa is financially poor and that, in making additional aid the centrepiece of African 
development strategies, donor policy ends up “looking at the issue the wrong way around” 
(2005:301). Like Mistry, Taylor underlines the point that Africa has already received 
substantial amounts of foreign aid without showing tangible signs of development.18 He 
further shares Mistry’s unease that, rather than promoting development, foreign aid might in 
fact be responsible for holding back Africa’s progress. It is hard to differ with Taylor’s last 
                                                          
18 Taylor observes that the amount of resources (financial and otherwise) which has gone to Africa is 
equivalent to six Marshal Plans (2005:303).  
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point although that is far from saying that we should also accept his reasoning. My own 
criticism of foreign aid to Africa stems from a concern which is at a polar opposite to Taylor’s: 
more than it liberates, aid as it is currently administered tends to be about the perpetuation 
of dependency among the recipient African states. I therefore find myself agreeing instead 
more with Moyo’s (2009) point about the role of foreign aid as far as African development is 
concerned.   
 
What lies behind the African crisis of development, Taylor asserts, is the considerable 
misgovernance of the region at the hands of its public officials. He squarely lays blame for 
Africa’s underdevelopment on the “misallocation of funds and the lack of prioritisation—as 
well as deep-rooted corruption and wastage” (Taylor 2005:301). Taylor makes the standard 
claim that, without “enhanced governance”, it is futile to resort to greater inflows of aid. The 
policy of injecting more foreign aid is perceived as a risky enterprise in view of its potentially 
harmful political fallout. Commentators of Taylor’s stripe remonstrate that aid has the 
negative consequence of shoring up Africa’s neopatrimonial system of governance. Taylor 
recommends that donor aim should be to cultivate a political environment conducive to 
development, and this demands addressing entrenched African political cultures of nepotism 
and cronyism. The tendency of donors to omit or downplay the impact on development 
stemming from the nature and form of the African state is what renders aid-based solutions 
to Africa’s lack of development untenable. However, Taylor’s analysis falls short of exploring 
or understanding the historical and indigenous evolution of political leadership and 
governance and its interplay with development, again deferring to external players as the 
source of change. He similarly doesn’t try to find out why donors may be willing to overlook 
bad governance and corruption in some cases and that if this could have something to do 
with self-interest. 
 
It is here that other commentators, in particular Booth 2005, take up Taylor’s argument about 
aid and governance. The purport of Booth’s review is to gauge the extent to which the 
Commission fuses together the “best current thinking” on impediments and solutions to 
Africa’s development crisis. Like many of the critics, Booth delivers a mixed judgement on 
the Commission for Africa. After celebrating the inclusion of UK Department for International 
Development and ex-World Bank technocrats as a positive step in ensuring the 
Commission’s development credentials, Booth turns his attention to the “biggest blind spot” 
in the Report which he argues originates from failure to anticipate the detrimental impact of 
Africa’s politics on development (Booth 2005:494). Whether the focus is on weak states, 
capacity building or aid quality, Booth’s conclusion is that the system of African politics is 
what fetters the development of sub-Saharan Africa. While Booth also problematises aid and 
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is critical of the Commission for not engaging with current understandings of how African 
governance hinders development, he does not venture into broader issues that draw 
together historical legacies, power relations and the potential of the African peoples 
themselves. 
 
The ‘Big Push’ and African development 
The Commission for Africa can be seen as part of a broader push for rapid change across 
the African continent, described by some as the “big push” or “great transformation” 
(Sandbrook 2005; Brown 2006; Easterly 2009; Maxwell 2005). By taking over where the 
aforementioned critiques leave off, for example, Sandbrook’s analysis knits together the 
dynamics of culture and politics in presaging Africa’s great transformation. Like Williams, 
Sandbrook focuses on ambiguities and shortcomings in the Report with regard to the way 
culture informs politics. Sandbrook ventures a detailed account of the wider repercussions of 
Africa’s socio-political realities on economic transformation. He sees the politico-economic 
setting in contemporary Africa as constituting a hybrid system, a precarious state of affairs in 
which a market-informed rationality coincides with well-established norms and practices of 
reciprocity and redistribution. Even though the Report ostensibly dedicates a whole chapter 
to African culture, Sandbrook suggests that there exists a significant mismatch between 
what the Commission sets out to achieve and the constraining African reality. Particularly, 
Sandbrook argues that where sectional interests are embedded in such hybrid systems, 
social conflict in the context of transformative change becomes inevitable.  
 
There is, however, shortfall in Sandbrook’s analysis. First, Sandbrook makes no effort to 
explicitly state what he understands as the meaning of “culture”, despite the centrality of the 
concept to his objectives. Sandbrook assumes of culture as inert, reflecting a structural 
functionalist mode of coming to terms with social reality. Sandbrook’s account overlooks, for 
example, the essence of culture as understood from within the field of postcolonial and 
cultural studies. Contemporary approaches to the study of culture place emphasis on the 
dynamic and contested nature of the concept; of cultural meaning as fundamentally unstable 
and liable to “subversion”. Second, the adoption of a conventional perspective re culture 
does not inform the reader of political struggles that exist within Africa whose aims are to 
overcome barriers to progress stemming from retrograde tradition and custom. As Iyob 
(1997:648) has observed of some of the social changes taking place in Eritrea, for example: 
“Social, economic and political policies are now being formulated with an eye to their impact 
on the fragile unity of the diverse sectors of Eritrean society. For example, affirmative 
policies intended to transform traditional ethnic and gender relations are accompanied by 
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laws and decrees introducing a separation between state and religion”. This highlights the 
potential of African agency to bring about social, cultural and political change. And this 
seems to run counter to the dominant neopatrimonialist literature (read hegemonic Africanist 
discourse) on the nature and form of the African state.  
 
Sandbrook aligns with many other commentators in arguing that a “great transformation”, 
while perhaps necessary, is unlikely to materialise within the current African and 
international context (Brown 2006, Easterly 2009, Maxwell 2005). Brown (2006:349), for 
example, describes the Commission’s initiative as a modern-day “liberal internationalist” 
economic and political roadmap for the continent. He looks at the current Western donor 
attention on Africa from a useful comparative historical perspective, placing the 
Commission’s mandate against the antecedent of the nineteenth-century colonial project in 
Africa. Brown questions whether Western donors today have heeded any of the lessons 
from previous colonial encounters with the continent. For Brown, the most significant factor 
in African underdevelopment is the legacy of colonisation’s state formation. Brown 
perceptively notes that “it was perhaps the shift in imperial approach, as the question of 
whether and how to acquire territory turned into how to govern those territories once 
acquired, which left the longest legacy” (Brown 2005:363). That is, rather than establishing 
centralised legal-rational states, colonial political administration created quasi states along 
the line of customary beliefs and practices. It is this choice, Brown argues, that would 
subsequently spawn the neopatrimonial political orders believed to be currently stymying 
development across the continent. Brown however doesn’t link all this to the internal 
contradictions and crises of the capitalist system as it depends on constant expansion to last 
out. 
  
The lack of attention to past mistakes by the Commission also underlies Easterly’s (2009) 
inquiry. Easterly distinguishes between “transformational” and “marginal” approaches to 
development. He defines the transformational model as “West comprehensively saves 
Africa” whereas the marginal strategy stands for “West takes one small step at a time to help 
individual Africans” (Easterly 2009:373). Reminiscent of Brown, Easterly indicates that there 
is a long history underlying the Commission’s vision of African development by means of a 
“big push”. Here, Easterly recounts that, as early as the 1940s and 1950s, the idea of a big 
push has been championed by economists and development theorists (e.g. Walt Rostow, 
Paul Rosenstein-Rodan) who believed that a combination of dedicated political leadership 
and foreign expertise is what it takes to effect change (Easterly 2009:375). This basic 
concept has survived in one form or another through the decades that saw the advent of 
‘structural adjustment programs’ (1980s) and ‘shock therapy’ (1990s) to the new Millennium.  
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In his assessment of the Commission as a transformational approach to African 
development, Easterly notes two general trends in such approaches: escalation (that is, 
doing more of the same) and cycle of ideas (that is, the tendency to recycle and adapt old 
ideas rather than innovate). Easterly contends that the marginal approach to development 
holds a better promise for target countries. 
 
Like Easterly, Maxwell (2005) favours the adoption of the “marginal” route to African 
development and is critical of the Commission’s idea of launching a big push, questioning 
why the Commission does not prioritise or present a sequence of development goals. 
Maxwell, more importantly, problematises the use of “Africa” as a monolithic concept to refer 
to the myriad of sub-Saharan countries. It is contended such a broad term suppresses the 
heterogeneity that characterises the continent south of the Sahara. Indeed, it is hard to 
argue against his critique of the Commission’s formulation of wholesale recommendations 
that do not make due or meaningful distinctions within the region.19 For example, Maxwell 
(2005:486-487) argues for the need to disaggregate the “big push” at the level of 
implementation on account of geographical as well as sectoral differences.  Maxwell insists 
that it would be ill-advised to push to the same scale in every African country, but rather to 
set priorities according to needs and circumstances. Similarly, he warns that it is not 
appropriate to push equally across all sectors of a nation’s economy. Rather, Maxwell 
contends that it is selective and targeted development that will ultimately bring about the 
most effective change. Maxwell doesn’t pause to think and otherwise suspect if there can 
possibly be a political link (drive for domination) to engaging in such an act of 
overgeneralisation as the Commission for Africa does. He can only see the technical side of 
the problem. 
 
That is more or less the gist of what I have tended to call the mainstream literature 
concerned with the Commission for Africa. In the end, what this literature makes clear is that 
sub-Saharan Africa is in need of overhaul of its economy and politics, and this may or may 
not imply a quest for a great transformation. The challenge that the African states face, and 
an area of debate, is the nature of the change sought as well as the means of achieving it. 
Further, any serious effort to achieve real change must, presumably, anticipate alternate 
measures beyond foreign aid and outsider tutelage and involve the peoples of Africa 
themselves. 
 
                                                          
19 This is not to suggest that there are no social, cultural, economic, political and historical 
commonalities across the sub-Saharan Africa region. 
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In their own ways, the mainstream reviews of Blair’s Africa initiative highlighted above raise 
important issues and concerns about the Commission and its Report. However, on balance, 
the commentary does not provide an adequate investigation of the cultural, ideological and 
political assumptions behind the Commission’s profession to the understanding and practice 
of ‘African development’. Their primary business seemed to be the justification of the status 
quo as unsurpassable, or the capitalist economic and political order as eternal. The various 
problematisation of foreign aid, for example, do not offer alternative solutions beyond and 
outside what is arguably in the interest of the dominant powers. That is, outlining the 
contradictions besetting the Commission for Africa and the significance of the ensuing 
conundrum for UK Africa policy as Williams and others have done is one thing, exploring 
how Africans themselves can proactively bring about change is quite another. Likewise, the 
controversy surrounding the instrumentality of external aid could have been thought through 
using a broader frame of reference. The relevant input could have benefitted from analysis 
that locates the African development crisis in underlying structural and political causes—
colonial history and current neocolonial policies like unfair trade rules and practices, debt 
overburden as well as the culpability of Africa’s elites (for example, Arrighi 2002 and 2005; 
Hardt and Negri 2000; Leys 1994; Mamdani 1996; George 1992; Saul 2006). By highlighting 
perceived paradoxes in the Commission’s development vision, the contributions thus further 
the debate on the Blair Africa project’s chances of success at the level of practical 
implementation and from a strictly mainstream development viewpoint. Concerning the 
question of how the problem of African development may otherwise be understood, the 
search for alternatives must be directed elsewhere. 
 
1.2 Counter-hegemonic discourses and the Commission for Africa 
The visibly unconventional critiques of donor initiatives such as the Commission for Africa 
highlight the continuation of what is argued to be an ‘imperialist’ agenda.20 By tapping into 
the range of theoretical currents which obtain from the Marxist intellectual tradition, these 
commentators have interpreted such initiatives as forms of hegemony. Counter-hegemonic 
discourses about the Commission emanating from the likes of Bush (2004), Hoogvelt (2006), 
Cammack (2005) and Miller ed. (2005) give a flavour of the literature in this category and 
present useful analyses for exploring the possibility of alternative approaches to African 
development.  
                                                          
20
 The review here doesn’t enter into a discussion about how effective usages of ‘imperialism’ as 
explanatory category (of the dynamics of global capitalism in the 21
st
 century) can be. I do take notice 
however that there is a growing debate on the need to supplant imperialism in its Leninist (obsolete?) 
guise with the notion of neo-imperialism as a more contemporary, perhaps apt, reference. For the 
purposes of this study, I don’t draw any serious distinctions between imperialism and neo-imperialism; 
instead, I use the concept of ‘imperialism’ quite loosely and as a generic word.    
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Dependency 
Bush’s (2004) critique of the Commission for Africa declares Blair’s project “irrelevant” for 
what he sees as its untenable faith that Africa’s salvation will follow in the footsteps of a 
globalising capitalism. Bush argues that it is “unclear just how yet another commission on 
Africa… will advance strategies to ameliorate worsening [North-South] disparities in income 
and wealth” (Bush 2004:14). He instead opines that the (then) Blair Government could have 
perhaps used its time better “in dusting off the findings of the Brandt Commission [1980] and 
even the Pearson Commission [1969]...” (Bush 2004:14-15). Contrary to the Commission’s 
supposition that there are benefits to be gained from aligning to the global economy, Bush 
argues that doctrinal globalisation is in itself what stands in the way of real African 
development. Using a framework that blends dependency theory and aspects of 
Wallerstein’s world system theory, Bush foregrounds the dialectical way in which North-
South relations are structured and operate. As such, Bush’s argument emphasises the kind 
of linkages that can be made in centre-periphery dynamics; that any transformation in the 
centre reverberates in the periphery in an inverse way.21 This, Bush laments, is most 
apparent in the globalisation process that the Commission for Africa sees as “panacea” for 
the continent’s underdevelopment (see also the likes of Chossudovsky 1997 and Frank 
1993). In the words of Bush: “… the problem is not that the continent is insufficiently 
integrated with globalisation, it is that it has been integrated in a particular way that has left 
underdeveloped its resources of people and raw material” (Bush 2004:18). In particular, 
Bush decries the Commission as a proponent of neoliberal globalisation despite mounting 
evidence that, over the last four decades, the South has fared badly under this economic 
and political model. For Blair and his Commissioners to miss this glaring reality, Bush 
argues, it can only mean one of two things: that they are either confused or else they are 
deceptive (Bush 2004:19). Instead of opting for policies that may only mitigate the symptoms 
of Africa’s underdevelopment, Bush argues that the Commission should have considered 
putting together strategies that could have helped address the underlying (structural) causes 
of the African crisis. According to Bush, the right policies for Africa are those “that will attack 
the profits of Western interests, corporations and individuals that benefit from African misery” 
(Bush 2004:19).  
 
                                                          
21 Here Bush’s analysis shares common ground with that of the underdevelopment theorists, for 
example Samir Amin, Henrique Cardoso, Enzo Faletto, Celso Furtado, Andre Frank and Walter 
Rodney. 
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To his credit, Bush does not lay blame only on the overseers of globalisation in the North, 
but also acknowledges the role of local elites—the African comprador class—in contributing 
to the continent’s underdevelopment. Bush undoubtedly scores a vital point here, for it is true 
there are elites in the continent who are willing to throw their weight behind the call for 
globalisation often at the expense of subordinating their nations’ interests. He chronicles the 
gradual undermining of Africa’s political leadership under the forces of globalisation, 
culminating in their adoption of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) 
project, which some commentators have talked about as a capitulation of sovereign 
decision-making by African states and their leaders (cf. Bond 2005). Bush insists the search 
for solutions to Africa’s economic, political and social stagnation should involve a profound 
reorganisation of the matrix of global capitalism. Nonetheless, in what appears a step at 
odds with Dependency’s call for revolutionary supersession of capitalism by delinking, Bush 
proposes that the North embark on reformation of the international trade system, and that 
this should include abandoning subsidies and protectionist policies and practices by the 
Northern states which place African economies at a distinct disadvantage. “Only when the 
reality dawns on Blair that the character of capitalism in the twenty-first century is the 
problem rather than the solution to Africa’s crisis,” Bush argues, “will a glimmer of hope 
emerge as to what strategy for the continent’s growth and development might look like” 
(Bush 2004:14). As such, Eritrea presents a useful case study for exploring Bush’s thesis 
and the challenges that face any state that pushes against the dominant forces of global 
capitalism and Western interference (see chapter four in this study). 
 
Structuralism  
Like Bush, Ankie Hoogvelt (2006) considers the Commission for Africa as an illustration of 
the evolving interrelationship between core and periphery in the age of globalising 
capitalism. More specifically, Hoogvelt is interested in “the coherent conjunction between 
certain material forces of globalisation and the emergence of a new moral mandate and 
institutional form for intervention in the third world” (Hoogvelt 2006:159). According to 
Hoogvelt, projects such as the Commission for Africa are “post-modern imperialist” 
undertakings. 
  
On a theoretical plane, Hoogvelt’s starting point is to make sense of the interplay between 
structure and agency in analysing historical change. It is a broader conceptual frame of 
reference which helps inform her account of transformations in the nature of imperialism and 
global capitalism. By leaning more toward the structure end of the dichotomy, Hoogvelt 
further reinforces her analysis by adapting Robert Cox’s notion of “historical structures” as a 
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composite of (capitalist) international class alliances, national governments that primarily 
serve this class’s interests and the dominant ideas and practices that are harnessed for 
building consensus within civil society. Hoogvelt’s adoption of the neo-Gramscian model, in 
which the previous Gramscian category of “historic blocks” is superseded by “historic 
structures”, is important here. Whereas in Gramscianism proper hegemony is understood to 
apply at the level of the nation-state, the move toward a neo-Gramscian perspective serves 
to highlight the supranational dimension of hegemony in the current phase of capitalist 
globalisation. Blair as Prime Minister and Chair of the Commission for Africa is not 
representative solely of British political and business interests; he is equally a spokesperson 
or agent for the transnational capitalist class and the many national governments and the 
multilateral institutions that act on behalf of this class. He also comes across as an 
ideological warrior for them. As to the rest of the Commissioners, including the Africans, their 
enabling roles within a dominant historic structure also accords with the role of the petite 
bourgeoisie, a small segment of the social populations in the global South, whose interest 
forces it to behave in that way—as a transmission line in the words of Frantz Fanon. 
 
As occasionally global capitalist expansion runs into crises intrinsic to this system— 
“structural bottle-necks” as Hoogvelt would say—it is important for the system’s continuation 
that obstacles be overcome. Human agency, Hoogvelt asserts, proves ineffectual if not 
peripheral in such transformative processes. For Hoogvelt, depending on the particular 
epoch and on the extent and intensity of the crisis, the means resorted to are likely to vary in 
form and nature. In the case of “post-modern imperialist” interventions, agents of the 
reigning historic structure may see it fit to deploy resources including military, political and 
civil-ideological means (both hard and soft power) in alternation or concurrently. Putting 
aside the question of morality and Africa advocates’ genuine commitment and struggles, 
what Hoogvelt sees in the Commission for Africa ultimately is a kind of strategic manoeuvre 
whose real purpose is to propagate neoliberalism through a process of co-optation as 
opposed to direct coercion.  
 
Open Marxism  
Like Bush and Hoogvelt, the Commission for Africa as vehicle for furthering a hegemonic 
world order is taken up in Cammack’s (2005) assessment. According to Cammack, the 
Commission for Africa, G8 development programs, the UN Millennium Project and other 
similar initiatives, aspire to spread “a series of supranational initiatives aimed at endowing 
transitional states … with the capacity to pursue and legitimise capitalist development” 
(2005:331). The way that these initiatives promote capitalist development is through the 
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revitalisation of state agency, by consolidating the power and influence of states that are 
compliant to guarantee the unencumbered expansion of global capitalist interests. In 
contrast to Bush (2005) and possibly Hoogvelt (2006), Cammack does not see the 
hegemonic imperative of globalisation being confined to the global South only. Cammack 
notes that the same imperative lies behind the crafting of Northern domestic policies as well. 
As far as the Commission for Africa is concerned, Cammack believes the initiative is also 
equally representative of New Labour’s designs for the “modernisation” of Britain. In that 
respect, Cammack’s position can to some degree be likened to that of the World System 
theorists, for example, Immanuel Wallerstein. 
 
Cammack clearly demonstrates how the Commission, rather than being an innovative step 
or offering new potential, represents prevailing development orthodoxy. For example, the 
choice of Nicolas Stern, former European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) and World Bank Chief, as the Commission’s director of research is in itself 
revealing. Again, Cammack draws a similar lesson as he ponders the background context to 
the Commission, where he juxtaposes the Commission’s agenda to reforms already 
underway on the international stage. Such broader transformations cover developments at 
the global institutional level, evolution of new institutions in Africa, reform of the global 
political economy, elevation of the governance agenda, and so on. All of this is geared, 
according to Cammack, toward further upgrading and embedding neoliberalism across 
Africa. 
 
Cammack’s critique (of the Commission’s Neo-institutionalist approach) draws heavily from 
Open Marxist theory in accounting for recent Northern development initiatives. As Tsolakis 
(2010:387) explains, Open Marxism aims to explain “the relationship between global capital, 
the international system and the state.” In line with this, Cammack thus argues that 
“capitalism has reached a point… where the idea of the ‘completion of the market’ provides 
an appropriate focus of analysis” (Cammack 2005:345). The universalisation of the market, 
or the diffusion of the social relations of capitalist production, implies an interventionist state; 
a state whose agency is sought to the extent that it imposes the dominant relations of 
production (cf. Harvey 2005). How initiatives such as the Commission for Africa unfold is 
explained by capitalism’s core imperatives which transcend national or regional boundaries 
and interests. A regulatory framework on a global scale—or what Cammack refers to as 
meta-governance—is necessary to reproduce the neoliberal global order. The benefits of 
employing an Open Marxist approach enables Cammack to make sense of the similarity of 
hegemonic development policies and programs wherever they are applied—in eastern 
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Europe, Russia and Latin America in the 1990s, Britain under New Labour, or sub-Saharan 
Africa in the new Millennium.  
 
Radical African Political Economy 
Finally, The Alternatives Commission for Africa Report (Miller ed. 2005) provides a useful 
compendium of alternative scholar-activist critiques of African development initiatives that 
aim to promote neoliberalism. The central question for the authors of this report is whether 
the Commission’s blueprint indeed signals a rupture with the established Northern norm of 
looking at (African) development. In response to this question, many of the authors redirect 
our focus to the nature of the development policy underlying the Commission for Africa 
Report at the same time as calling for a review of the North’s actions and rhetoric. Miller ed. 
(2005) invites perspectives from those on the ground in the different parts of Africa, from 
Cape (Dot Keet) to Cairo (Samir Amin), that together refute the Commission’s self-ascribed 
status of presenting a new way forward. This alternatives report effectively highlights how 
the Commission for Africa and G8 initiatives not only prioritise the interests of corporations 
over that of the peoples of Africa, but also prove problematic when it comes to bridging the 
gap between donor words and actions. The critique of the Commission’s neoliberal policy 
agenda, furthermore, follows at the macro-level concerning the characterisation of the 
African development crisis and the likely solutions to it, as well as more concretely at a level 
involving substantive issues such as aid, debt and trade. 
 
Dot Keet’s contribution to The Alternatives Commission for Africa, for example, counters the 
Blair Commission’s understanding that the nature of the African development problem is 
linked predominantly to factors internal to Africa (Keet in Miller ed. 2005). Keet instead 
locates the root causes of Africa’s economic and social decline in the region’s lopsided 
external relations, which is akin to what Bush (2004) also thinks. In Keet’s supposition, what 
the Blair Commission has managed to uncover by way of “reasons” for the continent’s lack 
of progress are the outward manifestations of the problem. As she writes: “the strategies of 
the Africa Commission … are in the main focused on the symptoms rather than the 
underlying systemic sources or causes of the problems” (cited in Miller ed. 2005:5). A real 
way forward for African development, Keet argues, entails promulgating a set of measures 
that can undo Africa’s systemic disadvantage including: effective trade roles and rights in 
lieu to market access; autonomous policy rights instead of technical assistance; financial aid 
as human obligation, not as political lever; debt repeal as opposed to debt relief; poverty 
eradication in place of poverty amelioration; genuine democratic arrangements as bedrock of 
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good governance; fair and just participation in another world system (Keet in Miller ed. 
2005:5-9).  
 
Keet’s stance is echoed by a number of other contributors to the Alternatives Commission 
for Africa. In Neoliberalism wants to have the last laugh, Charles Abugre highlights the 
external origins of the crisis, insisting that African underdevelopment reflects an ideological 
state of affairs; a refusal to admit the foundering of neoliberalism and that the tendency to 
define and act on the issue of African poverty in moral terms becomes a spurious exercise 
(Abugre in Miller ed. 2005:27). Like Keet, Abugre outlines a number of possible steps 
forward involving transformations in relation to resources, debt and trade. Abugre proposes 
Africa steps up, as well as keeps within the continent, the revenues it generates while the 
issues of (oppressive) debt and barriers to trade are simultaneously dealt with. For both Keet 
and Abugre, the clamour around Africa as a moral cause is simply beside the point.  
 
Concern about donor countries’ actions as opposed to rhetoric is another significant theme 
that emerges from the Alternatives Commission for Africa. Critics who lament the developed 
world’s failure to match its words with action cite the many false hopes that Africa as a 
region has experienced in the wake of numerous past development initiatives. The 
convening of the Pearson Commission (1969), Brandt Commission (1980), followed by a 
series of G7/G8 Plans and lastly the Blair Commission (2005) are highlighted as defining a 
pattern in the North’s relations with Africa—culminating in no discernible gains for the 
continent.  The viewpoint advanced in this case is that these initiatives are bereft of the kind 
of political will which could radically overcome structural/ systemic impediments. The 
indictment of the Northern states’ complicity in the continuation of African misery is 
particularly emphasised in the discussion on the question of debt and its effects. Indeed, a 
considerable portion of the Miller ed. report is dedicated to highlighting the impact of debt on 
the economies of Africa (see Dembele, Amin and Jubilee South in Miller ed. 2005).  
 
The counter-hegemonic perspectives captured by Bush (2004), Hoogvelt (2006), Cammack 
(2005) and evident in Miller ed. (2005), all provide a useful theoretical, practical and even 
political basis for not only critiquing the Commission for Africa, but also for signalling the kind 
of alternatives that are needed and possible. As Hoogvelt writes, “rival structures can be 
developed and this leaves open the possibility that history may develop in a variety of ways” 
and “it is the task of the critical social scientist to uncover ‘plausible alternative futures’.” 
(2005:161). 
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1.3 The case of Eritrea: voices from the margins 
In exploring alternatives to the hegemonic development discourse and its underlying agenda 
represented by the Commission for Africa, a starting point is to reaffirm Africa’s 
heterogeneity and to validate her intrinsic capacity to define and enact development 
accordingly. The many and varied critiques of mainstream development initiatives, including 
the Commission for Africa, have so far skipped the potential of the African peoples and fully 
explore, as Hoogvelt would ask, plausible alternative futures. This is presumably where 
Eritrea and her development experiment ought to fit into the picture. 
 
‘Culture’ and the Eritrean story 
While much has been written about Eritrea’s political history (for example, Connell 2011; 
2001; Gebremedhin 2002; Habte Selassie 2010; Iyob 1995; 1997; Makki 1996; Mengisteab 
and Yohannes 2005; Pool 2001; Reid 2005; Venosa 2014), there appears to be a dearth of 
academic research that focuses on the country’s collective self-determination and nation-
building journey as a process underwritten by a strategic conception and application of 
‘culture’. How Eritrea’s distinct national experience, the mobilisation then and now of an 
entire society through culture, informs her ideas and actions about nationhood and 
development needs to be fully explored. That is, a major gap in development literature is on 
the strategic dimensions of culture that underpin social struggle and change. The paucity of 
literature on Eritrea with the kind of focus on culture could also be because Eritrea’s history 
as a nation-state is still so recent. However, a rudimentary look at the public discourse of the 
Eritrean Government with regard to its national development strategy raises interesting 
questions about alternatives to the development agenda coming from the North, and 
refocuses on issues of sovereignty, national culture, historicity, resistance and self-reliance. 
 
Of particular interest is the way in which national culture is woven into counter-hegemonic 
development discourse. There is useful literature which begins with the pioneering work of 
the likes of Frantz Fanon and Amilcar Cabral, and that continues in contemporary forms in 
certain postcolonial and subaltern literature, that helps to illuminate resistance to domination 
through culture understood in the broadest sense. The significance of what Fanon and 
Cabral wrote more than five decades ago—in the context of colonial Africa—regarding the 
deployment of culture as a vital tool of struggle by subaltern and oppressed groups to 
achieve common political objectives, appears pertinent to understanding contemporary 
scenarios, including Eritrea. Fanon, for example, characterises culture as a “special battle-
field” where the goal of African economic, political and social emancipation can be fought. 
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For his part, Cabral analogises culture to a flower when underlining the centrality of culture in 
the social and political fields. Like a flower that bears the seeds that ensure a plant species’ 
propagation, so too culture warrants the viability of a people’s sense of identity and being. 
The implications of Cabral and Fanon’s works for Eritrean self-determination and nation-
building are worth elaborating further and in light of the contemporary context which is not 
defined by formal or classical colonialism but by less direct yet equally oppressive power 
relations.  
 
1.4 Conclusion 
This chapter reviewed some of the literature on both the Commission for Africa and the 
Eritrean story of political self-determination and economic development. The review comes 
in the context of the search for alternative African development to the current dominant form. 
 
In the case of the Commission for Africa, the review covered two types of sources, 
presented as mainstream and radical respectively. Despite minor difference, the review 
confirmed the first series of responses to be largely in line with the Commission’s 
development agenda. Meanwhile, the review of the second collection of commentary 
showed that this literature featured perspectives that considerably diverged from the 
Commission’s. Compared with the first group’s quite accommodative approach, the second 
set of sources was found to be more effective in generating better insight into African 
development. At the same time, the review uncovered some weaknesses in the two bodies 
of literatures, even though this tended to vary in terms of its nature.   
 
In an additional move, the review also deliberately dwelled on the literature on Eritrea and 
showed its scope as well as limitations. I noted that there remains a gap in the Eritrean 
development literature in that, overall, there is no significant reference to history, collective 
agency and culture. In my review, I also pointed to the need to address this perceivable gap 
to complete the picture of Eritrean post-independence development and to draw implications 
for African development. I therefore called to source information about the Eritrean 
development experiment that has hitherto been unconsidered. It was rationalised that the 
inclusion of such supplementary data will make it possible to go beyond what the 
Commission for Africa and its many discussants have already said. 
 
The next chapter, the methodology, will feature both the conceptual and practical tools that 
are necessary to address the topic, including the research questions. This chapter is 
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designed to envision potentially an alternative development theory and practice based on 
the literature review.  
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2.  METHODOLOGY AND METHODS 
Social scientists have sometimes drawn the conclusion … that all knowledge is 
founded on assumptions which are arbitrary from a rational point of view, and that 
ultimately it is a matter of taste or politics which paradigm one adopts.   
-  Martyn Hammersley  
 
Scholarly inquiry is sustained by key philosophical assumptions about what authoritative 
research is supposed to embody. The very pursuit also involves the identification of which 
research methods may be compatible with the generation of knowledge in a specified 
project. This chapter presents the conceptual framework as well as the practical facets of the 
research. It fleshes out the research questions and outlines the methods of inquiry in 
accordance with the nature and objectives of the project. In this respect, it is essential to 
contextualise the research within ontological and epistemological field, for presuppositions 
about the nature of social reality and of knowledge bear significantly on how the topic is 
treated and on the status of the research overall. The justification for sourcing research 
material, namely the election of a qualitative historically- and politically-informed approach 
will be addressed.  
 
2.1 Reality, Social Inquiry, Africa  
When dealing with the vexed subject of sub-Saharan Africa and the region’s development 
future, whether research culminates in adequate understanding of the continent’s 
development problem or not, may depend, in the end, on the feasibility of the researcher’s 
methodological stand.22 In the practical reality of African development, this whole exercise is 
likely to come down to exploring ways which could ensure the experiences and aspirations 
of the majority not only are simply acknowledged but also acted upon. So how is one to 
designate a sociology of knowledge such as would clear the ground to pursuing alternative 
pedagogies? Also, in terms of general outline as well as specifics, what ought the relevant 
alternative paradigm of inquiry to feature? Prior to addressing in detail the issue of what type 
of research method to implement and why, I will attempt first to specify the nature of social 
reality and evidence of knowledge which closely resonates with my plans in this project.  
                                                          
22 It is the case that Eurocentric universalising renderings of ‘Africa’ and of the concept of 
‘development’ itself tend to be problematic. This kind of outsider (ideological) formulation commonly 
masks vested material and political interests. The dominant Africanist perspective on the region’s 
apparent social decline turns out to be of questionable scholarly merit and practical promise. As such, 
it is the subject of this thesis’s critique, not its source of inspiration. 
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The holistic setup of society 
In attempting to come to terms with the significance of lasting African development, I set off 
by accepting that the concept of society differs essentially from its component parts 
considered in disaggregation. That is to say, I agree with the viewpoint that we cannot 
possibly comprehend society and its dynamics by concentrating discretely on its constituent 
elements. More specifically, I tend to think that development doesn’t obtain from how 
society’s basic elements—people and aspects of social organisation (economy, politics, 
culture and ideology)—are independently structured and operate within the ‘totality’. I find it 
particularly instructive to envisage society and, by extension, the development phenomenon, 
holistically along the line of Marx’s philosophical thought on society. I am accordingly 
suspicious of assumptions about society that contravene the precept of holism in regard to 
economic life and social development. In more substantive terms, my broader perception of 
the nature of society markedly differs from the assertions of methodological individualism; I 
don’t seek to draw the nature of social reality from the atomistic configuration of society. 
Furthermore, given this general orientation, the version of economic behaviour and activity 
associated with methodological individualism should not count as norm, or as universally 
valid. At the same time, it may seem equally fallacious to exaggerate the place and role of 
the individual at the expense of an integrated model in which the economy, politics, culture 
and ideology work to influence social consciousness in particular ways. Ultimately, a 
paradigm which assimilates rudiments of Marx’s postulate as stated above culminates in a 
specific form of development knowledge and practice—one at odds with free-market 
economics whose origins lie in methodological individualism. Methodological individualism, 
by its very nature, and the theory of societal holism are mutually-exclusive. Social research 
can therefore only be based on one or the other paradigm, but not on both at the same time. 
Following Hammersley’s (1995:13) notation, you can, if you will, read the present study’s 
‘tastes’ for an integrated model of society as the expression of the author’s personal politics 
regarding how social research ought to be conducted. In any case, I am of the opinion that 
politics tends to be unavoidable in the field of social inquiry. Below is a brief synopsis of how 
I have come to agree with the viewpoint that a conception of reality diametrically opposed to 
methodological individualism can hold greater potential in fostering our understanding of 
sub-Saharan Africa development.  
 
The idea of society being constituted of the behaviour and actions of autonomous, ‘rational’ 
individual human beings, such as suggested by methodological individualism, sounds a 
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problematic hypothesis.23 Equally, a critique could be made of the view that development 
can be analysed by distinctly considering the levels of society, the economic base and 
superstructures.  
 
The whims and behaviour of human beings as individual stakeholders seems to diverge in 
obvious ways from the ‘norms’ of what we think of as social ‘reality’. In other words, a 
worldview premised on conceptions of reality wherein the apparent concern and aspiration of 
individuals receives supreme importance possibly comes across as preposterous. A more 
typical characterisation of social reality could be that reality hardly ever matches the 
cumulative sum total of how each person as a solitary being thinks and acts, so the 
modelling of development on such assumption tends to be untenable. This then not only 
calls into question the founding principle of market economics, but also the entire Liberal 
ideology—to which incidentally the Commission for Africa appears exclusively indebted. The 
ramifications for African development don’t end there.  
 
As I have pointed out already, the metaphysical-idealist conception of human beings as 
essentialised, pre-social creatures is likely to lead to prioritising the ostensive ambition of 
individuals. Methodological individualism assumes that the essence of (personal and social) 
development is the quest for self-gratification on an individual scale, irrespective of how 
others and the ecosystem may fare. Not surprisingly, the denial in this case of any social 
aspect to economic activity, and the implication this can have for African development, has 
background in the worldview of such proponents of neoliberalism as Margaret Thatcher24 
who was to set the tone for subsequent UK (Tory and Labour) governments. However, there 
are some enduring lessons that need to be drawn from methodological individualism: firstly, 
because and in spite of its origins, a development perspective which follows on from 
methodological individualism can but only be one means of looking into the world. There 
appears to be then nothing preordained about the approach to reality associated with 
methodological individualism; this distinct attitude proves specific to the historical and 
cultural experience of those who propagate it, and; secondly, it is imperative to perhaps 
remember that an outlook about the development process that arrogates both human 
eccentricity and a complete disunity among the ‘levels’ of society becomes expressive of 
                                                          
23
 In other words, the self-seeking Homo economicus suggested by the likes of Adam Smith, David 
Ricardo and disciples is an oddity of a human being.  
24 The former British Prime Minister, the late Margaret Thatcher, who was a leading political figure 
among those who lent unreserved support to neoliberalism, was on record in saying that she didn’t 
believe in something called society. It is also the case that much of the critical development literature 
actually blames the neoliberal agenda for much of the tribulations of the South.     
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residual ideology. Such a position seems to be grounded less in empirical-realistic reflection 
and more in abstract-reductive analysis.  
 
As an alternative, a position opposed to neoliberalism and methodological individualism 
implies a reality in which the social group’s and more generally humanity’s interest takes 
precedence over that of the individual. It is in reverse to the modus operandi of private 
ownership, consumption and exchange that marks other rival systems of cognition. What is 
more, an approach to national development focussed on practices of central planning, as in 
the Eritrean case for example, can be seen as a validation of the integrated character of 
society and its mechanisms.  
 
The parable of the Blind men and an Elephant can be quite didactic in conceptualising 
society’s holism. In this story, a group of blind men come across an elephant. They are 
asked to describe what is in front of them. Each feels a different part of the animal’s body 
and gives his answers accordingly. The man who feels the tusk, for example, describes the 
‘elephant’ as like ‘an arching-tapering stick’. As the legend suggests, it is impossible to 
provide a full description of a unity on the basis of only partial exploration. Singularly, the 
body parts (leg, tail, tusk, trunk…etc.) identified by the proverbial blind men don’t give a clue 
as to the existence of an intact living creature that is an elephant.  
 
This style of reasoning applies to conceptualising society and development. Individuals as 
the basic units of society cannot in isolation possibly make a coherently organised and 
performing social entity within which development may eventuate. Instead, as Amin (1998) 
notes, the essence of a social totality seemingly lies in the subsumption into an integrative 
collective formation of varying group-based identities; their respective loyalties or 
disloyalties, including any ensuing mutual and reciprocal dynamics. Thus, social reality can 
perhaps more accurately be imagined if we take into account how, for example, social class, 
national, gender-based and other collectively-expressed identities align and interact within 
the web defined by political, economic, cultural and ideological thought and practice. These 
arrangements, in turn, bear little or no resemblance to the kind of solipsistic way of being 
that may only characterise the experience of hermits, the Robinson Crusoe types as Samir 
Amin would have it. Hence, in terms of make-up and dynamics, society appears designed in 
such a way as to mimic the properties of a complex living organism, the human being for 
example.25 As an analogy, and again echoing Amin (1998), the countless biological cells in 
the human body may not be responsible for maintaining the body as an organic whole. Were 
                                                          
25 In philosophical terms, this is commonly referred to as Organicism. 
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cellular activity not to be appreciated in conjunction with the vital roles performed by the 
various organs and internal bodily systems, then there could be no point in talking of a 
holistic entity, a human being, in the first place (see Amin 1998 for more details). So much 
so for the purport of social development, and if I have resorted to allegory, anecdote and 
analogy to drive home my message, it is because this kind of language strikes me as 
succinct metaphor for the concept of social reality.  
 
Normally then, society, as much as the human body itself, appears subject to the organising 
principle and holistic operating mode of an organism. This is the sort of broad understanding 
(of reality) that I bear in mind when reviewing the Commission and when considering the 
Eritrean development experiment. But before ending this opening section, it is important to 
pursue the implications of such presupposition a step further into a theoretical framework—
to promote viable African development, the core theme. 
  
Solidarity, conflict, logic of the development phenomenon 
Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o (1993:78) makes the vital observation that societies become genuinely 
free and develop “when they control all the tools, all the instruments, all the means of their 
physical, economic, political, cultural and psychological survival.” He uses the shorthand 
“means and context” to describe the climate within which a society’s “integrated survival and 
development” takes place.26 He further notes that this freedom is contingent on the balance 
of the internal and external forces bearing on the society at any particular moment in its 
history. Left on its own, human society ordinarily works out (through consensus or 
contradiction) the problems internal to it and accordingly sets itself on a ‘development’ 
course. But as so often happens, the contact with the external environment will also have a 
major determining impact on the prospect of internal change and development. Depending 
on the specific scenario, the influence exerted by the external environment can either be 
constructive or else obstructive, as I expound shortly. Particularly, in situations characterised 
by unequal power relations (where mutual benefit is perhaps impossible to anticipate as in 
the existing North-South global setup), the stronger party will always have the edge over the 
weaker. The powerful player’s relative position of strength further means it can dictate the 
terms of mutual interaction unilaterally and in such a way as serves its interest.  
 
With regard to the topic of this study, Ngũgĩ draws attention to the integrated and dialectical 
way of how such an unequal state of affairs comes to pass. By couching his analysis of post-
                                                          
26 I understand the reference to ‘means and context’ to be about ensuring simultaneously capacity for 
technical innovativeness and sovereign ways of political administration.   
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colonial Africa within the umbrella framework of conflict theory, he urges us to distinguish 
between mainly two clashing influences on the continent—an imperialist system and a 
liberationist heritage. This conclusion seems to describe reasonably well the nature of the 
prevailing relationship between the rich industrialised states and the countries of sub-
Saharan Africa. It is a dynamic which could have far-reaching repercussions for the 
‘partnership’ that the Commission is keen to promote with the region, of which Eritrea is a 
part.  
 
To remain relevant, thus, studies of development in the African context should be consistent 
with the broader tenets of conflict theory and the techniques of dialectical inquiry. Besides, 
while economic gain and political control seems to be the main imperative behind the 
Commission’s Africa venture, evidently it is in the cultural-ideological sphere that this 
(neocolonial) contest for domination and freedom turns out to be most intensely fought. And 
it is in this respect then that culture’s potential as a strategic resource in the struggle for and 
against external domination assumes central significance. There is a distinctive insight 
conveyed through one of Ngũgĩ’s remarks about culture which I consider crucial when it 
comes to the dialectic of external control and African self-determination. The likening of 
culture’s role to a society’s “self-image” as it “sorts itself out in the economic and political 
fields” could bear special relevance to any analysis of the Commission and Eritrea’s 
development strategies (Ngũgĩ 1993: xv-xvi). More acutely, I am interested in exploring the 
hypothesis put forward by Ngũgĩ that “If culture is the product of the totality and continuity of 
our economic and political struggles, it is also a contributor, a reflection, and a measure of 
the success of those struggles” (Ngũgĩ 1993:56-57). My reading of this statement suggests 
that ‘culture’ can be a site for undertaking critical analysis of social, political and economic 
transformation, or development. The likely merit in Ngũgĩ’s observation is that he seems 
here to supply an intelligent revision of the base-superstructure conundrum that is neither 
economic determinist nor dismissive of culture as mere epiphenomenon. I hence intend to 
systematically expand on its potential signification with reference to the discourse of 
development and the reality. I am interested to learn how, as an effective tool, culture plays 
a distinct role in the representations of ‘development’ by both the Commission and the 
Eritrean Government. In particular, I want to understand the significance of culture in my own 
project rather closely: culture as the product of the kind of economic and political struggles 
pitting Africa against the dominant powers, and; culture as an active force in mapping the 
state of this ongoing struggle. Only when we frame the Commission and the Eritrean 
Government’s respective positions in the light of this general frame of understanding do we 
begin to appreciate what may underlie the development agenda of each.   
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The study traces where the Commission’s conceptual sympathies lie in relation to the 
“means and context” of sub-Saharan Africa’s integrated survival and development. This is 
necessary for rendering an overall assessment of the Commission’s potential to bring about 
development. A distinguishing aspect is that the Commission appears unopen to employing 
the above (Ngũgĩan) pedagogic principle when explaining the challenges to African 
development. On the contrary, the Commission’s notion of “means and context” simply 
reflects and helps sustain its own pro-market discourse. Presumably, the Commission for 
Africa has elected not to mull the integrated/ dialectical nature of African development even 
as polarising inequality remains an essential part of neoliberal globalisation. Instead, the 
Commission has tended to cultivate a decontextualised approach to African development. 
To carry through with what may be described as a self-mandated hegemonic venture, its 
strategy has evidently been to close out alternative modes of interpretation. The Commission 
appears oblivious to how culture, social struggle and economic objectives can be closely 
intertwined. Moreover, its apparent tendency has been to censor and even deny such 
understanding among the subjects of development. In the end, given the Commission’s 
conscious or unconscious circumventions, it is necessary to advance another (more 
effective) form of development thought and practice. This may compensate for the 
Commission’s supposed practices of editorialising through omission and commission, if not 
active obscurantism.  
 
As discussed earlier, African development could be considered for heuristic purposes as a 
macrocosmic instantiation of the way the human body develops and changes through time. 
Typically, development in Africa (and in any context) is supposed to integrate a series of 
mutually-underpinning and interdependent features that extend to economic, political and 
cultural adaptation and continuity. From this perspective, we can possibly imagine the 
African development process and the Eritrean experiment in particular as rounded and as 
responsive to a logic of reciprocal action and reaction. As Ngũgĩ (1993: xiv-xv) argues: 
 
     [F]or a full comprehension of the dynamics, dimensions and 
workings of a society … the cultural aspects cannot be seen in 
total isolation from the economic and political ones. The quantity 
and quality of wealth in a community, the manner of its 
organisation from production to the sharing out, affect, and are 
affected by the way in which power is organised and is 
distributed. These in turn affect and are affected by the values of 
that society as embodied and expressed in the culture of that 
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society. The wealth, power and self-image of a community are 
inseparable.
27
                           
 
But beyond simply pointing to the interconnectedness characteristic of the development 
process, what I attempt is to probe the state of play re the internal and external determinants 
of African development. I take culture, the “self-image” of society, which develops in 
accordance with its history, to be the barometer that would mediate this process. I will be 
applying this principle to the analysis of the Eritrean development experiment (which can be 
seen as an exercise in self-determination) against the backdrop of the Commission’s plans 
for the continent (which can be seen as extending neoliberal globalisation).  
 
First of all, there seems to be the imperative to be, that is, for humans to be able to 
guarantee their being at the local and macro levels. This entails avoiding adversity by 
safeguarding one’s physical integrity in the face of threat emanating from natural and social 
sources. But the absence of discernible natural threat, while significant in its own right, may 
not be enough for continued human survival and development. Hence, parallel with the 
challenge to remain physically safe, humans need to feed and to cloth themselves in 
addition to securing shelter from the elements. Through the millennia, the African peoples 
have achieved this by undertaking productive work, that is, through economic activity that 
sees them harnessing nature’s bounty using technology.  
 
The capacity to exercise a measure of regulatory influence with the view to resolving any 
internal discord comes as another central pillar in the nexus signifying successful adaptation 
and social development. In other words, internal order heralding a harmonised state of 
existence tends to be a prerequisite for development to take place. It goes without saying 
perhaps that when an entity, a sub-Saharan African state, effectively manages its internal 
affairs, a healthy state of being naturally accrues. Inversely, any disequilibrium involving the 
internal forces at work is likely to undercut the prospect of normal development in the 
continent. Besides, the whole notion of being should have meaning and purpose to avoid a 
state of anomie. And pivotal in this connection turns out to be the type of ‘culture’ an African 
                                                          
27
 In a 2018 article entitled The Significance of Karl Marx, Chris Wright sounds to be making a similar 
point when he wrote: One has only to reflect that access to resources—money, capital, technology—
is of unique importance to life, being key to survival, to a high quality of life, to political power, to social 
and cultural influence …The owner of the means of production, i.e., the capitalist, has control over 
more resources than the person who owns only his labor-power, which means he is better able to 
influence the political process (for example by bribing politicians) and to propagate ideas and values 
that legitimate his dominant position and justify the subordination of others. See 
https://www.counterpunch.org/2018/05/25/the-significance-of-karl-marx/ for more details. 
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society forms in the course of its history which unravels as the product of ongoing interaction 
with the natural and social worlds.  
 
Nevertheless, survival and continued maturation ought not to be understood purely in terms 
of contemporary African society working out its internal contradictions as it was the case in 
the earliest period. As has been suggested already, there seems be a flip side to the story: 
supposedly, the entire process rests on the type of contact it is likely to undergo with the 
external environment.  
 
The development of the region’s societies, like that of the human body, thus looks predicated 
on a delicate synchronisation of internal factors and external ones. In each case, the impact 
of the external environment tends to be experienced normally or as a burdensome and 
coercive encounter. This could be of utmost importance when thinking especifically about 
the meaning of the Commission for Africa and the Eritrean case. When an entity appears 
capable of coping with the impact of the external environment and probably even manages 
to profit from it, then the contact can be described as positive and conducive to its 
development. Solidarity and cooperation based on ethics of internationalism may be a good 
example of that. In contrast, if the effect is of a disruptive nature, the contact with the 
external environment can be deemed detrimental to the development process.28 Again, I 
can’t emphasise enough the import of this observation in relation to the present study. At this 
point, I happen to also be conscious of the need to talk, if somewhat metaphorically, more 
concretely about what I have so far been trying to outline.  
 
I take it for granted that exposure of the body to extreme weather for example results in a 
person experiencing heat stroke or hypothermia. Not to get sick in this way, it is in turn 
advised to keep away from drastic weather conditions. In similar vein, it is possible to see 
that economic, political and cultural subjugation of a society by another emasculates the 
prospect of that society’s development. Speaking of Eritrea in this case, prevailing narratives 
of Eritrea’s socio-political history seem to paint a predominantly negative picture with regard 
to the country’s experience of relations with the outside world. A sense of maltreatment, 
betrayal and victimhood at the hands of external actors tends to be the abiding Eritrean 
                                                          
28 Rodney’s (2012:224) quite perceptive comment perhaps sums this point up very well: The 
decisiveness of the short period of colonialism and its negative consequences for Africa spring mainly 
from the fact that Africa lost power. Power is the ultimate determinant in human society, being basic to 
the relations within any group and between groups. It implies the ability to defend one’s interests and 
if necessary to impose one’s will by any means available. In relations between peoples, the question 
of power determines manoeuvrability in bargaining, the extent to which a people survive as a physical 
and cultural entity. When one society finds itself forced to relinquish power entirely to another society, 
that in itself is a form of underdevelopment.  
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political and cultural sentiment. Britain and the US in particular are believed to be 
responsible for Eritrea’s postwar political odyssey and continuing troubles. The same 
narrative, especially in its more contemporary manifestation, also communicates Eritrean 
self-belief, will and poise as the other condition. So, it seems sensible to view Eritrea’s post-
independence development as a corrective agenda involving specific measures to deal with 
its (imbalanced) past. That is what any Eritrea researcher possibly needs to bear in mind as 
he or she tries to come to terms with the country’s current development experiment. But just 
to re-emphasise, given the organic character of society, the principle of dialectical interaction 
seems to pervade all the levels comprising the social whole. However, what I am most keen 
to focus on, considering my specific goal, is the dynamics of culture in development, or 
nation-building as the Eritreans prefer to call it. This is what I intend to elaborate on in later 
stages of the study. But in case there exists some unease (in spite of the stipulation about 
society’s integrated setup) about the recourse to ‘culture’ as a key theoretical category, I 
have to address any probable concern through the following short addendum. 
 
In the first place, I wish to clarify that I am in no way equivocating about the essentially 
material and cultural underpinnings of African political self-determination and development. 
Yet, I concede the problem of specifying exactly what research strategy to employ—
materialist or ‘culturalist’—may loom large in a work such as this. There seems to be a real 
danger here of fostering a slanted picture of the state of development in the continent when 
not carefully weighing up the stakes in either expressing or supressing one or the other 
research approach. I have thus been obliged to ponder a series of interesting but at the 
same time very contentious propositions. I sought to establish whether it would have been 
more profitable to pursue the argument at a political-economy level. Simultaneously, I 
needed to also check if greater advantage could accrue from adopting a strategy centred on 
discourse/ symbolic analysis. Having mulled the pros and cons associated with both 
approaches, I have in the end decided on a hybrid research plan, one that joins together 
materialist and culturalist or discursive mode of analysis. I envisage this methodological 
approach to be particularly useful in the case of the present project. 
 
My major misgiving extends to how epistemological assumption foreshadows social and 
political practice and how that conforms to moral and ethical judgement and standards of 
truth. In attempting to find a way out of this methodological conundrum, I came to realise (as 
I indicate in the Introduction) that, as well as being guided by critical groundings in the 
established terms of debate on African development, incidentally I may have further 
resources in the guise of my autobiographical background. How those two facets, the 
abstract (or academic) and the personal conjuncture, may facilitate a commensurate theory 
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of knowledge and action from the point of view of the subjects of development is what I 
intend to elaborate in more detail in the upcoming sections. At this stage though, I should 
affirm the need to transcend the unreflexive discourse characteristic of mainstream 
development policymaking—where historical amnesia, the scanting of power-relations and 
general intellectual averseness passes for the meaning of social analysis. Equally, and in 
wishing to find space for my own project within the radically critical literature, I see wisdom in 
systematically examining the discourse-development nexus. I also think it prudent on the 
other hand to explore indigenous (subaltern) experience if only to underscore the power of 
such knowledge and its link to development practice in the material and therefore universal 
sense.  
 
2.2 The Commission, Eritrea, development: an imperative for a composite 
methodological policy 
I stressed the importance of guaranteeing the robustness of the approach I shall be 
employing. I intend to fulfil this objective through a narrative strategy spacious and flexible 
enough to thoughtfully combine a miscellany of analytical categories and devises. This 
comes as useful to critique the neoliberal agenda in Africa and also to signal potential 
solutions against the backdrop of the Eritrean model. I have accordingly sought to take 
advantage of a syncretic, even an eclectic, research approach.  
 
This thesis examines the Commission for Africa and Eritrea’s national development 
experiment by locating the origin, signification and propagation of African development within 
the (triple) junction of historical, political and cultural-ideological analyses. As a study in the 
history and politics of development, the thesis adopts a two-pronged qualitative 
methodological approach. It looks at development concurrently as a ‘social construct’ and as 
a ‘transhistorical’ phenomenon synonymous with the human condition. Given the 
complementarity typifying the current research approach, it is hoped a more or less 
satisfactory account of African development may be possible.  
 
Realism, constructionism, development 
The analytic philosopher and social constructionism theoretician, Ian Hacking, acknowledges 
that a category can be socially constructed and real all at once, or that also we can be social 
constructionists about some things and realists about others. In contemplating whether ‘child 
abuse’ is socially constructed or real, Hacking (1999:29) underlines that the phenomenon is 
real but that it also was subsequently constructed as a concept. He recapitulates “neither 
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reality nor construction should be in question”. Hacking’s observation appears fraught with 
theoretical, political and methodological undertones when extrapolated to the study of sub-
Saharan Africa and its future development, and deserves be taken up further. I explore the 
ramifications with reference to the Commission for Africa, Eritrea and the phenomenon of 
‘development’.   
 
Following up on the reality-construction juxtaposition suggested by Hacking, I make the dual 
observation that (a) there are two discrete categories of ‘Africa’ at the same time as (b) I 
believe generally what we conceive of as ‘development’ owes entirely to two asymmetrical 
classes of logic. On the one hand, there exists a real-concrete Africa and, on the other, there 
turns out to be a fabricated instance of the very same Africa. The former represents a rather 
definite geographical and social space which we appreciate in terms of the actual historical 
and contemporary experience of the social populations of the African continent. By contrast, 
our sense of the ‘second Africa’ derives from what idealising hegemonic discourse about the 
place seems to paint for us. In addition, the material, existentially describable Africa tends to 
be about ‘emic’ development aimed at overcoming natural and social challenges by usually 
mobilising internal resources. Its abstract-formal equivalent, meanwhile, largely symbolises a 
predetermined externally-originating political plan. It is possible to speak of an Eritrea, a 
north-eastern African state with a population of some five million inhabitants, and of Eritrea’s 
sovereign development orientation, in realistic terms for example. In the same way, we could 
think of the Commission’s policy of stock categorisation of the forty-plus African states as 
‘sub-Saharan Africa’ and as ‘developing countries’ as expedient ideological representation.29 
 
And as for ‘development’ too, our formal knowledge of the phenomenon appears 
circumscribed within a binary field of conceptual thought and practice. In one respect, the 
meaning of development has come to find echo in a socially constructed narrower 
understanding of the subject, typically at the hand of a very tiny but powerful global elite. In 
another, the essence of development could be posed quite broadly and fluidly so that under 
the rubric we may account for a wide range of real life social and economic practices. Simply 
as well as disinterestedly stated, the aim behind this last kind of development can be 
described as the transformation of unfavourable human conditions into better human ones, 
less any ulterior motive as the case could be.  
                                                          
29 It is really important to disqualify as problematic the use of ‘Africa’ as a monolithic referent to the 
myriad of the sub-Saharan countries. It is believed such generic term glosses over and suppresses 
the immense heterogeneity that characterises the continent south of the Sahara. The Report appears 
to acknowledge this fact in passing and seemingly somewhat speciously. As such, the Africa 
Commission appears unfazed in formulating wholesale recommendations that could potentially 
entrench capitalism in the African continent without due distinctions.   
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Further, one version of the development phenomenon, exemplified more visibly by the 
West’s self-ascribed postwar mandate for the then-decolonising South, belongs within the 
preserve of hegemonic discourse. The other type, however, seems to have a substantive 
basis as key expression: it is reminiscent of what everyday people seek to achieve within the 
domain of empirical lived reality and often on their own account. The approach adopted by 
the Commission for Africa appears indicative of the way in which sub-Saharan Africa as a 
region and development as a form of social practice are invariably portrayed merely as ideas 
through the effects of a reigning discourse. All this stands in stark contrast to how the African 
populaces happen to live their material realities on a day-to-day basis, as in Eritrea for 
example. The pursuit, more or less, of autarkic development by the Eritrean Government 
meanwhile could be better comprehended as a version of development embargoed by the 
dominant Africanist development discourse, in particular the Commission’s. Obviously, the 
‘two Africas’ and the corresponding types of ‘development’ never intersect, nor can it be 
expected to reduce either to the other. Eventually, what this binaristic way of talking about 
Africa and development seems to show is the need to adapt a distinctive research formula 
and design to meaningfully resolve the tension inherent in the reality-construction 
problematic. And of course the point in all of this is to map out a consistent path of 
development for sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
Ideology: its uses and misuses  
In analysing the Commission’s policies, this thesis focuses on the terms of understanding of 
the Commission for Africa as being reflective of conjunctural ideological and political 
exigencies—that of neoliberal globalisation. The way the study reviews the Commission’s 
claims involves the linking of its development vision to the underlying conceptual mode of 
thought and practice which appears to be rooted in positivism and its derivative scientism.  
 
The main objective is to render apparent the overt as well as covert ideological and political 
underpinnings of the Commission’s claims. Similarly, the interpretation of the Eritrean 
approach to development ought to be contextualised within the framework of social struggle 
against foreign economic and political domination. Even if conceivably a social construct at 
some level, I hesitate indeed to review Eritrea’s development agenda from within the 
framework of social constructionism proper. According to Hacking (1999), the Eritrean 
approach to development appears to diverge in an important respect from the established 
criteria for when a category can be submitted to social constructionist analysis. Compared to 
an ascendant, fundamentalist and transnational capitalism, the development model pursued 
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by the Eritrean Government turns out to be marginal to warrant, strictly speaking, any social 
constructionist treatment focusing on dominant power dynamics on a world stage. As 
Hacking (1999:6) would explain it, the stipulation for phenomenon X (neoliberalism in this 
case) to be considered under the rubric of social constructionist analysis is that: “in the 
present state of affairs, X is taken for granted; X appears to be inevitable.” And yet given the 
prevalence of a firm counter belief that, “X need not have existed, or need not be at all as it 
is. X, or X as it is at present, is not determined by the nature of things; it is not inevitable” we 
must also critique X and perhaps seek its radical reconstitution and even supplanting.  
 
Now, this way of thinking about ‘development’ proves more meaningful in respect to the 
Commission’s program of forcing liberal political systems and market-driven economic 
growth upon the continent than the more localised and modest Eritrean initiative. Or, to 
restate the point, I presume it is hard to misjudge that the Eritrean development experiment 
has been influenced by real experience of collective oppression and exploitation. Likewise, 
perhaps we should not fail to recall that there can be nothing natural about the brand of 
development propounded by the Commission. This implies we cannot talk about capitalist 
development as if it is universally applicable. The primary focus then has to be on how 
ideology as knowledge in the service of power papers-over enduring material inequalities to 
normalise the capitalist global political economy. And possibly inseparable from this interest 
or task is the need to document the responses of those on the margins of the status quo. 
Our aim should be to explain how they strive to realise sovereign ways of being and 
knowing. As such, in the first phase, the study looks at the oppositional discourse embodied 
in the Eritrean national/ popular culture. This is meant to illuminate how actual experience of 
colonial and neocolonial manipulation informs the struggle for social emancipation and 
development. In parallel, the argument scans the Commission for Africa and any secondary 
literature sustaining its viewpoint on development for discursive manifestation or symptoms. 
This study thus draws from the literature and methodology of development as discourse in 
combination with the approaches of subaltern social narrative and practice.  
 
In development as discourse, analysis of the influence of power on knowledge exposes the 
role of hegemonic discourse in painting social reality in the image of those who wield power. 
Escobar (1995:5) explains how power impinges on knowledge to give rise to a “certain order 
of discourse [which] produces permissible modes of being and thinking while disqualifying 
and even making others impossible”. The development model highlighted in the Report will 
be treated as a form of dominant discourse for the exclusive focus on free-market 
development in Africa. More deliberately, the power relations underlying its sponsorship by 
one of the leading agents of the ‘historic block’ still in business, a Northern state with not 
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only a history as colonial power but also active neocolonialist disposition, will be examined. 
Similarly, the way in which the Eritrean Government articulates its development agenda 
must also be scrutinised primarily as resistance discourse to understand its distinctive 
context, underlying influences and potential implications.     
 
I think the underlying core beliefs, values and assumptions that characterise dominant 
development discourse such as the Commission’s blueprint can be brought to light through 
critical textual/ content analysis. Accordingly, this study to some extent is inspired by the 
closely-related works of Escobar (1995), Fairclough (2003), Foucault (1979) and Said (1994) 
for their insights into the way hegemonic discourse de-legitimises that which is deemed as 
irrelevant from the point of view of power. By casting those on the margins of capitalist 
society in negative light as “victims”, “others” or “undeveloped”, dominant discourse hands 
control to whoever is in a position to exercise power.  
 
I generally share with these writers the point about the negative role ideology plays in the 
shaping of peoples’ destinies. My own attitude hence has been never to take lightly what 
ideology in the hands of dominant groups can do. This is based on a perception that 
ideology tends to be more than just a passive or innocuous subordinate sphere; given the 
putative claim to knowledge and expertise, it can justify all kinds of actions, including meting 
out cruel sanctions on entire populations and even justifying wars of aggression that result in 
mass killings and destruction.  
 
In the case of the Commission, the major effect of ideology appears to be the inversion of 
reality head on heel along with the active cloaking of the exact circumstances under which 
the African majorities subsist.30 It is this misrepresentation presumably for political reasons 
(of the issues relevant to African development) which in many instances helps castrate the 
willpower of the people and clears the way for others to meddle in Africa’s affairs. As 
ideology tends to saturate the Commission’s policy proposals, it becomes incumbent that the 
current study places emphasis on what the role of politics has been in determining the 
Commission’s findings. I think it proper consequently to mount the critique of the 
Commission by interpreting its articulations of development from the perspective of social 
constructionism in the manner Ian Hacking has made use of the concept.  
 
                                                          
30 As Marx remarks in The German Ideology: If in all ideology men (sic) and their circumstances 
appear upside down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their 
historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process.  
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The virtue of social constructionism is the interrogation of the status quo as merely 
contingent on a specified socio-political history and the cultural output that may attend to 
this. In the case of the Commission, constructionism appears responsible for the kind of 
Eurocentric attitude that leads to a process of mystification of the “means and context” of 
African development. This seems to be evident in relation to both the substantive side of 
development and the more academic or speculative aspects. The apparent 
misrepresentation extends to the background historical context, the proposals on 
governance, aid and economic growth. Most importantly, it also applies to the significance 
and power of culture in undergirding the entire development process. In order to unmask the 
Commission’s tendentious features, it is important to take to heart what Ian Hacking has 
foreshadowed about social constructionism: that getting the point of social constructionist 
inquiry reportedly is what turns out to be the most worthwhile thing about constructionism as 
a research paradigm. And why would that be the case? It is because the sole imperative for 
pursuing social constructionist research consists in “raising consciousness” among those 
subjects who find themselves on the receiving end of oppressive social relations with the 
view to attaining liberation eventually. As Hacking (1999:6) would argue, “the point is less to 
describe the relation … than to change how we see those relations … [by fostering] new 
perspectives.” And that specifically is what I hope the critique of the Commission’s poetics 
and politics of development is geared to achieve.   
 
While the analysts of dominant discourse provide important insight into the basis on which 
knowledge is projected, they are often criticised for falling short of systematically elaborating 
alternative pathways or solutions.31 In my own study, I explore alternative approaches that 
place greater emphasis on the African nations’ own capacities to determine their futures, 
while at the same time subjecting these alternative discourses to scrutiny. Therefore the 
tendency to approach African development from the perspectives of poststructuralism or 
related ‘postisms’ only furnishes half of the story. The limitation in scope common to 
discourse-based social constructionist analyses seems to arise from certain epistemological 
incoherencies. Ultimately, the focus on discourse is unlikely to adequately address the 
question of how knowledge potentially contributes to social (and political) practice that can 
                                                          
31 Escobar is criticised for conflating ‘development’ exclusively with the postwar development project, 
thereby ignoring the material promise for the poor in the global South that can derive from other forms 
of developmentalist options. Likewise, Said’s Orientalism came in for strong criticism not only from the 
expected Orientalist quarters (Bernard Lewis and company) that the book accuses of scholarly 
underperformance, but also from the very side Said advocates on behalf of. Critics from this last 
category identify Orientalism as a work that turns the peoples of the “Orient” into passive subjects 
devoid of any will (to self-determination) outside and beyond the one prescribed for them by Western 
Orientalist discourse (among others, see for example Sadiq al-Azm 2000). It took a different 
endeavour—Orientalism’s sequel, Culture and Imperialism—before Said could redress what he 
overlooked earlier and offer examples of agency from around the global South. 
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impact the real world. The static interpretation of language and other symbols on the part of 
a literary scholar or analytic philosopher may not in any direct way change the fact that a 
great deal of the African masses remain economically poor with limited or no access to 
proper health care services and education. Similarly, the tendency of relativising knowledge 
particularly as concerns reality and truth tends to contradict the experience of those who 
suffer at the hands of an oppressive absolute global capitalism. For all these considerations, 
I can’t be so remiss as to not recognise the need for additional measures to enhance the 
approach followed in this study.  
 
Development, collective experience and the tide of history (from below) 
In further examining the Commission’s model of development beyond the theoretical frame 
of development as discourse, I will refer to ‘development’ particularly in the Eritrean context 
heuristically and from a national historical-materialist perspective. This in turn calls for a 
multi-disciplinary framework that is broadly historical and ethnographical. The purpose here 
is to emphasise not only the historicism inherent in the concept of development, but also the 
role of human agency and culture in motivating alternate visions of development. 
 
The historian Edward Palmer Thompson, credited for his seminal approach of writing history 
“from-bottom-up” and considered as having greatly influenced subaltern historiography, 
admonishes against perceiving social categories (class in his situation) as a “structure” 
(Thompson 1966:9). Thompson goes on to indicate that class “... entails the notion of 
historical relationship ... which evades analysis if we attempt to stop it dead at any given 
moment and anatomise its structure” (1966:9). For her part, Sarah Pink, leading authority on 
digital ethnography, tracks the way “experience can be mobilised as a particular way of 
knowing other people’s world through a digital ethnographic approach” (Pink 2016:20). As 
she explains, the main purpose in researching experience through digital means is to 
perceive of “experience as a critical component of addressing … research problems … 
about what it is like for other people to ‘be’ in the world, and how we know and learn about 
this …” (Pink 2016:39).  
 
So too the current study aims to explore African/ Eritrean development as a dynamically 
constituted phenomenon rooted in popular experience, not to mention history. A deliberately 
ethnographic and historicised expression of development is therefor particularly useful to 
understand the Eritrean Government’s beliefs and practices regarding development; why 
and how it is thought that linking the past to the present helps drive the prospects of Eritrean 
nation-building and development. Or, to use that celebrated quote of Marx’s, men (sic) make 
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their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-
selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted 
from the past. This study will also closely adhere to the approach developed in works of the 
subaltern studies group in its more social and historical (early) form. 
 
Again, as with the approaches to textual analysis highlighted in the previous section, I do not 
pretend that this second and complementary research path could be free from drawbacks 
either. While the historian’s empirically-based method often proves strong precisely on those 
areas that don’t merit the attention of the textual theorist (for example, the role of experience 
in inducing change), the approach can however be criticised for ignoring the effects of 
ideology on consciousness and thus on reality. To be more specific, in the historian’s 
schema the individual tends to be pictured as a pre-existing entity instead of subjectivity 
being something contingent on amorphous and irreducible interaction with the social 
environment. Also, the overemphasis on experience by writers like E.P. Thompson and heirs 
fails to adequately answer why members of a supposedly ‘discrete group’ develop uneven 
experiences and choose to pursue discrepant agendas, or even end up acting and behaving 
against their own self-interest. Or, why disunity and internal strife often prevails among 
otherwise ‘homogenous’ social groups and that social struggles may not always turn out 
victorious. The fact that neoliberalism appears to have found currency and rejection at the 
same time among portions of the populations in Africa can, in part, be explained in those 
terms. So too the prevalence of political opposition in Eritrea (against the EPLF then and the 
Eritrean Government today) perhaps has much to do with the unstructured, loose and 
indeed capricious character of how consciousness develops. At last, the point that needs to 
be made is the following: that it can be hard to imagine fulfilling the stated aims of the current 
project based on an incomplete research approach. And that is the reason for insisting on a 
two-fold or mixed methodological option encompassing critical discourse analysis and 
historical materialist narrative.  
 
The use of these tools of critical analysis in informing the present study provides a point of 
departure from the existing literature. I envisage the Africa Commission document(s) as 
political text to be interrogated on theoretical grounds. To this end, I will analyse the Report’s 
content in order to identify the questions it poses and the answers it offers at the expense of 
what it tends to bypass or censure. As a point of contrast, the development ‘discourse’ of the 
Eritrean Government will likewise be interrogated and used as a platform for exploring the 
significance of culture and history and the force of individual and collective agency in 
impacting social change.   
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2.3 The research process  
In terms of periodisation, this thesis contextualises the Commission for Africa and Eritrean 
socio-political and national development history within the postwar international order. Not 
only has the conjuncture witnessed the dawn of the development project and a turn to a 
neocolonial chapter in the evolution of imperialism, but the period also coincides with the 
onset of the Eritrean peoples’ campaign for national self-determination. Nevertheless, what 
ought to be kept in mind is that the postwar setting need not imply a discrete timeline. When 
we think of African development in the present period we have to also take note of how the 
preceding precolonial, colonial and anticolonial history also impinges this prospect.  
 
The literature spawned by the development phenomenon proves so vast as to turn the 
researcher’s information sourcing effort truly daunting. It seems obvious that in formulating 
its proposals, the Commission for Africa consulted a body of knowledge about ‘development’ 
amassed over the decades, if not centuries. All of that appears to have been blended into 
the content of the Report.  
 
Even if it is impractical to revisit the bulk of the literature informing the Commission’s outlook, 
still it would be wise for any sensible review of the Commission to grasp its tenor. More to 
the point, it is probably superfluous to attempt to reference the broader literature concerned 
with capitalist development (and its ripple effect across the globe) dating back to the late 18th 
to early 19th centuries, or even earlier. Not only can it be impossible to cover all the material 
on account of its sheer volume, but also the overt study of the history of capitalist 
development and its reciprocal impact on the peripheries might not be novel; a great deal 
has already been written on that score, starting with Karl Marx himself and disciples at one 
end of a pole and Adam Smith and his liberal heirs at the other, through to the present 
moment. Only by way of a highly selective and focused initiative can the process of sourcing 
the necessary material admittedly be carried through.   
 
On the other hand, where the Eritrean literature is concerned, the converse seems to be the 
case. Indeed, an obvious aspect about studying Eritrea seems to be the dearth of sources 
with a focus on development as topic. This fact about sourcing suitable Eritrean material 
poses a real dilemma for anyone wishing to research Eritrea today. It is perhaps not 
surprising consequently that there tends to be diminished interest in studying Eritrea. 
Coincidentally, and for reasons I have alluded to already, I see myself as better equipped 
nonetheless. In this regard, my personal advantage to access a range of publically available 
(vernacular) Eritrean sources should make it easier to complete the analysis. Also, given that 
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my stated aim is to try to make perceptible the Eritrean people’s world, it is necessary that 
the data selection and analysis policy reflects this desire. In my judgement, a sound 
approach to interpreting Eritrean development therefore should come in the shape of 
‘ethnography of experience’ along the lines mapped by Pink (2016). This means I will need 
to present the ‘ways of being and knowing’ involving the Eritrean people using my own 
experience. In the end, as a distinct way of studying contemporary Eritrea, a digital media-
based ethnographic approach comes with the added benefit of achieving two goals at once. 
Firstly, by carrying out the research in a digital space one can get around the thorny issue of 
collating information about Eritrea. Also, as a method of gathering evidence, it turns out to be 
safe, realistic and very much ethical. Secondly, this choice of method proves useful in 
fostering other peoples’ senses of what it is like to be in the shoes of the Eritreans in the 
present time.    
 
In terms of method, this study distinctly focuses on two main sources of information for 
analysis: the Commission for Africa publications, including the Report, and literature 
produced by the Eritrean Government relating to political self-determination and national 
development (for example, website material and reports featured on the Eritrean national 
television station (EriTV) which is broadcast in Australia32). These various resources will be 
used both for analysis and as tacit reference points for elaborating alternate development 
strategies.  
 
With regards to the primary sources of information, I will draw upon the English language 
report, Our Common Interest, and accompanying material by the Commission for Africa as 
the primary unit of analysis. Relevant secondary sources, including the literature directly and 
indirectly concerned with the Report itself will also be consulted. I have set out to analyse in 
depth not just the reports of the Commission for Africa but also the role of the 
Commissioners and the other aspects. It appeared to me not enough to focus largely on the 
final published documents without also looking at the submissions by stakeholders and the 
deliberations by the Commission members. I was concerned that any such ‘partial’ focus on 
the Commission might misrepresent the situation. To that end, I made some effort to be 
comprehensive in how I wanted to study the Commission for Africa and its findings. I was 
interested to know about the submissions the Commission received and about other 
information relating to its work. In the early stages of the research, I wrote to the 
                                                          
32 The Eritrean Government rarely produces publicly-available official reports of a nature comparable 
to the Commission for Africa report. However, Eritrea’s Ministry of Information, the state-run media in 
particular, is extremely active and there are ready sources of information in the public domain about 
Eritrea’s national development that can be exploited as useful dataset. 
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Commission for Africa on two separate occasions specifically requesting such additional 
information. I didn’t receive any replies from the Commission in this regard. As I couldn’t get 
a response from the Commission, I was left with no choice but to carry on with the inquiry 
into the Commission using the only material available to me. This may mean my analysis of 
the Commission for Africa remains somewhat curtailed as I have been unable to reference 
the non-publically available portion of the data.     
 
For the Eritrean Government literature, my main source remains the internet which is home 
to a large volume of original Eritrean material on self-determination and development. I have 
been keenly following the production and growth of this literature over many years, out of 
general interest and well before embarking on the present project.  In the last period, I had to 
devote even more time going through the bulk of the material to select samples for this 
research. The digital field site I am most (but not exclusively) interested in is constituted by 
audio-visual records in English, Arabic, Tigre, Tigrinya and some of the other Eritrean 
languages. In particular, both modern and archival material featuring pervasive use of 
patriotic revolutionary and protest performing arts/ music shall be given special 
consideration. My task will involve translating and analysing the content of relevant audio-
visual material and other texts in the different Eritrean languages. The data-sampling 
process will cover sources closely aligned to the Eritrean Government’s point of view 
(Eritreacompass.com, Alenalki.com, Eastafro.com, Dehai.com, Shaebia.com, 
Erigazette.com, Madote.com, and Tesfanews.com) together with select literature on the 
broader topic of self-determination.  
 
2.4 Reflexivity 
The overarching message in Ngũgĩ’s life work is a call to combat and overcome what he 
identifies as mental colonisation, or else metaphysical empire. In Ngũgĩ’s supposition, the 
economic exploitation and political subjugation of the continent has been expedited because 
cultural imperialism has succeeded in making many of Africa’s elites see reality through its 
prism. According to Ngũgĩ, obscurantist cultural policies and practices prove the ultimate 
weapon in the arsenal of those who seek to enmesh Africa in neocolonial relations. In his 
own words:  
 
The effect of a cultural bomb is to annihilate a people’s belief … 
in their heritage of struggle … in their capacities and ultimately in 
themselves. It makes them see their past as one wasteland of 
non-achievement and it makes them want to distance 
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themselves from that wasteland … to identify with … all those 
forces which would stop their own springs of life. It even plants 
serious doubts about the moral rightness of struggle. Possibilities 
of triumph … are seen as remote, ridiculous dreams. The 
intended results are despair, despondency and a collective 
death-wish. 
                                   Ngũgĩ’s (1986:3)  
 
 
My interest in the present study grew out of a number of interlocking reasons. Given my 
African (underdog) heritage, a major incentive is a personal and political desire to guard 
against the pitfall of intellectual co-option. For far too long, Africa (of all the parts of the 
world) has been the province, the playground and guinea pig, on which outsider word and 
action has had a free run.33 Specific to the Chair of the Commission and its auspice, the 
then-UK prime minister, Tony Blair, I will have to express some real reservations as to this 
figure’s suitability to be conferred with the magnanimity of instituting a development 
commission for Africa.  
 
Today, around the globe, there appears to be increasing consensus that neoliberalism 
stands as the villain that the Majority World, including Africa, has to grapple with and lay to 
rest before real development eventuates. I puzzle over how an individual of the caliber of 
Tony Blair would qualify for the role of Chair of a commission on development. Blair has 
proven himself to be an ardent neoliberal ideologue and an extreme proponent of the 
market. So, for him to authorise a development commission for Africa sounds truly 
enigmatic. As former UK prime minister, Blair’s public record evidently speaks volumes 
about his zeal for the neoliberal cause, so much so that as he was convening the 
Commission for Africa, his government was mercilessly prosecuting an unprovoked war of 
aggression against a stricken developing nation that is Iraq. What is more, according to a 
2017 article, Tony Blair’s Ghoulish Last decade, Blair’s most recent conduct in pursuit of 
self-enrichment has been even more unethical, something which adds to my concern as I 
have stated.34  
                                                          
33 You can’t anticipate the Northern states to authorise a commission of development on say the 
Central America region or South Asia, but it is taken for granted to hold one on behalf of Africa. Aren’t 
levels of underdevelopment and poverty comparable to that found in some parts of Africa also 
common to particular countries in both these regions? Is Honduras more prosperous than Ghana for 
example, or can Bangladesh be considered to have attained a higher socio-economic level of 
development in comparison to Tanzania? Of course my question is purely rhetorical in nature. 
34
 See Marcetic, B. (2017) https://www.globalresearch.ca/tony-blairs-ghoulish-last-decade/5611253 
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The virtue of fundamental human dignity enjoins people to assume personal responsibility in 
matters of self-determination. Undoubtedly, the question of African development (or lack 
thereof) holds significant ramifications to my life as I have tried to indicate at the beginning of 
this study. It is gravid with direct and indirect consequences that I have to endure and live 
with. Particularly, as an Eritrean born in the second half of the 20th century, great power 
politics in the name of ‘modernising’ the continent has had a lasting impact on the 
experiences of my life; In 1952, US geopolitical interest dictated that Eritrea involuntarily be 
federated with its ally Ethiopia, a decision that led to the Eritrean War of Independence and 
subsequently to my own flight as a child in search of refuge.  To not have a say in such an 
important life-and-death topic is tantamount to shirking one’s responsibility and duty. 
Similarly, to best serve the interests of Africa, it is incumbent to proceed from a sovereign 
vantage point that embodies intellectual rigor and moral integrity. I intend to combine textual 
critical pedagogy with what I would like to call the personal dimension to enhance the 
findings of this research.  
 
Also an additional impetus for the current project is a shared humanism to turn around 
existing (dreadful) African conditions. Grievance abounds over the large-scale human 
suffering and waste of life characteristic of most of contemporary Africa. The steady decline 
that plagued Africa escalated to fully-fledged crisis in recent decades. Every day now, the 
continent’s reality continues to plunge into a kind of incapacitating morass from which Africa 
appears unable to extricate itself. Once stable and prosperous countries such as Libya and 
Nigeria have now become badly unsettled, joining the likes of Congo and Somalia. Crippling 
debt in combination with catastrophic wars has thoroughly impoverished Africa, undermining 
the whole continent and its peoples. Africa evokes images of endless calamitous disease, 
famine and related misery.35 Disconcert over this unedifying state should rightly prompt us 
into action on behalf of the peoples of the continent. Supporting the cause of African political 
and economic emancipation is all the more urgent considering that the global ideological 
backdrop against which the continent finds itself is constituted by an ever intensifying neo-
liberal imperialist onslaught.  
 
                                                          
35 The 2014 Ebola pandemic is the latest scourge to strike parts of the continent. Also the refugee 
crisis and the tragic way many of them die while crossing the Mediterranean Sea in route to Europe is 
another example. And, following the NATO destruction of Libya, it has been reported migrants from 
sub-Saharan Africa are being ‘sold at open slave markets in Libya’ in 2017! This, when we thought 
humanity has left the practice of profiting from the slave trade behind it centuries ago (for more details 
see http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/04/iom-african-migrants-traded-libya-slave-markets-
170411141809641.html). 
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Still a further consideration, one more pertinent to the subject matter, is the need to entertain 
the Commission for Africa’s particular proclamations—among many others—that are based 
supposedly on the fact that it has studied and learned from the “vast wealth of analysis over 
the last fifty years”. In the same vein, the Commission declares that it strove hard to be 
“blisteringly honest” and thus its recommendations can be “held up to public scrutiny.” 
(Commission for Africa 2005:22). Citing this as lending support to the viability of its mission, 
the Commissioners enunciate that theirs is: 
 
a. New kind of development through new kind of partnership based on mutual respect 
and solidarity (Commission for Africa 2005:17); 
b. Measures proposed constitute a coherent package of African development 
(Commission for Africa 2005:2).  
 
This study contributes to the existing body of literature on African development. The findings 
of this study are intended to provide (another) opportunity to hold this Commission up to 
scrutiny, and hopefully give rise to alternative modes of thinking about African development. 
Driven by a desire to resurrect a subaltern agenda, Emma Miller36 urges contributions that 
critically address the subject, in particular from African scholars. Miller (cited in Miller ed. 
2005:3) underscores the “... need to ask Africans what they see as both the problems and 
the solutions facing their continent ....” Miller’s plea aligns very much with my own concerns 
about the fate of Africa in this so far very eventful new Millennium.  
 
That sums up the type of methodology that I will be relying on to conduct the inquiry into the 
prospects and problems of African development. I will apply the above methodological 
insight and techniques to the next chapter on Culture and Development and also throughout 
the rest of the study. 
  
                                                          
36 Emma Miller is the editor of The Alternatives Commission for Africa Report (2005), an online 
anthology compiled within four weeks of the Africa Commission Report’s appearance by the 
Spinwatch website, documenting mainly African responses to the Blair Africa Commission and its 
Report from all over the continent.  
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3.  CULTURE AND DEVELOPMENT  
The business of obscuring language is a mask behind which stands the much bigger 
business of plunder … Everything can be explained to the people, on the single 
condition that you really want them to understand.            
     -  Frantz Fanon 
 
This chapter contextualises the Commission for Africa and the Eritrean story of 
development. Given the perception of the development process as internally-directed and 
independent of unduly external influence, the chapter describes what the Commission and 
the Eritrean approach represent. The chapter also focuses on how this could possibly further 
our knowledge of ‘African development’. The present chapter is made up of two parts. In part 
one, I recount the genesis of the Commission for Africa and provide a summary of its 
Report’s main content. Part one also features a review of the Commission’s theoretical 
pronouncements on ‘culture’ in the context of African development. I do this in order to 
explain how the allusion to culture by the Commission slants the narrative strategy according 
to the underlying political and economic imperative. As a comparative act, meanwhile, part 
two gives an overview of Eritrean society and its modern history. It begins with a brief 
account of the wider geopolitical processes that culminated in the formation of the modern 
Eritrean entity. This section then touches on the origins and progress of Eritrea’s national 
struggle which led to an independent Eritrean State together with a basic outline of the post-
independence political setting. The presentation here highlights the dynamics of the Eritrean 
peoples’ struggle for self-determination, the construction of ‘national culture’ and its relation 
to current Eritrean development policy and practice. Ngũgĩ’s precept relating to the interplay 
of culture, politics and economic life serves as the general frame for my argument about the 
importance of sorting a congenial African development.    
 
3.1 Commissioning an ‘ultimate’ commission on African development 
The equation of Africa’s contemporary fate with a story of economic and social stagnation 
has provided justification for repeated outsider probes into this continent’s future 
development trajectory. The 2004-2005 British Government initiated Commission for Africa 
comes as the latest in a series of Western interventionist manoeuvres that purport to 
characterise and remedy the crisis of development in Africa.  
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The Commission for Africa owes its being to the former The Boomtown Rats singer-turned-
Africa advocate, the Irish celebrity Bob Geldof (Williams 2005:529). The latter’s activism to 
end African poverty dates back to the Live Aid Concert in the wake of the Ethiopian famine 
of the mid-1980s. When Geldof visited Ethiopia in 2003 and saw then that there was not 
much change in the life of the people in almost a generation, he resolved to take up the 
needs of Africa with the British Government (Bush 2004:17). Though Blair had once 
famously declared “Africa is a scar on the conscience of the world. But if the world as a 
community focused on it, we could heal it”,37 apparently the continent’s dire state had since 
slipped from his foreign policy agenda list. It took Geldof’s lobbying before Blair could be 
convinced of the urgency to address the continent’s lack of progress by putting together a 
development commission (Bush 2004:17). So, in February 2004, the British Government set 
up a commission for Africa to scope the measures needed to put Africa onto the 
developmental track. And, a year later, the Commission for Africa published its analysis and 
recommendations as Our Common Interest: Report of the Commission for Africa.  
 
Before I venture further, it is important to note one basic fact about the origin of the 
Commission for Africa. In terms of the potential for African development, there seems to be 
something quite suggestive in Geldof, Blair and the British Government’s self-delegation. 
The very act of their sponsoring a development commission on behalf of Africa probably 
bespeaks to a long-held tacit assumption: that, without the significant involvement of the 
West, the African states may not be able to take care of their own affairs. Those behind the 
Commission for Africa consequently appear to grant that African development has to come 
largely from without at the same time as they play down the continent’s own resources and 
potential. For precisely this sort of residual reason, we should review the Blair Commission 
critically and against the Eritrean case as a contrast. By doing this, we can hope to know the 
likely implications for real African development.  
 
The subject-matter of the Africa Commission Report  
The Commission’s stated objective is “to define the challenges facing Africa and to provide 
clear recommendations on how to support the changes needed to reduce poverty” 
(Commission for Africa 2005:1). The Commission for Africa Report is divided into two parts. 
Part 1, entitled The Argument, is designed to serve as a “call for action” by evoking ongoing 
(appalling) African conditions and by summarising the Africa Commission’s 
                                                          
37 I am citing here Tony Blair’s speech to the 2001 British Labour Party Conference, in which he 
outlined his government’s Africa policy. 
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recommendations. Part 2, with the heading of Analysis, “lays out the substance and basis” of 
the recommendations in the pages of the ten uninterrupted chapters (Commission for Africa 
2005:1).  
 
The Report enumerates the steps that both Africa and the rich Northern states must follow to 
stimulate African development through a mix of economic growth, social and political 
reforms, increased bi-lateral trade and donor aid, and debt review. It envisages African 
development as predicated on a joint effort involving African states working in partnership 
with the Northern states. Varying emphasis is placed on internal and external causes as 
precipitating the African development crisis (Commission for Africa 2005:113). Problem 
areas internal to Africa and (un-)helpful practices by the rich industrialised states are 
identified as deserving immediate attention. What is it, then, that on the one hand, Africa is 
advised to take care of, and, on the other, Northern donors are entreated to observe in the 
drive to develop the continent? 
 
The ‘do-it-yourself’ component of Africa’s development 
Through its Report the Commission addresses the African states to improve public 
performance in at least five interrelated areas; governance, peace and security, investment 
in social capital, growth and poverty reduction, and in their trade capabilities.  
 
Good governance is presented as a core requirement within the Report’s African 
development strategy. Despite the general sense that Africa needs to register concurrent 
progress in all the areas for the wheels of the “big-push” to start turning, the Commission 
places far greater emphasis on governance. According to the Report, improved governance 
creates conditions which are conducive to economic growth. Good governance is also about 
African states expecting acceptable standards of rule of each other and exercising the 
mandate to deal with those who create or contribute to instability (like Eritrea?). More 
significantly, enhanced governance as defined in the Report entails individual African states 
adopting principles of transparency as opposed to condoning corruption. The Report 
recommends African states rally behind what it considers a rejuvenated African Union (AU) 
which apparently has superseded its less effective predecessor, the Organisation of African 
Unity (OAU). To take governance to a higher level, the valuable work of the AU’s New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and its African Peer Review Mechanism 
(APRM) are recognised as needing further support. Improved governance, ultimately, is 
sought after not only for its positive contribution to the African states’ capacities to formulate 
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and deliver effective policies, but also for its repercussions for peace and security, without 
which there can be no development.  
 
In a similar vein, the Report insists that the welfare of the social population be attended to. 
Access to education and health services is perceived as human rights issues for the peoples 
of Africa. In fact, a whole chapter, Leaving No-One Out: Investing in People talks about this 
as an important development target. The Report underscores the role of the state in 
guaranteeing education for its citizens. The need to upgrade public health services is also 
raised in the Report as key to containing and eliminating preventable diseases such as 
Tuberculosis, Malaria and HIV/AIDS. The Report equates a healthy and skilled workforce 
with efficient and increased economic output. In short, the Commission for Africa’s wish is to 
see African development which is truly inclusive.  
 
To reduce poverty through growth, the Report’s formula is for the public and private sectors 
to work together to “create a climate which unleashes the entrepreneurship of the peoples of 
Africa...” (Commission for Africa 2005:15). This is expected to translate into domestic and 
foreign investment and to impact positively on employment, leading to prosperity in the long 
run.  
 
The last concrete issue that the Report raises is Africa’s share of trade within the global 
market. The Report recommends that Africa produces more goods in addition to the need to 
diversify its export commodities in order to compete more effectively in international markets. 
It calls for the African states to put in place the infrastructure and to undertake reforms in 
relation to tariffs, customs and bureaucracy so as to facilitate trade within the continent and 
beyond.  
 
Before rounding off this section, it is important to note briefly that the Report also raises the 
question of how to source the necessary resources that would underwrite the 
implementation of the Commission’s program. It has been calculated that annual budgets of 
US$37 billion and US$75 billion will be required during the first (2005-2010) and second 
(2010-2015) phases respectively. In each case, Africa is required to contribute an amount 
equivalent to one third of the annual budget. And finally there is this crucial reminder too 
about the Commission’s work: that ‘cultural awareness’ has been the all-encompassing 
underlying feature of its process.   
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The scope of Northern collaborative action 
According to the Commission for Africa, where African development is concerned, the rich 
world’s cooperation in the three spheres of trade, debt and aid has to be secured 
simultaneously (Commission for Africa 2005:27). The Report notes that Africa’s share of 
global trade has steadily declined from six per cent in 1980 to only two per cent in 2002 
(Commission for Africa 2005:27).38 According to the Report, the external causes of this 
decline in African trade are the twin hurdles of subsidies and protectionism which the rich 
states consistently employ. Subsided Northern goods drive commodity prices down and high 
import tariffs frustrate Africa’s chances of gaining greater share of global trade. The Report 
recommends that the rich world expedites the removal of the existing trade barriers that 
disadvantage Africa.   
 
The Report also touches on the inertia that debt generates as a significant contributor to 
Africa’s struggle to advance forward. It is acknowledged that debt repayments drain the 
national budget of most African countries and makes it hard for states to fund the vital 
sectors of health, education, infrastructure …etc. The fact of onerous debt is what other 
sources also corroborate as impeding African development. A Statement by Jubilee South, 
an advocacy network from the global South, for example highlights, “the financial burden of 
debt servicing ... [which] results in the violation of our people’s basic rights and impoverishes 
our countries” (Jubilee South, in Miller, ed. 2005:19). The Report recommends multilateral 
debt relief of varying scale for the countries of sub-Saharan Africa. In particular, in the case 
of the very poor states which fall under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) label, the 
Report favours 100 per cent debt cancellation (Commission for Africa 2005:328).  
 
The third element that the Report looks at relates to aid which Africa receives from the North. 
The Report describes how in the past aid has been ineffective due both to internal 
mismanagement and donor policies of politicising aid in pursuit of their own self-interest. Of 
late, the Commission asserts, the case has been reversed. The Report states, “... the 
evidence on the effectiveness of aid... shows it is simply untrue that aid to Africa has been 
wasted in more recent years” (Commission for Africa 2005:28). The Commission 
recommends that the quality of aid to Africa should be improved to correspond with the 
specific needs of the recipient African country. Likewise, it proposes that the quantity of aid 
                                                          
38
 It was even lower at 1.7% in 2016 according to Evita Schmieg. See 
https://www.swpberlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/projekt_papiere/Africas_Position_in_Global_Tr
ade.pdf  
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needs to be doubled to US$25 billion initially, and tripled to US$50 billion over the period 
spanning 2010–2015.  
 
Thus the Commission for Africa lays out its vision of development for the sub-Saharan Africa 
region. It has presented its model as quite paradigmatic, other possible approaches to 
African development notwithstanding. As part of the search for alternate development, it 
becomes therefore necessary to scrutinise that model further to appreciate its likely 
potential. In particular, it bears to talk about the model’s Western origins and capitalistic form 
to see how this might align with African realities.   
 
3.2 The Commission for Africa’s moot openings  
The official custom of instituting a commission as a means for investigating a complicated 
issue and coming up with a plan of action raises as many questions as it answers. 
Legitimate questions posed in relation to any commission of enquiry are likely to revolve 
around its rationale, independence, and the terms of reference it is governed by (see chapter 
five in this study). Further, the fact that commissions often tackle highly sensitive and divisive 
topics adds to their contestability.39 Therefore, it is not uncommon for a given commission to 
raise polarised views in relation to the overall status of such a formal body. The Blair 
Commission on African development is no exception in this case. 
 
As many of the commentators have stated, the Commission for Africa warrants our attention 
for a variety of different reasons. For my part, I locate the source of interest in the 
Commission’s initiative outside the range of the reasons hitherto mentioned in the various 
exchanges. Moreover, to convey what could be important about this Commission, I do not, at 
the same time, resort to revisionist interpretation; any retrospective evaluation made on the 
basis of final outcomes (from the vantage point of the due date of 2015 and beyond) 
perhaps smacks of simplistic vain exercise. And nor does my concern with the Commission 
see me dwelling on the substantive side of African development, important as this can be.  
 
Instead, my emphasis exclusively is on how the Commission’s tacit economic and political 
aims apparently justify a distinctive approach to ‘culture’ as the bedrock for its work. In 
rationalising this focal tendency, I simply point out that a stable edifice anticipates a solid 
foundation. As it turns out, the overriding economic and political fact induces the 
Commission to place strictures on its conceptual horizon about the ‘essence’ of culture. How 
                                                          
39
 For example, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa during the 1990s dealing 
with political crimes committed during the Apartheid era. 
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the Commission appears to be keeping tabs on its conceptual contours (to accommodate its 
particular development model) is what I attempt to tease out by reflecting on one core but 
fairly typical statement from its Report.  
 
We try in this report to tell a story. It is inevitably a complex story, 
for many of the issues impact one another and cannot sensibly 
be addressed in isolation. The path we pick through this thicket 
of interactions is this. We begin by telling the world how the 
problem looks through African eyes, for the cultures of the 
continent are all too easily brushed aside in the rush to offer pre-
packaged solutions from the developed world. 
                  (Commission for Africa 2003:23) 
 
In the preceding extract, the last sentence makes for a moot point. Indeed, “how the problem 
looks through African eyes” proves to be the very assertion which provides stimulus for my 
own thoughts on the Report.40 Accordingly, I ponder what the Commission’s definition of 
‘culture’ possibly entails. Likewise, I assess whether the Commission shows any tendency to 
scant, if not dismiss, the role of culture in Africa’s economic and political transformation. 
This, in turn, should enable us to decide if the Commission’s blueprint itself represents pre-
packaged development from without. Alternatively, we may be able to indicate whether the 
plan symbolises a novel approach to African development, with which the continent’s 
populations could possibly agree.  
 
In fairness, I should commend the Commission for insisting on the need to have culture play 
a central role in African development. The Commission sets itself apart by categorically 
calling for cultural understanding to be at the forefront of all African development policy. 
Indeed, the Commission in its Report devotes a major chapter, Through African Eyes: 
Culture, to the continent’s cultures as integral to development. Therefore, its message of 
wanting culture to define “… the terms of the development debate and the actions that 
follow” will have to be well-received (Commission for Africa 2005:130). Similarly, the 
Commission deserves due credit for spelling out, on the one hand, the practical advantages 
of incorporating culture into development policy, and, on the other, for highlighting the 
consequences of failing to do so. We need not have to agree with the Commission’s finer 
points to appreciate what is being advocated in this case. It thus makes sense for the 
Commission to declare that “… cultural urgency underpins [its] findings across the report …” 
                                                          
40 Authenticating the validity of this claim becomes all the more necessary as a way of testing the self-
assured tone with which the Commission sets to fulfil its mandate.  
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(Commission for Africa 2005:130-131). And what could be even more positive is the 
Commission’s counsel to look at the role of culture in development, considering that the topic 
is “relatively less studied in Africa” than in other regions. 
 
Be that as it may, some significant problems seem to beset the views on culture as laid 
down in the Commission’s Report—with important consequences for practical African 
development. There is apparently a major reason though as to why the Commission’s 
articulations come unstuck; the delinking of culture and social struggle on purely ideological 
account. This then not only appears to be against the holistic setup of society, but also it 
likely flouts the organic sources of the development process. And because of this basic 
weakness, whatever effort the Commission subsequently expends to bring its idea of 
‘culture’ up to date, including the many rhetorical manoeuvres, visibly fails to bear fruit. Let 
me expound by being more specific in terms of some of the actual ‘language’ that the 
Commission employs and the relevance hence to African development.   
 
Among other things, the Commission speaks of culture as being about “how the past 
interacts with the present” as part of the process of collective identity formation and of 
imagining the future. To my mind, not only does this statement sound very incisive, but also 
it can be deeply consequential where the development process in the case of sub-Saharan 
Africa (and especially Eritrea) is in question. Apart perhaps from simple gesture or slogan, 
the Commission seems coy however to say how exactly the relevant link ought to be thought 
through.  
 
Radical African theory of culture, to say nothing of critical anthropology, progressive 
historiography and the field of Cultural Studies, teaches us that people actively fashion their 
collective identities by endorsing particular versions of the past. The selection of certain 
cultural traditions normally follows from what a social group’s present and future political 
aspiration may involve. Those who happen to be socially oppressed invoke aspects of the 
past in a manner that usually furthers the cause of their economic, political and cultural 
emancipation. It may not be uncommon then for the peoples of Africa in their present fight 
for a better economic and political future to tap into legacies of struggle handed down from 
earlier phases of African history. As Rosaldo (in Kaye and McClelland eds. 1990:103) 
explains, “the analysis of traditions so conceived becomes the historical narrative of their 
struggle, not the synchronic analysis of static cultural forms … ideology, not social analysis, 
has created the dichotomy between vital culture and inert tradition.” Essentially, it is the spirit 
of struggle and hard work which Africa evidently needs to preserve and even intensify, albeit 
the form and content of the relevant traditions may undergo adaptation to meet newer 
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urgencies. However, rather than continue on general theoretical terms, it is proper to 
substantiate what I have so far been saying about the significance of culture for achieving 
economic and political objectives. Hence, in light of the Commission’s conjectures around 
the key themes of ‘South African apartheid’ and ‘African political leadership’, it is possible to 
set forth a competing historical narrative of the African peoples’ struggle—in accordance with 
the principle of the purposive reconstitution of cultural traditions as historical narratives of 
peoples’ struggles.  
 
The Commission and the South African conjuncture 
The Commission for Africa states that its work has been sustained by far-reaching economic 
and political changes that began to take shape in Africa and the wider world since the mid-
1970s. The evolution in politics, in particular, is what the Commission gives primacy to as 
precursor to a climate conducive to Africa’s economic development in the new Millennium. 
The Commissioners appear to have been inspired by these changes in politics to the point of 
proclaiming that “a singular moment has arrived for Africa” (Commission for Africa 2005:25). 
In order to understand the Commission’s interpretations and the implication for African 
development, it is necessary to quiz how the Commission through its Report frames this 
background political context as watershed.  
 
The assertion about the developments in African politics sounds somewhat subjective and 
may be open to debate for a number of reasons. It not only puts under the spotlight how the 
composition of the Africa Commission came to be determined, but, more tellingly, it can 
explain how and why the Commission advocates a particular brand of development for the 
continent. This susceptibility to interpret those political changes in biased and triumphalist 
light could be fundamental to forming an overall picture of the Africa Commission’s 
development discourse. 
 
The Commission’s rather sanguine representations of the changeover from apartheid to 
democratic rule in South Africa turns out as major point of contention with regards to its 
questionable portrayal of African history as commonly understood by the peoples of this 
continent. According to the Commission, the demise of the apartheid system in South Africa 
“has brought a new confidence to the whole of the continent ... [it] has reminded Africa ... 
that no injustice can last for ever.” (Commission for Africa 2005:23). Most people in Africa 
and elsewhere rightly felt sincere joy at the end of (legal) apartheid in 1990-1991. So, the 
Commission’s statement of a post-apartheid new dawn can’t be inaccurate on first account. 
The trouble with the Africa Commission however seems to be the following: firstly, the 
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Commission distinctly fails to mention who was propping up the apartheid regime against the 
wishes of the majority population and how it was forced to relinquish power, and; secondly, it 
shows a certain tendency to muddle the essence of social justice by conflating formal 
institutional rights with substantive equality. Put simply, the Commission tends to whitewash 
the whole aim of the South African liberation struggle against apartheid—the radical 
redistribution of the nation’s wealth in the interests of those who produce it.  
 
Apartheid South Africa found staunch external allies in the administration of Ronald Reagan 
in the US and the government of Margaret Thatcher in the UK at the time (1980s) when most 
of the world had turned its back on that regime. Throughout the decades of the 1970s and 
1980s, the economies of the front-line states of Angola, Botswana and Mozambique suffered 
as a consequence of Pretoria’s ‘border wars’. Apartheid South Africa appeared untroubled in 
its offensive against the neighbouring states partly because it enjoyed solid diplomatic and 
political backing from the US and the UK governments. To counter the continued South 
African aggression, these front-line states had to divert resources away from vital national 
development programs and into the defense effort. Eventually, the South African apartheid 
state, in addition to the worldwide campaign against its racially-motivated segregationist 
policies and practices, also came under enormous military pressure in Angola in the late 
1980s at the hands of the Peoples Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola, FAPLA, the 
internationalist Cuban troops, and the liberation forces—the African National Congress, 
ANC, and South West Africa People’s Organisation, SWAPO (cf. Gleijeses 2013; El-Tahri 
2007; Deutschmann 1989).41 The Report tends to crowd out, possibly for utilitarian reasons, 
vying characterisations of the political history of the southern Africa region, including the role 
of Western powers in supporting the expansionist South African regime and the active 
struggle by African peoples (and their friends) for self-determination. The Commission’s 
apparent omissions notwithstanding, it is normally along these very lines that the popular 
African political narrative frames the period in question.   
 
As part of the process of arriving at a negotiated political settlement, the ANC made historic 
compromises by downgrading its stated commitment to socialist principles in so far as this 
applies to the economy. It appears that the imperative of securing peace limited the ANC 
                                                          
41 The military setback at the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale in south-eastern Angola (1987/1988) has 
been described as a major cause for subsequent political developments in Southern Africa—the 
signing by the apartheid regime of the non-aggression pact with Angola, agreeing to the 
independence of Namibia and the dismantling of the apartheid system itself in South Africa. For 
further details, the reader can refer to 
http://www.democracynow.org/2013/12/11/the_secret_history_of_how_cuba. Also, to learn more about 
southern Africa political history, it is worth checking Piero Gleijeses’s (2013) text, Visions of Freedom: 
Havana, Washington, Pretoria, and the Struggle for Southern Africa, 1976-199.  
77 
 
leadership’s bargaining capacity to demand the complete adoption of its Freedom Charter in 
the early 1990s. Nelson Mandela and his colleagues accepted to carry on with the capitalist 
economy in the post-apartheid era. Nevertheless, the then-ANC leadership42 saw no wisdom 
in completely abandoning the objectives of the liberation struggle, especially the obligation to 
social justice for the majority. As Patrick Bond (in Subiros 2007:91) explains, “…the [ANC’s] 
Reconstruction and Development Program (1994) reflected the influence of trade union and 
leftist social movements, and served as the ANC’s first electoral campaign platform.” In the 
early post-apartheid years, the ANC clearly recognised the need to improve the conditions of 
the majority by the means available to it. Theirs was a longer-term reformist strategy of 
reducing economic inequalities through political office.  
 
In contrast, the later ANC leadership, Cyril Ramaphosa, Jacob Zuma, Thabo Mbeki and 
Trevor Manuel included, looks keen to promote the business interests of the few (blacks and 
whites) at the expense of the South African masses.43 Substantively speaking, it would seem 
that there has not occurred noticeable transformation in employment, health and education 
in the lives of many South Africans since apartheid despite this country’s bounty.44 As 
Patrick Bond (2017) comments:  
 
By the 2000s, Ramaphosa had earned a reputation for seeking 
profits at any cost. The worst incident was at the Lonmin 
platinum mines at Marikana … On August 15, 2012 Ramaphosa 
emailed a request to police … demanding “concomitant action” 
against “dastardly criminals,” against whom police should “act in 
a more pointed way.” 
                                                          
42 In addition to Mandela, the leadership concerned comprised of the likes of Oliver Tambo, Chris 
Hani, Joe Slovo, Ahmed Kathrada, Mac Maharaj and Walter Sisulu, to name a few. 
43 South Africa under the presidency of Thabo Mbeki (and followed by Jacob Zuma) not only 
embraced neoliberalism at the national level, but also in the early 2000s Mbeki and four other African 
heads of state (Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria and Senegal) endorsed neoliberalism (through the NEPAD 
Initiative) as a ‘suitable’ development model for the African continent (see NEPAD website). Trevor 
Manuel, one of the African Commissioners, was the South African Finance Minister in 2005. He urged 
Africans to “own” the recommendations of the Commission for Africa. Apparently, there can be little 
doubt that the current ruling ANC elite is deeply committed to neoliberalism so much so that, as 
Patrick Bond writes, it has been prepared to gun down protesting South African mining workers calling 
for better pay and conditions.   
44
 As Saul (2011:77) observes: Important as it was to overcome apartheid and similar racist structures 
in southern Africa, it was easy to see that people in southern Africa were also seeking to liberate 
themselves from class and corporate oppression … These goals came readily to seem to be at least 
as important to any true liberation as was national self-assertion. Nonetheless, the fact is that these 
attendant goals were to fall by the wayside; indeed now, some decades after the fall of the most 
visible forms of colonial and racial domination, it has become ever more apparent just how narrow the 
definition of ‘liberation’ has been permitted to become … For liberation in any expansive sense is, 
quite simply, something that has not occurred in southern Africa. 
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He was referring to 4,000 desperately underpaid miners who had 
been on a wildcat strike the prior week, during which six workers, 
two security guards and two policemen had died in skirmishes. 
Neither Lonmin officials nor Ramaphosa wanted to negotiate. 
The day after the revealing emails, as strikers peacefully 
departed the strike grounds for their homes in nearby 
shantytowns, 34 men were shot dead by police, and 78 wounded 
… Ramaphosa’s role was especially unconscionable given his 
struggle history. 
 
The South African government as led by the new ANC elites then appears to have chosen to 
be answerable to the overseers of neoliberal globalisation rather than defend the interests of 
the majority of its people. This apparent abdication of responsibility when it comes to the 
ideals of the liberation struggle seems now more typical despite on-going discontent and 
opposition at the grass-roots level. A PRESSTV piece (2016), Leftists blast out of Zuma 
address, observes that “… criticism against [Zuma] has reached its height over his 
expropriation of public money for private expenditure … and corruption within his 
government.” In the parlance of proponents of underdevelopment theory, the phenomenon 
of a comprador African class (exemplified by the likes of Cyril Ramaphosa and Trevor 
Manuel) acting as an agent of capitalism seems to be well alive in the contemporary South 
Africa.  
 
Such possibly ought to read a meaningful account of the background political context 
involving in particular the southern Africa region as well as South Africa itself. It becomes 
hard to imagine the Commission for Africa as being ‘on the same page’ as the African 
peoples given its policy to sanitise the relevant historical narrative and the present reality. 
Moreover, it is probably in this that we get a glimpse of the essentially reactive nature of the 
Commission’s agenda for African development. This same story of vetoing contending 
explanations seems to repeat itself in other ways as well. It plays a significant part again in 
relation to the Commission’s discourse on African governance. The following comment 
therefore represents an alternate view on how we could have equally approached the topic 
of good governance and corruption in Africa. 
 
Inadmissible tales of governance and development initiatives 
Again, the Commission’s description of African politics and corruption does not seem to 
produce a rounded picture despite the adamance that the Commission has worked hard to 
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be “blisteringly honest” and “frank about corruption and incompetence...” (Commission for 
Africa 2005:22). There could be a flipside to this story of corruption not prefigured in the 
Report, and that is that Africa has also had its fair share of good leaders who demonstrated 
integrity and honesty.  
 
There was, inter alia, the nationalist Patrice Lumumba in the former Zaire, the pan-Africanist 
Julius Kambarage Nyerere in the beacon of hope and freedom that the Tanzania of the 
1960s-70s once represented, and the youthful and proud revolutionary Thomas Isidore Noel 
Sankara in Burkina Faso. Granted that the Commission’s preoccupation is with Africa’s 
present and future development, and allowing that there are few contemporary African 
leaders renowned for their stance in actively fighting corruption, yet historical reflection can 
be (going by the Commission’s own standards) central to any understanding of 
development. As M. Babu (cited in Rodney 2012:284) comments, to understand the present 
“we must look into the past and to know the future we must look into the past and the 
present.” The inclusion of positive experiences involving honourable African leadership is 
meant to prevent the smothering of hope and self-belief among the current generation of 
Africans. By learning from such historical examples, the African peoples can influence their 
present and future in accordance with their desires. A brief word seems to be in order on the 
leadership characteristics of the trio of Lumumba, Nyerere and Sankara, if only to explain 
why their style of governance does not rate a mention in the Commission’s Report.  
 
The Report talks about how corrupt Mobutu Sese Seko45 was in misappropriating aid and in 
plundering the wealth of Zaire, without ever referring to Mobutu’s predecessor, Patrice 
Lumumba, in the same context. It would have been appropriate to concurrently allude to 
both leaders’ legacies when considering the development journey of the post-independence 
Zaire/ Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).  
 
Unlike Mobutu whose regime was complicit in the underdevelopment of the former-Zaire for 
over three decades, Lumumba was a nationalist patriot who led his country to independence 
from European colonisation. Lumumba’s quest to consolidate Congolese national self-
determination ran a collision course with the vested interests of the former colonial powers, 
Belgium and France, as well as with that of the United States. His patriotism was perceived 
as posing a threat to the interests of these foreign powers and culminated in the decision to 
get rid of him (see Witte 2001). The local agent responsible for executing the foreign 
assassination plot was none other than Mobutu himself, who turned against Lumumba by 
                                                          
45 In the Report, Mobuto is now referred to as the Zairian ‘dictator’ which contrasts with the previous 
label of ‘ally’ when in power from the early1960s-mid 1990s. 
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staging a coup that had been masterminded from abroad. Lumumba paid the ultimate price 
defending the Congolese people’s right to their national wealth. Across Africa today, 
Lumumba is remembered for his integrity and selflessness as a leader and is considered a 
formidable moral force. Mobuto, in contrast, seems to have been consigned (deservedly) to 
the dustbin of history as a mendacious kleptocrat, a sort of malignant memento of post-
colonial African political leadership. Almost six decades on, the DRC despite its immense 
riches remains underdeveloped largely because of the legacy and continuing impact of 
Western policy.  
 
Julius Nyerere is another example of a visionary African statesman who should be 
appreciated in relation to the goal of post-independence African development. In his book of 
the same title, Simon (2006) regards Nyerere as one of the ‘fifty key thinkers on 
development’. Both during his reign as Tanzania’s president and after formally resigning 
from politics, Nyerere was commended in as many ways. The United Nations General 
Assembly, for example, bestowed upon Nyerere the title of “World Hero of Social Justice” for 
championing the cause of the world’s poor.  
 
In his native Tanzania, Nyerere is credited with forging a sense of national unity and 
harmonious coexistence among the hundred-plus cultural and linguistic groupings that make 
up the Tanzanian population. In recognition of his exceptional contribution to their nation, 
Tanzanians have come to confer upon Nyerere the twin Kiswahili accolades of Baba wa 
Taifa and Mwalimu—‘Father of the Nation’ and ‘Teacher’ respectively. But above all, Nyerere 
is admired in Africa and around the world for his humility and personal integrity. Nyerere took 
a great deal of care not to abuse his powers, nor was he tempted to misuse public funds for 
personal self-fulfilment. In resigning office voluntarily, he set a rare example of an African 
politician willing to forego power when one’s presidency became untenable.46 In contrast to 
Mobutu and Nigeria’s Sani Abacha (in between them, the two embezzled around $US10 
billions of public money) who tenaciously hang on to power, Nyerere peacefully retired to his 
birth village in rural Tanzania and was living off a small government pension to the end of his 
life (Meisler 1996). Seriously ill with leukaemia, Nyerere initially declined the Tanzanian 
government’s offer to fly him to London to receive palliative care for his illness. By the time 
he accepted to travel to London, it was too late as he had only a few days to live. Nyerere 
died in October 1999 and, given the example he set, his posthumous canonisation as a saint 
by the Catholic Church of Tanzania has been earnestly considered (cf. Mesaki 2011).  
 
                                                          
46
 The economic warfare that the IMF waged against Tanzania was part of the reason why Nyerere 
had to step down. 
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The third African head of state that I consider, a leader notable for his profound contributions 
to develop his country, is Thomas Sankara of Burkina Faso47, formerly Upper Volta. Sankara 
came to be recognised both for his (unassuming) personal code of conduct48 as well as for 
his mettle to face up to the challenge of lifting Burkina Faso out of its underdeveloped 
existence.  
 
Sankara was noted for his modesty and political temerity, traits seldom attributed to fellow 
political leaders. When serving as government minister before his ascent to the helm of 
power in 1983, a common habit of Sankara’s was to ride his bicycle to and from work on a 
daily basis (Benson 2007). Later, as president, one of his early acts was to sell the 
government’s fleet of Mercedes Benz and order his ministers to instead use the less-
expensive and fuel efficient Renault 5s (Thomas Sankara Website 2008). Years after his 
physical49 demise, Sankara’s devotion to the public good does not appear to have been 
forgotten. As Harsch (2013:263) notes of Sankara’s enduring legacy:  
 
In South Africa, for example, a Black Consciousness-inspired 
group has drawn explicitly on Sankara’s ideas to demand that 
President Jacob Zuma and other leaders of the ruling African 
National Congress give up their mansions and live by the same 
standards as the majority of the people.  
 
Meanwhile, the Sankara government actively worked to restructure Burkinabé society, which 
was deeply conservative, to facilitate the leap to ‘development’. The state legislated against 
traditional practices such as female circumcision and polygamy at the same time as it 
enacted additional laws to protect women’s rights (cf. Dembele 2008). Under Sankara, the 
state implemented agrarian reforms to assist the poor and abolished many of the privileges 
of tribal chiefs. By the time Sankara’s deputy, Blaise Compaore, conspired with the former 
colonial power, France, against his leader in 1987, Sankara had led his nation through four 
momentous years of far-reaching social transformations. Sankara was aged only thirty eight 
at the time of his murder during a bloody coup d’état instigated by Compaore, who was 
forced to relinquish power some twenty seven years later in the wake of the popular protests 
of late 2014. 
                                                          
47 Upon assuming power in 1983, Sankara renamed Upper Volta to Burkina Faso, literally the “Land of 
the Upright People”. 
48
 According to Harsch (2013:363), Sankara kept his own children in public schools and rebuffed 
relatives who sought state jobs. Would it be thinkable then to label Sankara’s politics as 
neopatrimonialist? 
49
 As Sankara himself would have it, “while revolutionaries as individuals can be murdered, you 
cannot kill ideas”. 
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Perhaps now it becomes easier to understand why the lessons of history featured in the 
Africa Commission Report may have been couched in such a way as to express a single 
development discourse. To broaden the range of Africa’s political-historical experience could 
have entailed allowing for the possibility of development outside the parameters defined by 
the Report. This could have led the Africa Commission into uncharted territory. It would 
possibly have obliged the Africa Commission to revise its terms of reference which, in turn, 
may have meant exposure to different visions of development, including contemplating 
socialist alternatives which contrast to the largely neoliberal agenda evident in the Africa 
Commission Report. Once more, such manifest lack of interest to engage in a thorough 
discussion about African history and politics speaks much about the nature of the 
development agenda on offer. The whole plan thus can possibly be viewed more as a 
mechanistic gesture than a carefully considered response to the problems facing Africa.   
  
Culture and the Commission’s policy of ‘wagging the dog’ 
Oddly, the Commission appears to neglect this readily accessible enhanced way of looking 
at the dynamics of culture as history. Instead, the Commission invokes a type of outmoded 
conception of culture to promote the ‘discussion’ on African development. Much is made, for 
example, of how the abolition of the Tol system, Somalia’s traditional court of elders whose 
job it is to dispense clan-based justice, played a major role in fuelling the civil war there 
whilst its continuation in neighbouring Somaliland has meant a semblance of relative peace 
and order.50 The question begs: why, of all of Somalia’s rich historical and cultural traditions, 
would this particular institution merit the Commission’s attention? Or still, who determines 
which (Somali) traditions are worth adopting and which ones deserve discarding, and for 
what reasons? Taking the case of England’s industrial and social revolution as precedent, 
wouldn’t the ‘modernisation’ of the African states necessitate a radical break with the past 
and on their own terms too? Even if we are not versed in Somali national history, it is 
imperative still to call to accounts the Commission’s style of composition regarding the past 
and its relevance to the present. Instead of accentuating the Tol system, the Commission 
could have brought to light the Somali people’s history of popular opposition to foreign 
incursion into their sovereignty.51 This certainly can be one possible way of making sense of 
the current turmoil in the country. In fact, despite their persistent and complex domestic 
issues, the majority of Somalis seem to think that external interference is the main reason for 
                                                          
50 The Commission’s admission that the background to Somalia’s political turmoil is complex seems of 
secondary importance here. Presumably, it is designed to fend off criticism of its version of the story.  
51
 The resistance put up by General Farrah Aidid and his fighters against the US intervention in 
Somalia in the early 1990s can be cited as an example here. 
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the continued state of warfare in Somalia today (cf. Hallinan 2015). No other writer so 
vehemently objects to the Commission’s quite mediocre and ad hoc way of treating this 
critical issue than Frantz Fanon who, long ago, penned these words: 
 
Culture has never the translucidity of custom; it abhors all 
simplifications. In its essence it is opposed to custom, for custom 
is always the deterioration of culture. The desire to attach 
oneself to tradition, or to bring abandoned traditions to life again 
does not only mean going against the current of history but also 
opposing one’s own people … When a people undertakes ... a 
political struggle, the significance of tradition changes … In an 
underdeveloped country [embarked on ‘progress’] traditions are 
fundamentally unstable and are shot through by centrifugal 
tendencies.        
                 Fanon (1967:180) 
 
Since the propagation of development as a ‘social construct’ in line with a desire to uphold 
certain interests is what apparently underlies the Commission’s effort, it probably comes as 
no surprise that the Commission talks down the importance of the complex interrelation 
governing the economic, political and cultural spheres. But there may still be further twists 
and turns to the Commission’s presentations as it strives to offset the limitations that 
ideology seems to impose on its renderings of culture. Here, I particularly concentrate on the 
Commission’s textual expressions vis-a-vis the published work of leading voices in the field 
of African theory of culture. 
 
And so on another level what also appears interesting about the Commission’s writing style 
is its manifest pretence, that is, the outwardly adherence to what reads like a liberal and 
even progressive understanding of culture. The fact that the Commission’s language seems 
to affect what others have elaborated in contexts at variance to its own, possibly gives a 
sense of artificiality to the Commission’s ways of operating. Specifically, the Commission at 
given points tends to closely simulate the prose of celebrated (anti-imperialist) African 
advocates—those who, because of their radical politics, either were thrown in jail (Ngũgĩ wa 
Thiongo’) or paid the ultimate price (Frantz Fanon, Amilcar Cabral). To substantiate my 
point, it befits to include alongside each other direct quotes of what the Commission, Ngũgĩ, 
Fanon and Cabral have to say on the role of culture in the life of society and in promoting 
political and economic change.   
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[C]ulture is more than [arts] … culture is about shared patterns of 
identity, symbolic meaning, aspiration … Culture is also about … 
how … values are formed and transmitted …. From the outset, 
as Commissioners, we were determined that the Commission for 
Africa would do all it could to avoid [omitting culture from 
development policy]. Culture could not be some bolt-on extra to 
our enterprise, or a dutiful nod to a worthy ideal. We were 
determined to build it into our process. 
                         (Commission for Africa 2005:121-122) 
 
 
What holds [a] society together is the culture it develops in the 
course of its struggle for economic and political survival … 
culture is an integral part of our growth …. Culture in other words 
is not something extra, like say a sixth finger on a human hand. 
Culture has rightly been said to be to society what a flower is to a 
plant. What is important about a flower is not just its beauty. A 
flower is the carrier of the seeds for new plants, the bearer of the 
future of that species of plants.  
               (Ngũgĩ 1993:77 and 56-57) 
 
 
A national culture is not a folklore, nor an abstract populism that 
believes it can discover the people’s true nature. It is not made 
up of the inert dregs of gratuitous actions, that is to say actions 
which are less and less attached to the ever-present reality of 
the people. A national culture is the whole body of efforts made 
by the people in the sphere of thought to describe, justify and 
praise the action through which that people has created itself 
and keeps itself in existence. A national culture in 
underdeveloped countries should therefore take its place at the 
very heart of the struggle for freedom … 
                                       (Fanon 1967:188)  
 
 
We were concerned constantly to examine our assumptions to 
discover whether in them we might be mistaking incidentals for 
essentials …. As we listened, we were particularly attentive to 
where cultural factors helped distinguish what succeed from 
what failed. We heard that ...”   
85 
 
                  (Commission for Africa 2005:122) 
 
 
[P]rofound knowledge of the culture of the people … [makes it 
necessary] to discern the essential from the secondary, the 
positive from the negative ... All this, with a view to the various 
demands of the struggle, and with the aim of being able to 
concentrate its efforts on the essential without forgetting the 
secondary, to arouse the development of positive and 
progressive elements and to resist flexibly but stoutly, negative 
and retrogressive elements; and finally, with a view to utilising 
the strengths and eliminating the weaknesses or transforming 
the latter into strengths.  
                      (Cabral 1974:16) 
 
 
In each of these passages, there clearly is a high degree of affinity in the form of the 
language employed. At the same time, there seems to be a gulf separating the Commission 
from the trinity of Cabral, Fanon and Ngũgĩ in terms of substance—as in what exactly it is 
that their respective languages are intended for. Whereas, Cabral, Fanon and Ngũgĩ’s 
immediate concern happens to be with the dialectics of culture in the context of social 
struggles against colonialism/ neocolonialism, the Commission (artfully) pushes the issue on 
a different tangent. Conspicuous by its absence from the language of the Commission is not 
only the theme of struggle, but also the entire question of the role of culture in influencing the 
other social fields (and in turn being affected by these) becomes exteriorised if you will. 
Judging by how this appears to force the Commission to depart from its professed objective 
of ushering in meaningful change, it can be argued that the Commission’s strategy comes 
across as unoriginal.  
  
All the same, the Commission does its utmost to present an up-to-date seemingly 
enlightened uptake on culture. The Commission seems to realise that contexts and 
conditions have changed which meant it had to avoid uncouth openly colonialist discourse. 
What the Commission attempts to do nonetheless is straddle a position from which it can 
possibly describe African culture in lofty, liberal cultural relativist terms whilst being careful 
about any underlying agenda it might have.52 The Commission preaches: it is wrong to think 
of African culture as “the expression of unchanging tradition … as regressive and tribal and 
                                                          
52
 Stuart Hall’s work on “encoding and decoding” discourses can be a useful guide and resource in 
this connection. 
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therefore inimical to development … an irrational force that generates inertia and economic 
backwardness. This is contrary to the evidence …” (Commission for Africa 2005:32). This 
rhetorical exercise of uttering very edifying stuff to then perhaps resist carrying what that 
might imply a step further to its logical conclusion, or else changing the trajectory all 
together, can have the net effect of diverting from the pursuit of serious development 
ultimately. And this may well mean that the Commission’s fairly dated theoretical conjectures 
on culture can be expected to impinge, in a proportionate way, practical African 
development. But how the Commission takes the clout from what genuine development 
ought to be, in addition to identifying sound strategies for potentially unmasking this, is the 
question that needs to be addressed in due course. 
 
 
3.3 Eritrea: society, political history, culture 
Eritrea is a relatively small Horn of Africa country with a population of around five million 
people. Its neighbours include the Sudan to the north and the west, Ethiopia and Djibouti to 
the south and the Red Sea shores bound it to the east.  
 
 
 
Map of Africa, with the location of Eritrea (source: internet) 
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Eritrea is socially and culturally heterogeneous. Diversity and variation is along religious as 
well as ethno-linguistic divides. In terms of the first, there is roughly equal split with respect 
to adherents of the two main religions: Christianity and Islam; in addition, animism is 
observed in some parts of the country, albeit on a limited scale. The Eritrean population is 
made up of nine distinct social groups. Each of these groups has its own language, leads a 
more or less distinctive cultural way of life and it occupies a relatively well-demarcated 
geographical territory. Besides, there is of course a mixed urban population in the capital 
Asmara and the main towns making up the bulk of the national population. The Eritrean 
linguistic groups are; Tigrinya and Tigre, together constituting some 50% and 30% 
respectively of the total population which also includes the other minority groups of Afar 
(4%), Blin (2%), Hedareb (4%), Kunama (2%), Nara (4%), Rashaida (2%) and Saho (4%). 
As for the interrelationship between religion and ethnicity, there is no one easy arrangement 
to serve as a simplifying pattern. In some instances religion and ethnicity completely overlap, 
but this is not so with most of the population; the supposedly Christian and Muslim Tigrinya 
and Tigre nationalities, include Jeberti Muslim and Mensa’e Christian minorities within them 
respectively; and the Kunama are either animists, Christians or Muslims. The present author 
identifies as a member of a ‘minority within a minority’ in that whilst I generally hail from the 
Blin, I nonetheless claim, unlike most Blina who either are Christian or Muslim, a dual 
heritage on the basis of my bi-religious parental backgrounds. Broadly speaking, religious 
affiliation in Eritrea doesn’t appear as accentuated partly due to the intermixed ancestry of 
much of the population and also due, as I will explain, to the unifying dimensions of the 
modern Eritrean nationalist experience.  
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The people of Eritrea (source: internet) 
 
 
Socio-political history and nation-formation 
The modern Eritrean national identity has gradually taken shape in the wake of political-
military developments during the last five hundred years or so. The more recent and pivotal 
history of Eritrea begins with the arrival in the sixteenth century of the Ottoman Turks on the 
port of Massawa on the coast. Around this time, the area partially became an extension of 
the Ottoman Empire. It is assumed that contestation between rival powers such as the 
Turks, Portuguese and Ethiopian rulers from the south which marked this period, constitutes 
the first step in the formation of Eritrean society in its current structure and form. Upon the 
disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, the Egyptians had briefly made their presence felt in 
the land before they too were swept away in the late nineteenth century by the Italian 
conquests of east Africa. Extending for five years from the moment in 1885 when they set 
foot on the coast to 1889 when they consolidated their grip to establish their colony of 
Eritrea, the Italians had to fight hard to overcome the resistance put up by the Abyssinian 
emperor Yohannes IV and his lieutenant Ras Alula Engida to whom Eritrea was the northern 
most part of Abyssinia proper. Victory over the latter (who had to fight on many fronts—
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against the Sudanese Mahdists and the rival Amhara war-lord who was encouraged by the 
Italians) enabled the Italians to claim Eritrea as their colony (cf. Connell 2011).  
 
For some fifty years, until their defeat by the British in 1941 in World War II, the Italians ran 
Eritrea as their colony. As with much of Africa, half century of Italian colonialism helped 
redefine completely the region’s loose social and geographical makeup. Arguably, it is within 
this short period of European colonisation that the colony of Eritrea was transformed into a 
modern political entity, delimiting the Eritrean nation and its physical boundaries in the 
process (cf. Negash 1987). For the next ten years, administration of this former Italian colony 
passed over to the British who, along with the USA, eventually decided to provisionally 
federate Eritrea with Ethiopia. Haile Selassie, the then emperor of Ethiopia, counting on 
active support from the western powers, abruptly terminated the federal arrangement and 
annexed Eritrea to Ethiopia in 1952. The takeover by Ethiopia and the unforeseen and 
coercive manner by which it was imposed on Eritrean society, paved the way for modern-
day Eritrean nationalism and struggle for political self-determination (cf. Venosa 2014).   
 
Eritrea’s struggle for national independence: culture’s scope and constraint 
Initially, Eritreans sought to regain their (usurped) nationhood through peaceful political 
means only to be confronted with violent repression at the hands of the forces of the 
occupation. The failure of this decade-long campaign to reverse the annexation in turn 
prompted drastic shift in the resistance strategy; the armed struggle was launched by the 
Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) under the commandership of Hamid Idris Awate. Despite the 
national consensus that the ELF initiated the struggle for Eritrean statehood, the ELF’s role, 
past and present, falls outside my remit on this occasion; the ELF simply could not see the 
struggle for Eritrean independence to its closing stages for reasons that again I can’t delve 
into here.53 It is a different national milestone rather which is commonly acknowledged as 
having a lasting legacy on the nation’s future political course. Eritrean history records that 
around the early 1970s ideological differences and power struggle within the umbrella ELF 
forced the leadership of what was to emerge as the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front 
(EPLF) to split and form its own movement. From its humble beginnings as a splinter run-
away and marginal group, the EPLF evolved into a formidable (Maoist) guerrilla movement 
by the 1980s and early 1990s. Having shouldered the brunt of the independence war (since 
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 In the early 1980s, the ELF was to spectacularly unravel when, expedited by the many 
compounding internal problems it has been plagued with, a combined external assault that brought 
together the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front and its close Ethiopian partners-in-arms dealt it a final 
death blow.  
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the cessation in 1981-1982 of the ELF as an active fighting force), the EPLF was able to 
conquer state power and usher in Eritrean (de facto) independence in 1991.  
 
The leadership of the EPLF considered it necessary to reproduce the dynamics of the 
Eritrean decolonisation process in a ‘national culture’. By national culture, I refer here to “the 
whole body of efforts made by the people in the sphere of thought to describe, justify and 
praise the action through which that people has created itself and keeps itself in existence” 
(Fanon 1967:188). On the topic of national culture, the anti-colonial struggle and future 
development, the Eritreans appear to have made, with varying degrees of success, practical 
use of the teachings of Amilcar Cabral and Frantz Fanon. Evidently, the EPLF’s was nothing 
short of a carefully prosecuted strategy in which Eritrean history in the making becomes 
blended with the idea of national culture itself. Enshrined within the elaborate framework of 
the EPLF’s 1977 National Democratic Program is a call to nurture an Eritrean national 
culture to undergird the claim for national self-determination and statehood (cf. People’s 
Front for Democracy and Justice 2007). In part, the Program presses the case for the 
serious appreciation, enhancement and refashioning into a symbolic national whole, the 
existing traditions of Eritrea’s fairly disparate socio-cultural groupings. It is entirely plausible 
that this Eritrean project could have been modelled on what Cabral (1974:16) in particular 
outlines as the essential organisational tasks and responsibilities of the anti-colonial 
movement:  
 
The liberation movement must be able to bring about 
slowly but surely, in the course of its political program, a 
convergence of the levels of culture of the various social 
categories which can be deployed in the struggle, and to 
transform them into a single national cultural force which 
acts as the basis and foundation of the armed struggle.  
 
 
The standard Eritrean refrain of Unity in Diversity, a slogan immensely popularised by the 
EPLF-cum-Eritrean Government, seemingly recapitulates the essence of the Eritrean 
national culture: it signifies, not to mention prescribes, national integration which is supposed 
to cut across the social divides mentioned. And of all the official Eritrean resources put out 
then and now, nothing more so manifestly conveys what this culture is about than the 
numerous audio-visual material produced by the EPLF and the Eritrean Government, a 
dataset hitherto untapped and which is explored further in chapter four in this study. 
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3.4 Historicity and the post-independence setting: continuity, misperception 
or total diversion? 
Needless to say, the invention and propagation of national culture in Eritrea’s case has been 
in response to the threat of external hostility and domination. At all times, pre- and post-
independence, a focus on the ‘national interest’ broadly articulated has helped imbue the 
form and substance of what typically passes for Eritrean national culture. As officially 
conceived, Eritrea’s national culture has been adapted to (contend with) a miscellany of 
economic, political, ideological and military contingencies that the society has to bridge in the 
course of its recent development. Nevertheless, closer observation of the current Eritrean 
national scene leads the observer to register a vital notation concerning the status of 
Eritrean national culture: two self-evidently disputatious accounts seem possible when 
considering the history of this nation on both sides of the divide marking national 
independence.54 These will be briefly introduced now before moving on to recount the 
different ways in which the current Eritrean political and economic reality has been 
interpreted. 
 
There is no doubt that during the armed struggle, the EPLF skilfully exploited culture to 
buttress the cause of Eritrean political independence. Although the components of the 
Eritrean population are the many social groups separated along ethnic and religious lines, 
this diversity and variation was to prove subordinate to the ideal of national self-
determination and independence. In fact, Eritrea’s national culture in its socially- and 
culturally-inclusive formal appearance has worked to instil the impression of a 
heterogeneous nation which has managed to harmonise cultural diversity and social 
contradictions. The basis for this national culture lay in the fact that, for the overwhelming 
majority of Eritreans, colonial Ethiopia represented an existential threat, in turn justifying a 
cohesive Eritrean response. The imperative of national unity, as opposed to fragmentation 
along sub-national line, became the linchpin of a ‘true’ Eritrean identity and its ‘ethos’. That 
is, then the Eritreans understood quite well the perils that attend to a factionalised domestic 
front vis-à-vis the colossal foreign occupier as Ethiopia was referred to. Not only was this the 
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 This appears to be in line with Fanon’s (1967:196) understanding of ‘national culture’ where he 
writes: Culture is the first expression of a nation, the expression of its preferences, of its taboos and of 
its patterns.... A national culture is the sum total of all these appraisals; it is the result of internal and 
external extensions exerted over society as a whole and at every level of that society.  
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exclusive sentiment insofar as the elites who steered the nationalist struggle were 
concerned, but also the same attitude reigned among the bulk of the civilian population. 
Eritrean independence from Ethiopia was the pinnacle of the whole nation working in unison 
for decades toward that common goal which cost upwards of 65,000 fallen combatants in 
addition to the many massacres perpetrated mainly against the Eritrean rural populations. 
With independence, a historical injustice committed by external powers against this country 
and its people was at last set right by Eritrean collective agency.  
 
The Eritrean Government today insists on the contiguous character of the Eritrean dream as 
it were. In other words, the primary concern of the Eritrean Government is to uphold what, 
from its perspectives, is the fundamental identity of the nation’s past and present struggle for 
economic and political self-development. The Eritrean Government even has come up with a 
unique designation for this: the Wafry Warsay-Yika’alo, literally Heir-Indomitable Campaign. 
In this Eritrean phrase, the word Warsay or Heir refers to the post-independence generation 
engaged in (indefinite) national service and development and who are considered to have 
taken over from the Yika’alo or Indomitable, otherwise the (heroic) EPLF fighter of an earlier 
epoch. From what I have noted so far, it is perhaps not hard to grasp why the Eritrean 
Government sees the significance of national culture as a continuum; judging by how the 
EPLF succeeded in organising the motley-formed Eritrean society into a sort of unitary 
wholeness and set the Eritrean nation on the path of self-determination and statehood, there 
can be no doubt about the galvanising role of a national culture when it comes to collective 
undertaking, like development. Not only had the heightened sense of shared national destiny 
helped propel the cause of Eritrean independence along purely political and military lines, 
but also that by pulling together the Eritreans managed to accomplish moderate 
development in certain fields in the zones the liberation movement controlled (see chapter 
four in this study). The prevailing mindset on the part of the current Eritrean leadership 
hence goes something like this: if the EPLF, under the austere and precarious conditions of 
the armed struggle, could mobilise the entire Eritrean society and accomplish so much, there 
is no reason to think that Eritrea won’t be able to attain even greater development now under 
the more propitious reality of formal statehood (the reader can consult Eyob 2012 on the 
EPLF’s economic and social achievements). 
 
All the same, from a broader point of reference, it is possible that there could be another side 
to this official story. Given the evolution lately of Eritrean politics, it is obvious that the sense 
of national purpose that worked so well in favour of this country’s cause for self-
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determination has begun to be increasingly questioned and even rejected from within.55 Of 
course, there are both internal and external contributing factors to this recent development 
even if (depending on who you speak to) the exact effect of either of these causes tends to 
be a moot question.  
 
On the one hand, the pursuit of its development vision within the present global system, 
while not entirely illegitimate, has meant that in practice the Eritrean Government’s policies 
are accompanied with significant human and political cost to the Eritrean population. Among 
other things, the features of this internally-deriving reality are; Eritrea remains under the 
authoritarian grip of a one party political system with absolutely no room for any dissenting 
domestic voices. Moreover, Eritrea excessively relies on a drastic policy of national service 
(targeting men and women between the ages of 18 and 48 years) for defence and 
development purposes. Initially planned in 1994 to last for only a year and half, in real term 
‘national service' in Eritrea drags on for an indefinite period of time. As pointed out already, 
more than anything else, the system of national service in its existing form accounts for the 
current refugee exodus from Eritrea, believed to be per capita one of the highest in the 
world. And it is here that we come across a dilemma of sorts so far as the Eritrean story of 
development is concerned; the lingering tension between what, on the one hand, is the 
Eritrean leadership’s belief in and demand for absolute self-denial, and, on the other, the 
civilian population’s questioning of the level of self-sacrifice it is willing to make as ‘true’ 
measure of its (Eritrean) patriotism. In other words, for the Eritrean Government, this 
becomes in effect a question of how to mould a ‘new human being’ who can renounce all 
capitalist sentiment in favour of (enforced) socialist morality and way of being. Despite the 
achievement of a number of development targets, those kinds of policies have resulted in a 
host of problems for the Eritrean Government whose long term effect is as yet to be 
determined. Also, for the first time ever perhaps, there began to emerge a sense of 
marginalisation among some of Eritrea’s socio-cultural groups like the Afar and Kunama 
particularly, a reaction to what other Eritreans perceive as a Tigrinya-geared cultural and 
political dominance (cf. Raji 2009; Kibreab 2008).  
 
Meantime, the internal situation in the country has been seriously impacted by the 
progression of regional and international politics. In the year 2000, Ethiopia launched a 
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 This is not to say that there haven’t been Eritrean critics (Tesfatsion Medhanie and the late Mikael 
Ghaber being prominent examples) who sensed problems with the Eritrean nationalist experiment 
even earlier on, in the very mode of the armed struggle waged by the EPLF. For someone like 
Medhanie, the social, political and economic challenges confronting post-independence Eritrea have 
a great deal to do with (insinuations of) past history: extreme centralisation of power, excessive 
preoccupation with the military aspects of the national struggle and the intense anti-intellectualism of 
the organisation’s core leadership. 
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large-scale military operation against Eritrea apparently over a disputed border territory with 
devastating effect on the economy and people of Eritrea. Following that war and the signing 
of the Algiers Peace Pact, a part of Eritrean land, including the flash point hamlet of 
Bademe, has remained, contrary to the findings and decision of the court of arbitration, in 
Ethiopian hands. Eritrea has been on a war-footing with Ethiopia ever since and the 
consequences of this in terms of the impact on development (and individual rights and 
political freedoms) cannot be ignored.56 And as previously indicated, Eritrea has been 
singled out by the United Nations Security Council for tougher economic and other sanctions 
ostensibly for its role in compromising the peace and security of the Horn of Africa region, 
specifically that of Somalia. Likewise, the attitude, more often in proxy than in sovereign 
capacity, of some of Eritrea’s neighbouring states, including Ethiopia (until very recently), 
Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia and Uganda, has led to the further isolation and ostracisation of the 
Eritrean Government internationally. No doubt, the implication for Eritrean development of 
these internal and external problems has been enormous and the relevant discussion needs 
to note down this context. 
  
Changing perceptions of Eritrean self-determination and development 
Up to this moment, my focus has tended to be on the genesis and (lately contested) role of 
national culture in the Eritrean journey for independence and political consolidation. It is 
fitting at this point to make one final observation. My statement here concerns the views of 
various players to whom, one way or the other, Eritrea’s current and future political and 
economic direction likely matters.  
 
For its part, the Eritrean Government itself squarely lays the blame on Western policy in 
Africa and the global South more generally, while it absolutely believes in the justness (on all 
levels) of its mandate. In the approach that the US and its allies have adopted towards it, the 
Eritrean Government sees dogmatic intolerance, to say nothing of external plots of 
destabilisation, with regard to the choices that other nations make—a perspective which may 
not be any further from the truth. Yet, given this drive toward independent political and 
economic development, Eritrea’s official rhetoric and action comes across as somewhat 
inexplicit and inconclusive on the question of what a ‘sound’ anti-globalisation posture may 
mean or ought to be eventually. In terms of site, agency and imagination as regards the 
hoped-for change, the Eritrean Government’s narrative does not clearly justify how its 
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 As I have alluded before, this situation appears to be changing now after the recent upheavals in 
Ethiopia that saw the reconfiguration of political power in that country. Beginning in June 2018 and 
following the reconciliatory overtures coming from the new Ethiopian Prime Minister, Ahmed Abi, 
there seems to be some let-up in this two decade-long state of no-war no-peace. 
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domestic experiment fits with the current Left-geared global resistance to capitalism. I will 
attempt to say more on this in time (chapter six) given the importance of the issue but will 
have to leave it at that for now.  
 
In contrast, the critique of the Eritrean Government’s policies coming, for example, from the 
diasporic opposition, tends to categorically fault the government for the challenges presently 
confronting Eritrean society. Among other things, the Eritrean Government is reproached for 
reneging on what is described as the ‘ideals’ of the Eritrean revolution (as it was then called), 
embodied principally in the question of political pluralism and citizenship rights.  
 
That makes for a fair criticism of the Eritrean Government given in particular how it brooks 
no dissenting opinion at all, even by those who fought hard for the country’s independence 
like those EPLF Central Committee members who were rounded up in 2001 to never be 
heard of again. But what is perhaps debateable is that, with little exception, the opposition’s 
assessment tends to be somewhat problematical, both theoretically and politically. In calling 
attention to this though, I am not in the least motivated by a desire to denigrate the efforts of 
some Eritrean human rights advocates who may well be driven by a genuine concern for the 
wellbeing of the civilian population; I can’t possibly feign ambiguity in relation to the heavy-
handed style of rule characteristic of the Eritrean Government which is indeed a real problem 
for many Eritreans.  
 
In any event, the understanding of the Eritrean opposition of the sources of 
underdevelopment and the solutions needed appears rather ingenuous and thus 
contentious. The opposition’s argument seems susceptible to certain weaknesses, for it 
proceeds from an intellectually and politically tenuous perception of the problem of African 
underdevelopment. An undemocratic national political dispensation aside, the very position 
of dismissing the role of the capitalist global political economy means that this vying Eritrean 
force may find it hard to realise its professed mission of bringing about improved economic 
and social conditions. A closer look, further, shows that this group tends to lack the 
wherewithal (conceptual and practical) to pierce through the opaque represented by the 
discourse of liberal humanitarianism and its underlying agenda. Having internalised the 
North’s rhetoric regarding the virtue of ‘good governance’ and the ‘free market’, Eritrea’s 
diaspora-based opposition appears unable to suspect (never mind detect and counter) any 
potential disjuncture between what may likely be in the interest of the Eritrean people and 
the interests of those pushing a neoliberal agenda. Worse still, and unlike the stridently 
nationalistic, secular and on the whole revolutionary stance of the Eritrean Government, 
Eritrea’s political opposition seems more interested in rallying around sub-national causes 
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and in-fighting for petty projects. Even if one considers the Eritrean Government as Tigrinya-
centralist and even if most of the Tigrinya-speaking opposition tend to be oblivious to the 
reality of Tigrinya cultural and linguistic supremacy in today’s Eritrea, my thinking is that any 
effective political dissension needs to have a national character and reach under all 
circumstances.57  
 
As for the non-Eritrean opinions, broadly this comprises a mixed bag of detractive and 
supportive positions concerning the model of development pursued by the Eritrean 
Government. Most (academic, journalistic and policy-driven) critique of Eritrea’s 
development strategy can generally be distinguished by its antipathy to the idea of the state 
controlling the economy at the expense of private sector interests. Someone like Martin 
Plaut (and possibly Thomas Friedman) can be considered as case in point here. In contrast, 
the pro-Eritrean Government’s writings, particularly that which is overly positive (see Thomas 
C Mountain and Andre Vltchek for instance) appears oblivious to issues of ‘democracy’ and 
human rights in Eritrea despite the ideological hijacking and vulgarisation of these otherwise 
transhistorical values by the dominant Western discourse. In the end, what I aim to achieve 
in this study is to adopt a point of view that not only takes into consideration all of the 
currents of opinion, ideology, historicism and interests, but also deepens understanding of 
what the Eritrean case signifies in this regard.  
 
So a closer look at Eritrea’s modern political history turns out important to grasp the genesis 
and context of its post-independence development policy. Attending to the Eritrean 
development experiment are some critical questions about the development process. Among 
other things, it is possible to infer that the pursuit of development (by African states) doesn’t 
occur in a void but under a set context. Likewise, we can see that development is normally 
informed by local concerns and expectations (even if it is impossible to exclude the bigger 
picture). And a further point to remember about ‘development’ may be that the process itself 
doesn’t unfold in a smooth fashion because of the amorphousness of experience among its 
subjects. But, ultimately, what the Eritrean example means is that we can’t make a priori 
claims about the ‘character’ and ‘trajectory’ of the development process. All this applies to 
any project in the name of African development, including the Commission for Africa.  
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 I am not suggesting here that the Eritrean Government is somehow lenient towards those who 
identify as Tigrinya-speakers; indeed, the Eritrean Government metes out equal punishment to 
anyone who opposes it and the individual’s culture, language or religion doesn’t matter at all in this 
respect. 
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3.5  Conclusion 
Chapter three gave an overview of the Commission for Africa and the Eritrean Government’s 
approach to national development. To serve as background, I touched on certain details 
about the Commission for Africa and its Report and the Eritrean development experiment. I 
highlighted, thus, not only the genesis and substance of the two development programs, but 
also the underlying ideological frame of reference.  
For both the Commission and the Eritrean case, my task initially entailed introducing the 
corresponding development approaches by stating their basic features. Besides a 
descriptive outline, the presentation at this level traced how the development agenda was 
set in motion on each occasion and the specific reasons for this.  
I noted that, based on a particular reading of the state of sub-Saharan Africa, the 
Commission resolved that capitalist economic and political development was the answer to 
the region’s decline in recent times. The detailed plan that the Commission drew up, 
including the various measures and actions, has been shown to follow in from its distinctive 
(read subjective) understandings of the region’s problems and the likely solutions. Opting for 
the private sector alongside liberal democracy, the recommendations made to the African 
states and external ‘partners’, the soliciting of personnel and information that enabled its 
work, for example, all of this came in the context of the Commission’s endorsement of a 
capitalist development model for Africa. Throughout, the Commission doesn’t seem to have 
tried to be reflexive about its choices.  
On the other hand, where Eritrea was in question, what became clear was that the 
development premise resulted from a totally different set of (historical) circumstances. 
Accordingly, it was possible to see how Eritrean development had taken its particular form in 
response to ‘local’ factors. Essentially, the Eritrean approach to development was found to 
be closely bound to the country’s story of political self-determination in the postwar period. 
This explains why, from a comparative point of view, it can be claimed that the Eritrean 
development process has been forged in the crucible of social struggle. And, unlike the 
Commission whose primary aim was to promote market-based African development, what 
distinguished the Eritrean approach instead was its collectivist description. Also, another 
element about Eritrean development was that the entire process appeared directed by the 
one-party Eritrean State. So, the disparities that I have just highlighted remain the first 
consideration when reviewing the Commission for Africa against the backdrop of the Eritrean 
approach to development.   
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As a further step and to set the tone of the argument, I also delved into some of the 
underlying assumptions that bear apparently directly on the prospect of African 
development. In particular, the chapter looked at the concept of ‘culture’ which both the 
Commission and the Eritrean Government posit as the centrepiece of what it means to 
undertake development. The attention was on the way culture, politics and economic 
concerns intercombine to potentially lend the development agenda in both instances its 
distinct signification.  
By imagining culture to be the “self-image of society as it sorts itself out in the economic and 
political fields”, I was able thus to draw parallel conclusions about the two development 
strategies in terms of the inherent objective. In the Commission’s case, my observation was 
that the significance of culture and of cultural analysis depended on the West’s implicit 
desire of dominating, politically and economically, the countries of sub-Saharan Africa. 
Simultaneously, it was possible to see that the role assigned to culture by the Eritrean 
Government stood in stark contrast to how the Commission framed the meaning as well as 
the practical value of culture. In the Eritrean case, culture and cultural practice appeared as 
intricately woven into the process of national political and economic self-determination. This 
chapter then illustrated the difference in the underlying motive for pursuing development in 
each of the Eritrean and the Commission’s cases. It showed how the Commission deploys 
culture, and language as the carrier of culture, to mystify rather than to edify. And that is the 
second element to consider when coming to terms with the argument in this study. My next 
chapter which focuses on the Eritrean development experiment will carry that argument a 
step further. 
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4. ERITREA, HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE, ENDOGENOUS 
DEVELOPMENT  
History ought never to be confused with nostalgia. It's written not to revere the dead, 
but to inspire the living. It is part of our cultural bloodstream, the secret of who we are. 
And it tells us to let go of the past, even as we honour it; to lament what ought to be 
lamented; and to celebrate what should be celebrated.                                                         
- Simon Schama 
 
The present chapter explores the significance of history and culture to the Eritrean example 
of development. This chapter focuses on the Eritrean development experiment to show the 
state in sub-Saharan Africa can undertake indigenous (non-capitalist) development. Also, 
the chapter uses the Eritrean case to explain that such development depends on careful 
ideological choice that is consistent with one’s experience. Informed by the argument for 
credible African development, the chapter thus reports the findings based on analysis of the 
Eritrean material as an alternative development discourse. The chapter is divided into two 
focus-areas of varying scope and substance. An opening statement briefly sheds light on the 
state/ quality of the Eritrean data and justifies the method and the narrative line chosen for 
this specific case. This is followed by an extended presentation of the official Eritrean 
material which forms the main body. This section is implemented over two consecutive 
stages, and considers the theoretical framework of Eritrean development and its everyday 
practical features while drawing implications for African development. A brief concluding 
statement sums up the story that the analysis of the Eritrean discourse of development 
produces.   
 
4.1 Researching Eritrea: preliminary note  
Before carrying through with the analysis of the Eritrean material in this chapter, first I should 
acquaint the reader with a specific consideration about studying Eritrea at this juncture. The 
first point concerns challenges around sourcing current Eritrean data, whereas, the other 
element relates to the efficacy of one’s analytical strategy given the nature of that material 
itself. I will deal with each of these complexities in turn so the reader can realise how the 
issue of data sampling and narrative design has been approached. 
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Sources 
Generally speaking, anyone researching Eritrea at this moment in time has to contend with 
the practical problem of accessing up to date information relating to the country. The 
cautious and secluded nature of Eritrea’s political culture not only means that largely data 
about Eritrea is scarce, but also it makes the likelihood of generating new data all but 
impossible.58 This data sourcing difficulty aside, there is a way around to pursue the 
research aims of this project using existing Eritrean material. In this connection, I see the 
researcher’s first step as consisting in locating the likely data sources on Eritrea out there in 
the public domain. Next, what I have thought is worth doing is to carefully weigh the material 
one uncovers to ascertain its quality, that is, its potential compatibility. Fortunately, my 
‘insider’ status means that my task seems to have been made a little lighter by eliminating 
the need for a third-party (a research assistant) to act on my behalf. 
    
A broad survey illustrates that there are a (limited) number of data sources on Eritrea that 
researchers can tap into. Moreover, depending on the individual types of sources, the format 
of the published material ranges in a way that reflects the purpose for which that material 
has been documented.  
For example, there is the material gathered by some of the international financial institutions 
and development organisations, such as the World Bank and the United Nations 
Development Program and similar bodies. The data from these agencies comes mainly in 
the form of statistics that shows actual outcomes of development in Eritrea. Depending on 
one’s research topic, it is possible to derive useful knowledge from their reporting on macro- 
and micro-economic development in Eritrea. Anyone interested in studying Eritrea and who 
is willing to implement a quantitative research approach could benefit from these sources.  
In addition to the data from multi-lateral bodies such as those mentioned above that has 
clear policy-implications, there is a variety of strictly academic writing on Eritrea focusing on 
social, political and economic aspects, for example, nationalism, state-building, education, 
gender issues and the like. One of the leading scholars and longstanding authority on Eritrea 
obviously is Dan Connell. As Eritrea observer, Dan Connell has published highly informative 
academic (and journalistic) work about the country dating back to the era of the armed 
struggle in the 1970s. His prodigious contribution can be considered a vital source of 
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 Ideally, the Research and Documentation Centre located in the Eritrean capital Asmara should 
have been the place where to begin sourcing information for this research project, but for reasons 
beyond the researcher’s control this has proven an unlikely possibility. A quick online glance indicates 
that this Centre has in store a trove of material (archival and modern) that can be of great benefit to 
anyone interested in learning about Eritrea and its recent history. 
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information on certain dimensions of modern Eritrean history and politics (see 
www.danconnell.net). Other, perhaps less prolific but just as notable, Eritrean and non-
Eritrean academics have also made significant additions to the literature on Eritrea. The list 
here is likely to feature such writers as David Pool, Gaim Kibreab, Richard Reid, Bereket 
Habte Selassie, Basil Davidson, Lionel Cliffe, Roy Pateman and Tesfatsion Medhanie, to 
name only a handful. Furthermore, some of the titles (by several of these writers and many 
more) appearing in the Africa World Press and the Red Sea Press provide useful 
perspectives into Eritrean issues, the Horn of Africa region and the continent at large. The 
same can also be said of David Bozzini’s logbook, a miscellaneous compilation of ‘Eritrea 
References’ which aims to keep track of the availability of academic work on Eritrea. 
Together with some of the material coming from a couple of specialist journals, such as the 
Journal of Eritrean Studies (till recently that is), the Horn of Africa Journal and possibly 
Review of African Political Economy, the value of these academic sources in continuing to 
enrich our knowledge of Eritrea remains great. In its totality, the diverse work that can be 
grouped under the label ‘academic’ forms an essential collection of secondary sources of 
knowledge on Eritrea.  
And finally, on top of the existing literature from all types of non-primary sources, there is 
that original Eritrean data found mostly online which documents both the Eritrean 
Government’s and the national opposition’s perceptions concerning the politics and 
economy of Eritrea. This Eritrean material encompasses the large volume of resources 
published by the EPLF/ Eritrean Government and the diaspora-based civic and political 
opposition.  
Now, given this multiplicity relating both to data source point and quality, the question of the 
relevancy (to this study) of the available types of Eritrean material becomes really important. 
For the purposes of this project, the dataset I shall be heavily drawing on consists of primary 
Eritrean material scattered in the public domain in which only the official government 
literature is given disproportionate consideration. There are some obvious technical and non-
technical reasons for why I have chosen to do so. First, there is the dominant fact that all 
research tends to be affected by some unavoidable constraints which necessitates knowing 
what a specific project ought to include and exclude. In this case, limiting the research scope 
to the Eritrean Government’s sources appeared suited to the study exclusively of two 
contrasting models of development. So, it is possible that a particular sense of pragmatism 
has influenced the data sampling process as I explain it. Second, this whole measure 
doesn’t imply that the literature selected constitutes the only legitimate Eritrean discourse 
available. Naturally, like all discourse, the official Eritrean discourse co-occurs with other 
rival indigenous Eritrean political discourses. Be that as it may, there tends to be good 
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reason as to why focusing on the official Eritrean material serves as a sound data selection 
strategy. My reason for prioritising this data category stems from the fact that the material in 
question represents the principal Eritrean counter-narrative vis-a-vis the Commission’s 
dominant development discourse. More than the Eritrean opposition’s, the official 
government discourse typifies the socialist dimensions of the Eritrean story of development. 
The unofficial Eritrean side of the story is not taken into account simply because the Eritrean 
opposition, which practically is diaspora-based, can’t be said to be involved in any form of 
national development in the literal sense. And, as I state, if my main aim is to describe the 
historical roots of Eritrean development rather than emphasise the substantive features, then 
I must present its indigenous intellectual and political underpinnings as officially summarised. 
In other words, if the intention is to produce a close/ realistic picture of Eritrean development, 
it becomes necessary accordingly to look at the assumptions and theories underlying the 
principal Eritrean discourse of development. Though a difficult vocation, considering my 
vernacular skills and other life experience, I would like to think I may be competent to 
interpret the central ‘message’ communicated by the primary Eritrean data. This should 
make it possible to eventually offer fresh insight into the meaning of Eritrean development. 
What is more, by drawing out the nuances of this information and thus making the story 
intelligible to a wider audience, I hope this work will acquire certain merit and therefore 
originality. 
 
Narrative frame 
In terms of rendering efficient the analytic narrative, meantime, the presentation of what the 
Eritrean data signifies necessitates an account that can draw together two distinct but 
closely interconnected chapters in modern Eritrean history. In line with the need to 
understand the genesis and context of current Eritrean development policy and practice, it is 
essential to analyse the relevant material diachronically by looking back at the pre-
independence struggle as seminal phase. This is imperative since the Eritrean Government 
actually uses the past as a yardstick to judge the future. 
As I touched on, the more recent (mainstream) history of Eritrea appears as a story of 
external hostility and internal Eritrean struggle for self-rule. In particular, Eritrea’s thirty year 
War of Independence from Ethiopia had a definitive effect in the way subsequently this 
country’s economic and political policies have come to be determined. By spawning a 
comprehensive body of unofficial oppositional discourse, the Eritrean armed struggle and its 
accomplishment acts as repository for the kind of social transformation being sought in 
103 
 
today’s Eritrea. It is to say that the form of development that we have come to witness in 
post-independence Eritrea has been mapped through the experience of that earlier milieu of 
collective struggle and sacrifice. Accordingly, only if we succeed in highlighting its historical 
scope can a proper interpretation of Eritrea’s post-independence development strategy be 
possible. It becomes important thus to visualise the Eritrean approach to development as 
being about coming to terms with “the present through the past, and the future through the 
present and the past.” So the reader deserves to be informed beforehand why it bears 
stating that there are important judgments that need to be made regarding how to access 
which Eritrean data and why, and also what kind of narrative strategy to adapt.  
Having cleared the ground, the rest of the chapter explores the significance of the Eritrean 
discourse of development by focusing on its abstract as well as its more substantial 
quotidian manifestations. As a first step, I consider it vital to explore how particular strands of 
the Eritrean material anticipate the type of worldview which informs the Eritrean 
Government’s concrete development plans. The idea is to follow how the Eritrean 
development discourse weaves together a set philosophy of being and a theory of social 
history, including ways of bringing about political change. To delineate the conceptual 
foundations of the Eritrean development undertaking eventually is to facilitate our sense of 
what its underlying premise is. Following this, I offer a more specific account of the practical 
imperatives that mark the Eritrean approach as the embodiment of a discourse of resistance. 
Besides, now as then, the topics stressed in the Eritrean discourse range broadly. These 
deal with social, cultural, political, economic and militaristic exigencies, all bearing on self-
determination, statehood and future national development. Characteristically, the Eritrean 
narrative evinces such (asymmetric) standpoint as: sense of being connived against and 
short-changed, a sceptical disposition, denunciatory tone, resentment, lamentation (or, in a 
word, a mindset betraying general feeling of being wronged); buoyancy, devotion, veneration 
of virtuous conduct, capacity to overcome rough times, positive self-image, affirmation of 
women’s emancipation and participation in change (or, in brief, a celebration of the epics of 
the Eritrean peoples’ potential and will to change their lot). And this whole ‘dualistic’ way of 
thinking and acting naturally has direct repercussions on the choices and decisions made 
about current Eritrean development.  
 
4.2 The world, its basic operating rules, social history, Eritrean development   
There appears to be a grand motif to the Eritrean national discourse during the armed 
struggle and thereafter that manifests as an expression of the human condition. The 
dominant Eritrean postwar trope can be summarised in a collective quest for freedom from 
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domination—by natural and social forces. The will to turn this mission into reality is what 
seems to have given the Eritrean national cause under the aegis especially of the EPLF its 
moral and political authority. Judging by the Eritrean Government’s rhetoric and action, the 
same call appears to have been carried over into the post-independence stage, where the 
principle of independent political and economic development is being fully advocated and 
defended. On paying close attention to the Eritrean narrative over the two consecutive 
phases in the country’s history, we start to sense that the quest for freedom and 
development depends on a distinctive mode of thinking about human society and its 
fundamental principles. This same thinking also extends to those aspects that map the 
‘trend’ of historical development and change. In its more specific expressions, that major 
theme can be distinguished by: first, representations of society as a self-contained internally 
coherent system; second, the conviction that, in accordance with certain established 
philosophical belief/ reasoning and the evolvement of history, human will and action can 
resolve the problem of ‘alienation', and; third, the corollary fact that Eritrean development 
policy presupposes the preceding dual premise. These closely interconnected themes are 
taken up in more detail below. 
  
The philosophical groundings of the Eritrean development claim 
It is possible to come across examples, be it in the EPLF’s or the Eritrean Government’s 
literature, which indicate that the normal progress of society, while inevitable, must first 
overcome specific challenges consequent to a dialectical process. That is taken as the 
starting point for any conception of human society and its development across time and 
space. Be it the group’s early 1970s founding manifesto, Our Struggle and its Goals, 
information relating to the essential views of the Eritrean President himself, Isaias Afwerki, or 
political seminars organised by the ruling party’s top cadres, the message is always the 
same and clear: comprehensive Eritrean development leading to lasting freedom and 
happiness can only materialise in the wake of Eritrean society as unity managing and 
deciding on its own affairs, outside influence notwithstanding. In all of the ‘language’ 
emanating from the Eritrean side, the central object is to justify both the endogenous and 
historical dimensions of Eritrean development. The intention here is to refute as well as 
supplant any decontextualised external diktats. For this first part of the presentation, I will 
use as sample material an example of a YouTube speech by an Eritrean Government 
minister and TV interviews with the Eritrean Head of State together with the Front’s 
manifesto. I will reference this material both to describe and analyse what underlies the 
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Eritrean approach to change on an intellectual plane. In combination, these three sources 
appear emblematic and can be used to canvass what needs to be gotten across.    
 
The essential materiality and dialectical tone in Eritrean development  
From time to time, officials of the Eritrean Government, either individually or as part of a 
formal delegation which includes the government-sponsored cultural troupe, travel abroad 
and meet with diaspora Eritreans. Genealogically, this tradition was thought up during the 
armed struggle to assist with its growth and consolidation. In addition to its fund-raising 
potential, the main purpose of those expeditions is to ensure that the diaspora populations 
are kept (politically and ideologically) abreast vis-a-vis the government’s national program 
and objectives. The visiting Eritrean official’s task thus is to brief the diaspora communities 
about important matters that concern their home country, not least the state of development, 
with the aim of winning their allegiances.  
In one such trip, recently, former EPLF commander and current Eritrean Minister of Energy, 
General Sebhat Ephrem, toured a number of European cities. While in Stockholm, he gave a 
speech in which he highlighted the underpinnings of the Eritrean Government’s social and 
political philosophy and its bearings on the national development drive (see Dimtzi Eritrawian 
Stockholm v12 2015). Not only did the Minister discuss what lies at the core of Eritrea’s 
socio-political system, but, more tellingly, he also endorsed the Eritrean system of politics. 
The complex challenges presently facing the country together with a sense of responsibility 
on his part to allay the audience’s fears about the future of Eritrea, is the framework and 
background for that particular speech. Interestingly enough, he described the essence of the 
Eritrean official attitude thus: mis hizbkha trekhbo ma’et ge’at eyu59 (a difficulty situation 
when faced by the people as a whole becomes easy and surmountable). But based exactly 
on what broader postulates is this Eritrean stand advanced? And how could that impinge the 
national development plan?   
   
Autonomous development choice, supremacy of a materialist objective reality    
At the heart of Ephrem’s 2015 Stockholm seminar is the question of the implication of 
Eritrea’s collective experiment in political self-determination and economic development. His 
                                                          
59
 In its culturally-specific sense that Tigrinya phrase means “a problem encountered with one’s 
people is (to be enjoyed like feasting on) porridge”. For the sake of the reader who may not be versed 
in that Eritrean vernacular, communicating the spirit, rather than the literal text, of what has been 
expressed seems to me to be more helpful. 
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point of view seems notable both for its breadth and detail. In what reads like a rehearsed 
reference to ‘laws’ that govern the natural and social realms and their import to Eritrean 
development, Ephrem specifically talks about the (animate and inanimate) world operating 
according to its own well-defined independent laws. Speaking in the Tigrinya language, 
kid’m ezi alemna h’gitat alewo … ezi alemna khulu b’program b’higi eyu z’kheid, he makes 
his very point.60 To elaborate, he metaphorically evokes what manifestly comes across as 
natural in the case of ‘roosters’, ‘chicken eggs’, ‘glass cups’ and ‘corn grain’. He also brings 
up the ‘Napoleonic wars’ and ‘Nazi wars’ along with the ‘rise of the European Union’. 
Ephrem accordingly announces a series of observations, and here I directly quote portions 
from his speech: 
(a) Whether we time it or not, a rooster always crows at 6:00 o’clock in the morning, that is 
its job …  
(b) … It takes twenty one full days for a chicken egg from the minute it is incubated till it 
reaches a hatching stage … and,  
(c) A glass cup suspended from hand when dropped on a floor breaks up into pieces …  
 
When you think a little deeper about the examples that this Eritrean official cites, you slowly 
begin to gather a number of things, inductively. In the first place, the commentary seems to 
offer proof that there is indeed a (antecedent) material world out there which we perceive 
through our sensory faculties—our eyes, ears and other senses. That, for example, roosters 
are real creatures and that they are capable too of crowing at set time of the day is an 
undeniable existential fact. Likewise, noting the absence of any reference to extrinsic forces, 
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 At the same time, he notes a couple of what one understands to be derivative or qualifying points 
whose relevance mostly arises in the field of practical activity: first, that, at given junctures in their 
history, humans only partially comprehend the workings of these laws, but can increase their 
knowledge over time and that the trick for them is to fathom how to act in the face of existing limitation 
in human knowledge; second, the fact that (unsolicited) external force inevitably produces a disruptive 
effect. Ephrem sees religion and science as being capable of aiding our understanding of these laws 
to a degree, but he concludes it is philosophical reasoning that furnishes lasting/ conclusive answers 
where the former’s explanatory power is found to be wanting. The Eritrean Minister relates that 
neither religion (a David conquering Goliath) nor scientific rational analysis (political craftsmanship) 
can meaningfully explain the Eritrean peoples’ struggle that, against all odds, saw them prevail over 
the might of the Ethiopian State and its superpower backers. According to Ephrem, only a 
philosophically-inspired and profoundly assured attitude can help avoid potential confusion in how we 
think and intend to act. In Eritrea’s case, he attempts to simplify the meaning of that approach using 
certain typically Eritrean refrains: mis hizbkha trekhbo ma’et ge’at eyu (a difficulty situation when 
faced by the collective will of the people becomes easier to deal with); kalsena newih eyu, kalsena 
mareir eyu, awatna gin nay gidin … ezi ayterfin eyu (our struggle is protracted and bitter, our victory is 
certain, that is inescapable), and; kulu gizie haki eyu zi’ewet (in the end, truth always prevails, or right 
defeats might). 
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what we might also read into the Eritrean point of view is that it is naturalist. That means the 
world may not necessarily be the result of supernatural design; it doesn’t therefore befit to 
describe it from the perspectives of metaphysics. Second, we learn that a material world 
implies an objective reality that cannot be reduced to transcendental human attributes—like 
a discretely existing and functioning mind or spirit. Most significantly, however, one also gets 
the impression that people develop their ideas (consciousness that glass splinters on hitting 
a hard surface) as a consequence of practically experiencing the real world around them, not 
the other way round. Or, in a word, it is determined that practice commonly precedes 
thought. Lastly, it is possible to think it is the speaker’s assumption that the laws of the world 
we inhabit are knowable to us. Our knowledge of both nature and society (even if incomplete 
at any one moment in time) is treated as objective and truthful. But what does all this mean 
in reference to Eritrean development itself?  
From the details that this Eritrean Minister ventures, it is apparent that the Eritrean initiative 
to transform the natural and social world has its basis on a thoroughly materialist, as 
opposed to an idealist, approach to reality. In other words, to better their existential 
conditions, it means the Eritrean people will have to harness their own productive labouring 
capacities and not just fall back on the power of (imported or divine) ideas to continue 
surviving. If experience is anything to go by, launching the nation on the path of hard 
struggle is what the Eritrean Government’s effort on the political, economic and military 
fronts has been about for already many years. Meanwhile, it turns out that any subjective 
posture (on the part of whomever) has limited or no bearing on the nature of reality 
understood in such impersonal terms. Consequently, we are left with no doubts that the 
development ‘discourse’ propagated by the Eritrean side takes its cues from the real world, 
bound as it is by certain inherent principles outside human volition or whim. For Eritreans, 
like subaltern groups everywhere else, the real world too embodies their distinctive historical 
experience of struggle against oppressive power—in its formal colonial manifestation. And, 
as final point, it is of interest to also note that this past experience has become the precursor 
of the present Eritrean development reality as impacted by the balance of internal and 
(neocolonial) external forces. That is the first of a two-part instalment of information about 
the world and its governing laws that Ephrem converses about, and here follows its second 
layer. 
 
Dialectic, social change, trajectory of Eritrean development 
The other ‘law’ that the Eritrean Minister identifies is a point about twosomes/ binary 
opposites (Tsm’ditat/ Ants’arat in his words) whose effect he considers in the context of the 
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self-directed nature of change toward some climax. Ephrem explains that it is only natural for 
things to exist as pairs and as opposites (two eyes per person, living beings as males or 
females, atoms as combining electrons and neutrons … etc.). Reportedly, the fact of duality 
also means it is impossible to come across somebody with three eyes, legs, kidneys or who 
might be transgender for that matter, an alarming probability to quote the Eritrean himself. It 
seems there is no scope here to think in terms of grey areas according to such schema.  
What this, when combined with a materialist approach to reality, amounts to is a kind of 
exclusive monopoly of the ‘truth’ on the part of the Eritrean Government. Parenthetically told, 
a position such as this can be seen as justifying the proscription by the Eritrean Government 
of all other contrarian (anti-realist and relativist) views. Especially, the policy has been 
aggressively pursued against the influence of religious evangelistic tendencies which the 
Eritrean Government considers a threat. I may here add that Eritrean advocates of 
Pentecostalism and Islamism are routinely hounded by the authorities and, following arrest, 
often get harshly treated without due process.61 From the Eritrean Government’s 
perspective, all contending thought and practice whether religious or secular has to be 
sidelined for it is deemed to hinder development as officially defined. The above comment 
serves as a slight but necessary detour. It is intended to show how the Eritrean Government 
tends to rationalise its (repressive) actions domestically based on its sole claims of the truth. 
Still, what gives Ephrem’s speech added importance by this stage is the inclusion of a 
discussion of the history and development of (Eritrean) society and the crossover with the 
other two (and certainly many more) sources. I will expound on how the fusion of 
philosophical thinking and social analysis works to give the theoretical paradigm at the 
centre of the Eritrean development initiative its definite form. 
 
Eritrean development and its historical materialist methodological core  
Adopting a distinctively classical social evolutionist terminology, the Minister frames the 
central thesis of his lecture as: Men ena nihna? Beyen halifna? Ab meweda’eta kemey elna 
ena nikheid zelena? Translated roughly from the Tigrinya text into the English language, the 
expression corresponds to: Who are we? How have we gotten to where we now are? And, in 
the end, how are we journeying into the future? Ephrem’s is a tacit reference to Eritrean 
                                                          
61
 This has been the case with some of the teaching staff of the Islamic schools in the town of Keren 
in the early 1990s where many of the teachers there were made to disappear. Also, a similar fate has 
met members of the Pentecostal Christian groups who have fallen foul with the various (secularist) 
policies of the Eritrean State. 
109 
 
society—its originations, the stages of development it has gone through and its likely future 
course and maybe final destination.  
The full speech makes for an interesting account of how and why Eritrean society has come 
to develop in the way it is developing at the moment. In his speech, Ephrem also reflects on 
whether this particular course of development can be viable in the long run. As he 
deliberates, he makes particular mention of the internal and external forces that have been 
responsible for the respective historical outcomes. And it is at this juncture that the views of 
the Eritrean President on society and politics and the full meaning of the Manifesto also 
become useful for understanding the theoretical underpinnings of the Eritrean quest for 
autonomous development. The Eritrean President’s outlook doesn’t seem to diverge a great 
deal from his Minster’s on this score, and the thoughts of both can be traced back to the 
Manifesto. Historicism, or the idea that human history is governed by immutable laws, is 
what one deciphers as at the centre of the official Eritrean mode of thinking.  
Whereas the Eritrean Minister’s proclivity is to celebrate exclusively the power of 
philosophical reasoning, the text obtaining from the President’s interviews in comparison can 
be judged as of interest from the point of view of day to day conduct of (radical) politics. Just 
to orientate the reader as to Afwerki’s way of thinking, here is a flavour of what he has to 
say:   
I say there is a law that governs communities. When individuals 
came together in primitive communities, there has to be a law 
that is acceptable for everyone. They came together to live 
together, to mobilise resources collectively and to achieve 
collective goals … The status quo of any community at one 
particular historical moment [doesn’t] allow a minority to grab on 
the resources of the majority and make the poor poorer while 
they accumulate at the expense of the majority. This has been 
the struggle of communities since millennia. This is a rule of the 
game, we are not inventing anything—you don’t invent 
anything.
62      
 Meantime, on the question of how societies develop and, further, on what grounds we might 
judge development as ‘sustainable’ or not, the Eritrean leader’s understanding can be 
summed up through these words:  
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 In declaring that there is in place “ … a rule of the game, we are not inventing anything—you don’t 
invent anything” it appears that Afwerki might be eliciting Marx’s philosophical materialism which 
states that the laws of the world, in its natural and social states, don’t lie beyond the bounds of human 
understanding and knowledge. See Dantò (2015) http://www.eastafro.com/2015/04/07/video-
president-isaias-afwerki-foreign-aid-is-meant-to-cripple-people-u-s-ngos-kicked-out-of-eritrea/. 
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You want to talk about a community at a particular historical 
moment, then you have to ask these very simple questions: Who 
creates wealth? And how do people share wealth created by the 
majority? And do they share wealth fairly and equitably? That is 
where the problem comes …
63
  
In Afwerki’s assessment, these are the sort of questions that need to be asked at all times 
and in the case of all societies to establish the ‘legitimacy’ of development. For him, the real 
meaning and object of development is to ensure the welfare of all members of society. The 
view held by the Eritrean Head of State seems to be that the subsequent development of 
society ought not to drift away from that earliest ‘contract’ that humans have entered into out 
of their own free will to secure a livelihood. According to the Eritrean formal understanding, 
the objective of social harmony and global peace follows on from a just and equitable 
redistribution of the common wealth of humanity. That is to say, this same outcome cannot 
otherwise come from a (capitalist) social order characterised by individualism, greed, racism, 
exclusion, polarisation and wars of plunder. As the Eritrean President elaborates:  
These are not the product of the 20
th
 or even the 19
th
 century 
when industrialisation came …. We have now the information 
age, we can talk about globalisation, but the same questions 
remain all along and the rules are always the same.64    
On the basis of the content of those ‘texts’ we can surmise the following. On the one hand, 
everything in this world comes with two discordant sides and the ensuing tension triggers the 
kind of change that would offset their effects and transcend them ultimately. On the other, 
that things continue to grow and attain a healthy higher state of being when they fully 
complete their natural course of development without (undue) interposition from the outside. 
Basically, it is not implausible to think that this exactly is the sort of abstract reasoning which 
presages the Eritrean social development experiment. I shall expound by adhering to what 
has been reported in the Speech, the Interviews and the Manifesto.  
First, as a way of explaining how binary opposites work, in particular, the Eritrean Minister 
invites his audience to think about Eritrea’s political and economic experience during the last 
decade or so in which the country came under foreign military aggression and economic 
sanctions. The specific phrase he uses to contrast Eritrea’s difficult past experience with the 
(presumably) positive about turn in more recent times, is this: key tselmete meret ayberihen 
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 See the link at footnote 62. 
64
 Again refer to the link at footnote 62. 
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eyu (one has to go through periods of darkness before it is possible to savour the light of 
day). If we cast our gaze back into the not-so-distant Eritrean past, it is possible to 
appreciate the implication of what is being said (in 2015) as the extension of an earlier 
position as has been stated in the Manifesto: There is … oppression and struggle within [and 
between] societies … But in time, oppression is invariably met with resistance. The 
impoverished and the workers rise against the rich … and the new erupts over the old. This 
is a historical truth. As far as the nature of change goes, that is, in terms of identifying its 
sources, causes and likely direction, the notion of enduring first adversity before 
experiencing improvement in one’s conditions, resonates as a basic and unvarying65 
philosophical principle of what it means to be an Eritrean. On top of anything else, it 
reinforces the view that social conflict is the engine of historical change. We also seem to 
glean here that historical development tends to be patterned and purposive in that a 
teleology of emancipation sits at its centre. So, it makes sense to think about the Eritrean 
approach as an example of development by contradiction in line with certain aspects of the 
anti-globalisation critical literature and praxis. 
Likewise, it is by way of augmenting further that very thinking that the Eritrean Minister 
afterwards evokes the other examples—this time to underline at once the autonomous, 
internally coherent and transcendent nature of change. Quoting Ephrem again, in the case of 
a grain of corn, his observation is that people, generally speaking, may have two choices as 
to what to do with corn grain: corn can either be ground into flour for baking, or else the seed 
can be planted in the soil. When cultivated, under the right conditions (ample water and 
sunlight), corn seed gradually gets transformed first into a seedling and thereafter into a fully 
blossomed kernel-bearing maize plant. It is reported, all one needs to do is just stand aside 
and observe as the entire evolutionary process takes care of itself.  
Besides, we are told that this very dispensation is duplicable and can be envisaged in other 
settings, including human society. As he contends, the same principle holds as far as, for 
example, the formation of the European Union goes. The rise of the EU, it is preached, was 
the culmination of a self-promoting indigenous process reflecting its member states’ ambition 
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 Mind you, this particular attitude is not limited to the Manifesto and Ephrem’s Speech of 2015 only; 
this key political belief often features in some of the other material produced along the full course of 
the Eritrean armed struggle for self-determination as well. During the height of the Ethiopian push in 
the 1980s to dislodge once and for all the EPLF from around its strong-hold of Sahel in northern 
Eritrea, for example, the celebrated Wedi Tkhul composed one of his memorable lines about the 
Front’s capacity to persevere in the face of adversity. In part, the Eritrean singer has this to say: 
midrin semayen ente telagebe, kem ayni merfi’e kulu ente tsebeba … rahwa ni rekhbala hanti ma’elti 
ala ye (even if we were to get caught in a situation in which the sky and earth would have to close 
down on us; even if everything were to turn out so critical and gloomy to the point of the likelihood of 
survival shrinking into a needle’s eye before us; even if …. Still there is that day when we shall 
experience a let up).  Wedi Tkhul (‘Nqhatyu Wesani’, c1983, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9DZr-
fceG5I). 
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to come together in a block and out of their own volition.66 Hitler and Napoleon, according to 
the same argument, could not remodel Europe (and the rest of the world for that matter) in 
their images. Despite the huge war machine at each one’s disposal, their coercive strategies 
for the continent could not bring a EU into existence; instead, it only left a trail of death and 
destruction and ended in their shattering defeats.  
Shifting his analysis to more contemporary topics, he extends that conclusion to America’s 
21st century overseas adventures which saw this power invade countries like Afghanistan 
and Iraq under the banner of a ‘war on terror’. Irrespective of the underlying reasons, for 
Ephrem, the attempt by NATO to (artificially) reorder Afghan society will fail. The explanation 
he offers is that the external actors concerned appear to be coming from a position of power 
to enforce their agenda on an unwilling population. As such, theirs turns out to be a policy 
that interferes with the process of society’s organic development which is usually 
characterised by reciprocities of give and take among equals. In and of itself, the response 
of the Eritrean President also appears to champion the theory of independent social 
development adumbrated by members of his government, including his Energy Minister. 
Now, undoubtedly, this whole deliberation is evocative of the vision guiding the development 
process in Eritrea: from the government’s point of view, not only will Eritrea inevitably 
experience change at the hand of its people, but what is also equally factual about this 
prospect is its gradual and cumulative nature. That said, as an afterthought, it is necessary 
here to iterate that the Eritrean understanding of ‘independence’ doesn’t seem to be about 
development under ideal conditions. Despite and perhaps because of the affirmation of ‘self-
regulation’ in change, the Eritrean Government seems to realise that development today 
doesn’t transpire in a vacuum. As the Eritrean official narrative makes clear, there is a rigidly 
structured global political economy in the context of whose power imbalances countries seek 
to gain control of their destinies and develop. And so in the words of the Eritrean President:  
That [ideal development] doesn’t happen in the real world … 
those who have the muscle to impose their will … have their 
interests and we have ours. Do we go with them, or do we go our 
own way?
67
  
Granted the weight of empirical evidence, it is the latter option that the Eritrean Government 
appears more or less keen to pursue—with what all that might mean in practice. Eventually, 
the choice by the Eritrean Government of such sovereign ways of being and knowing follows 
from the twofold belief in the concurrently independent and interdependent character of 
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 Brexit, the vote by the British people in 2016 to voluntarily leave the European Union, also proves 
this point albeit in a reverse way. 
67
 Source is the link at footnote 62 
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social development. Up to this point, we have seen how given aspects of the Eritrean 
material opens a window into the type of conceptual frame of reference that seemingly 
underwrites Eritrea’s version of what ‘development’ means and how it may be effected. Just 
before concluding this first part, I will need to flesh out what I think are the finer connotations 
of the investigation by referring to the current state of development in Eritrea.  
 
Eritrean development: combining autarkical thinking and praxis  
In scrutinising that material with the view to determining its semantic scope as regards the 
Eritrean development process, it is possible to register a couple of specific nationally-
relatable facts.  
Most of all, it sounds an avowed Eritrean position that a defining attribute of our world is its 
dynamic nature as opposed to stasis; growth and change as intrinsic to nature and society. 
Human knowledge, about social development or anything else, comes as a function of that 
reified universal principle. The essence of reality (as reflected in a continual process of 
interaction and change) must be equally obvious to all is what seems to be the point of the 
Eritrean claim. The Eritrean official perspective on the entire question of development thus 
reads something like: people embark on ‘development’ because they can think for 
themselves that what they set out to achieve amounts to exactly such a thing. As Eritrea’s 
(typically caustic) President would have it:  
One good thing we have done is we have never made a mistake. 
We have not relied on outside intervention … The lessons we 
have learned are assets for us … Unless we write our own 
programs, we can’t imagine achieving anything.68  
The hint in Afwerki’s message here being that there is no obligation to solicit ‘expertise’ (from 
a self-proclaimed outside authority) to articulate on behalf of others what reality is supposed 
to represent. Claims to privileged or esoteric perception are, on this score, harder to justify. 
The case for autonomous development in the Eritrean situation not only appears predicated 
on that presupposition, but it also tends to be validated by it.  
In terms of its fundamentals, the development process in Eritrea therefore appeals to 
universal epistemological standards albeit in accordance with specific influences that are 
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exclusive to the local environment.69 I think that, in the Eritrean case, the meaning of 
development appears premised on Hegelian dialectics via its materialist adaptations within 
the Marxist intellectual tradition.  
I believe that this is so based on the fact that the Eritrean outlook clearly exemplifies the two 
core propositions of dialectics, namely that change is embodied by: a quantitative versus 
qualitative interrelation, and; a model involving thesis and antithesis resulting in synthesis as 
a way of bridging the ‘alienation-history’ gap if you will. Revisiting the example of the 
transformations that see corn grain turning into a maize plant, it can be suggested that this 
particular simile reflects the doctrine of quantitative input (turning over soil, absorption of 
water, nutrients and sunlight) bringing about a qualitative change (a whole new plant). The 
same process also symbolises change as the cessation of one thing and the becoming of 
another. What went into the postwar Eritrean political and armed struggle in terms of human 
and material investment was a quantitative contribution. In turn, this brought about a 
qualitative transformation represented in the death of foreign domination and the birth of 
Eritrean statehood.  
In similar vein, it is possible to think of the Eritrean Government’s claim that its major 
responsibility is to improve the quality of life of the people beyond subsistence to a more 
sustainable standard of living in the future along this line. The focus on expanding the 
agricultural sector to achieve long-term food security, for example, could be understood from 
this perspective as well. As the Eritrean Government insists on a policy of self-reliant 
development and since the country lacks year-round major river systems, a key government 
strategy to ensure food security involves the micro-damming of seasonal streams using the 
national service force. The story repeats itself where development in other fields (health, 
education, transport infrastructure) is at issue. Every able-bodied Eritrean is expected 
(compelled is the right word here) to lend their fair share of effort towards the achievement of 
the national development goals as set by the Eritrean Government.70 This cumulative activity 
is what the Eritrean Government counts on as the quantitative input which will presumably 
usher in a qualitative transformation in the form of enhanced living standards for the 
population.  
In turn, the vexed issue of foreign aid as key to stimulating sub-Saharan African 
development becomes a moot point; Eritrea hence only selectively accepts official 
                                                          
69
 Asked, on another occasion, if there is any uniquely Eritrean style of management, the Eritrean 
President is reported to have said: There is no such thing as an Eritrean philosophy, it’s based on 
realistic approaches to dealing with challenges and I believe this is universal (New Africa, November 
2011). 
70
 The current indefinite character of the ‘national service’ and the controversy it has helped generate 
has much to do with the government’s belief in this respect. 
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development aid, and most foreign NGOs have been asked to wind up their work in the 
country. That conditional aid usually cripples society and that such ‘aid’ ought to be avoided 
at all cost is a strongly-held belief of the Eritrean Government can’t therefore be overstated. 
Given, on the other hand, the Eritrean Government’s direct involvement in the national 
economy, the Eritrean development model flouts the North’s development paradigm 
authorised for the global South. We learn from Ephrem, for example, that materialism and 
attendant dialectical process not only is the natural order as far as poultry and seeds go, but 
the very mode of reasoning is what also powers the Eritrean desire for substantive 
development. Afwerki’s analysis and his movement’s Manifesto also seem to underline this 
very point. The application of dialectical materialism to Eritrean society and its history again 
means that the Eritrean development process is infused with the teachings of historical 
materialism. Because of this, Eritrea’s post-independence political and economic course is 
bound to be in conflict with the interests of the dominant capitalist powers. That fact in part 
explains Eritrea’s current fraught relations with those same powers. Furthermore, since the 
Eritrean posture conforms to a form of universality advanced within the work of (the early) 
Marx, it means that its intellectual conception of progress (largely socialist) locates it at the 
opposite ideological pole to Liberalism. Or, more exactly, the Eritrean approach to 
development comes across as a total negation of the neoliberal model propounded by the 
Commission for Africa. That, in the end, is the theoretical tenor of the material I have been 
examining which should pave the way to my next task where I look at its more experiential 
dimensions.    
 
4.3 Struggle, culture, everyday development activity by contradiction  
In the first part of the analysis of the Eritrean material, I elected to lay out the conceptual 
parameters of the Eritrean approach to development. At the centre of the Eritrean 
development agenda can be located a dialectical and historical materialist understanding of 
the social world and how it evolves over time. The vital lesson I gleaned points to the fact 
that a full and healthy state of development obtains when things are permitted to run their 
natural course. Also, by extension, anything that stands in the way of that prospect obviously 
elicits resistance in the form of active human counter action. The EPLF and consequently 
the Eritrean Government appear to have approached the ‘modernisation’ of Eritrean society 
from this angle. At this point, I would like to complement what I have already noted with the 
subtext deriving from the sort of day to day empirical practices that give the process of 
development in Eritrea its distinct characteristics. Such everyday practices nourish, and are 
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nourished by, certain widely disseminated Eritrean ‘cultural traditions’ directly implicated in 
national development, a fact which enhances their importance.  
 
Alienating power and the course of Eritrean history  
Typically, the backdrop to the range of empirical evidence that I examine signifies a hostile 
eminently exploitative political environment founded on power imbalances; those who wield 
power inevitably use their position to hold down the weak and the impoverished who in turn 
have no option but to resist and win their freedoms. A state of ongoing strife, not illusions of 
functionalist consensus, turns out to be the abiding understanding of how the world as 
construed by the Eritrean lens operates. In Eritrea’s lived experience, the principal sphere in 
which unequal relations of power play out is the global context as it pits this country’s desire 
for self-development against powerful outside forces.71 Alienation, or else a state of 
estrangement involving a quest for endogenous development and external opposition, 
represents the underlying theme insofar as the substantial response coming from the 
Eritrean side is concerned. There seems to be good ground for saying that alienation 
remains a major issue in the life of the Eritrean nation as the following brief statement may 
illuminate.  
Anyone who has closely followed the Eritrean scene can’t fail to register that the Eritrean 
journey has been all about facing and defeating the alienating effects of hegemonic power 
politics. Eritrea’s political history details how this society has previously been denied its 
independence in the aftermath of European and later Ethiopian expansionist interests in the 
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 This is not to say though that the problem is absent from the domestic scene. Albeit it on a minor 
scale, oppressive relations tend to occur locally with reference to gender issues and patriarchal power 
for example. If I have to remind the reader of the problem of alienation regarding gender relations in 
Eritrea, it would have been only proper to give a taste of some of the Eritrean material that focuses on 
women’s participation and empowerment as the equals of their male counterparts. Dehan Kuni 
Wushate (Tigrinya for: Bidding you good bye my domestic life 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A_hcc_w8_jg) together with Hirimit Et Ana Nabr Alko (Tigrayit for: 
I have been enduring an oppressive life https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9C-hBqlsf4Q), each 
performed by female Eritrean combatants, present a resentful mood, highly disparaging of traditional 
gender roles assigned to the Eritrean woman. The image profiled in one of the clips (Dehan Kuni) is 
that of a stern-faced proud-looking Eritrean female fighter wearing a tight short with her sleeves rolled 
up and an AK-47 firmly clutched close to the body. It had probably been chosen to give the 
impression that Eritrean females can perform any duty assumed by males including frontline combat. 
The significance of the message in these two pre-independence era audio-visual pieces can be said 
to lie in its foreshadowing of women’s inclusion and role in the post-independence development 
program. Also while on the same note, I should make certain that I don’t ignore the question of 
alienation as relates to economic class and internal class-based social relations. Interestingly enough, 
the issue doesn’t appear to be an essential part of the Eritrean socio-political landscape since classes 
(capitalist/ working) don’t seem to be accentuated within Eritrean society which isn’t that industrialised 
anyway.    
 
117 
 
territory. Perhaps inescapably, we find out too that what incited the Eritrean political and 
armed response then was colonialist subversion of the right of that people to nationhood and 
a self-governing homeland. More recently, the problem of alienation in the context of an 
independent Eritrea is shown to result from the constraints of the global political economy 
and accompanying international relations. It is no wonder then that the practical expressions 
of the Eritrean case for alternate development appears rife with language which is critical of 
the status quo. In terms of its main thrust, such language tends to be targeted at the way the 
capitalist global system is structured and operates—to the detriment of the countries of the 
South, like Eritrea. Instead of continuing on a general theoretical tangent however, I shall 
flesh out below the relevance of this larger framework in terms of the effect for the 
implementation of Eritrean development. This requires delving into the specifics of Eritrean 
‘cultural politics’ in order to draw links with real development.  
 
Oppression and self-emancipation: reciprocal basis of Eritrean development  
In the case of the present author who incidentally is articulate in Eritrea’s major languages 
and can claim some first-hand experience of the nation-building process, there is plentiful of 
Eritrean material that can be used to study the mechanics of Eritrean development. Of the 
material that addresses the (compound) theme of alienation, I shall reflect on the content of 
some of the more current sources of information to promote the analysis. For the Eritrea 
observer, what is noteworthy about this data is the complete alignment of current context 
with historical memory. The bulk of the Eritrean material accentuates a range of closely-
articulated concerns which overlap and form a continuous thread that furnishes some overall 
thematic coherence.  
A 2014 Tigrinya live musical performance entitled Ma’ekeb (Sanctions) by Berekhet 
Mengisteab and another, Et Sheferna Helena (Whilst At One’s Abode), in the Tigrayit 
language by Ibrahim Wad Goret from 2010, for example, seem particularly instructive in 
terms of their potential to expose what the Eritrean Government considers the charade and 
shenanigans behind the confrontational tone of the ‘international community’ towards it. 
Another two (non-audio-visual) texts, an official press statement "Commission of Inquiry" 
Report: Cynical Political Travesty that Undermines Human Rights (2015) challenging the 
recent indictment of the Eritrean Government by the UN body for human rights violations, 
and an editorial Unprovoked US Hostilities Against Eritrea (2012) appearing in the ruling 
Party’s mouthpiece Sha’ebia Website, also come in the same line. Akin to the numerous 
other (archival and contemporary) material, those four sources of information offer a glimpse 
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into Eritrea’s external relations as concerns the West, in particular the US and its regional 
allies led (at least until very recently) by Ethiopia.  
In its own way, each piece seems to raise qualms about the prospect of positive rapport with 
these external powers given the latter’s exploitative track record against Eritrea. Directly and 
indirectly, a critique of the role of imperialism in the internal affairs of Eritrea is the focus 
point. Simultaneously, this dataset stresses what sounds a uniquely Eritrean self-assurance, 
not to mention grit, regardless. And it is precisely here in connection with issues of having 
faith in one’s mission that we discover a case of obvious thematic intersection with even 
more of the Eritrean material. As a topic in its own right, the question of agency (being able 
to ‘do your thing’) presents itself in a most unalloyed form in such Eritrean productions as 
Kurub hala kherna (Tigrayit: Auspicious times are upon Eritrea—any minute now) and Ke 
kewn eyu kemy zeykewun (Tigrinya: There is a will, there is a way) by Sham Geshu (2014) 
and Rimdet Alem (2006) respectively.72 Using language accessible to the average person, 
each of these live performances tells how everything in this world is possible if you work 
hard for it, all along insinuating that Eritrea is living proof of such a philosophy. Ultimately, 
Eritrean development is imagined outside the dominant paradigm as a purely Eritrean 
question whatever the ramifications. Before taking the next step, a little more 
contextualisation of this material might be useful to facilitate the reader’s senses.   
 
Against historical amnesia and latter passivity: Experience as impetus of 
development  
The context for the song by Berekhet Mengisteab is the imposition of sanctions on Eritrea by 
the United Nations Security Council (egged on by the US government) as punishment for the 
country’s supposedly destabilising regional politics. In fact, Ma’ekeb stands somewhat as 
monument to the way Eritrea has been frequently sinned by foreign powers across the 
decades. From the point of view of its producers, what likely turns Ma’ekeb into an effective 
ideological tool is the superimposition of miscellaneous yet strikingly pertinent moving 
imagery as the main event unfolds; the juxtaposition of old footage capturing pivotal 
moments in Eritrean political history with newer video reflecting contemporary events that 
touch on the development course of the country.73 Berekhet’s opening line, Ma’ekeb 
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 Kurub was performed as part of the 53
rd
 anniversary celebrations of the launch of the Eritrean 
armed struggle on the 1
st
 of September 1961, whereas, Ke kewn eyu… in its original version came 
out to coincide with the 2006 celebrations of Eritrean Independence Day. As such, it is hard to ignore 
their political and ideological value when it comes to the promotion of national development.  
73
 Flashes of black and white footage from around the middle of the last century shows the sort of 
political developments that helped seal Eritrea’s fate in the postwar period. For example, there is the 
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nay’mintay sebeb … (or, Sanctions for what reason?) succinctly communicates the 
prevalence of ‘acrimonious’ experience within Eritrean society to only then launch a 
celebration of the Eritrean people’s power of resisting external aggressors. Performed in the 
style of a riddle, Ma’ekeb is about lingering Eritrean grievances at the same time as it is 
about throwing down the gauntlet to Eritrea’s past and present adversaries. The lead vocalist 
takes advantage of the song’s simple and engaging lyrics to rhetorically ask what offence 
could Eritrea have committed for her to be (gratuitously) slapped with economic sanctions. 
And the rhythmic recurring technique of intoning that inaugural tune (by the backup female 
vocalists) works to lend weight to the sense of incredulity and irony that is part and parcel of 
conveying the intended message.74  
Ibrahim’s composition, likewise, comes across as a ‘plea’ to leave Eritrea alone to make its 
own decisions whilst simultaneously cultivating a cynical stance concerning the motives of 
hegemonic power. Reminiscent of a posture endemic (then if not now) within Dependentista 
circles and as if borrowing his language directly from their jargon, the Eritrean singer 
proclaims: Man’tu ibukum la raha ka aser senet jakafa? … Na’ameru tarikhkum dib makten 
ashwak la atrafa (Tell me what country ever managed to prosper on account of your 
generosity? … We in Eritrea are all too familiar with your past deeds that left us with a thorn 
on the side!). More or less, Et Sheferna can therefore be read as a cautionary tale against 
Eritrea dropping her guard when dealing with her traditional foes and turning into a satellite.  
Moving on to the Editorial and the Press Statement, again this material is notable for the way 
it catalogues a litany of violations that sums up Eritrea’s vexation with the attitude of those 
same nemeses over the decades whilst also highlighting the resistance of the Eritrean 
people that has gone along with this. And to conclude this part of the exposition, the 
contributions coming from Sham Geshu and Rimdet Alem celebrate through a decidedly 
buoyant vibe the subaltern’s capacity for own development. Both pieces appear to be 
designed as powerful antidote to the insinuations of dominant power. In each instance, 
promises of what can be termed a utopic future punctuate the verse. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
scene of Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia addressing a United Nations Security Council seating 
apparently pleading the cause of his country’s territorial integrity at the expense of Eritrean 
independence. The more contemporary colour images, on the other hand, depict variously; a stern 
faced Susan Rice (US envoy to the UN at the time) on the eve of the imposition of sanctions on 
Eritrea, the firing of heavy artillery rounds by Eritrean defence forces toward some unspecified target, 
Afwerki freely dancing among a jubilant large Asmara crowd celebrating some kind of an event, road 
pavement work and bountiful vegetable harvest …  
74
 Perhaps Bereket has in mind states which from the Eritrean (and possibly others’) perspective can 
be regarded as worse offenders in terms of their actions and yet somehow seem to get away with it all 
simply because of their close and cosy relations with those who happen to oversee the status quo.   
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The Eritrean musician, Rimdet Alem, performing Ke kewn eyu kemy zeykewun on ERI-TV (source: 
YouTube) 
 
Significantly, the general picture that emerges strongly echoes the prevailing Eritrean 
mindset insofar as the pursuit of development in this country is the objective. Among other 
things, an embittered tone common to the greater part of the material calls attention to the 
unethicality with which great power politics is exercised, making a victim of Eritrea and its 
people now as then. Much of the ‘text’ laments the double standards at the heart of Western 
policy toward Eritrea. The lyrics of both Ma’ekeb and Et Sheferna speak of how (innocent) 
Eritrea has gotten a rough deal in the immediate postwar period when US geostrategic 
interests dictated that the country be denied political independence.75 Moreover, both are 
matched by the Editorial and the Press Statement in their round condemnations of current 
hostile Western official attitude toward Eritrea.  
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 Eritreans often cite with a profound sense of consternation the words of the US Ambassador to the 
UN in the 1950s, John Foster Dulles: “From the point of view of justice, the opinions of the Eritrean 
people must receive consideration. Nevertheless the strategic interest of the United States in the Red 
Sea basin and the considerations of security and world peace make it necessary that the country has 
to be linked with our ally Ethiopia.” Now if it weren’t for that fateful decision, Eritrea probably would 
have been one of the first countries in sub-Saharan Africa to gain its independence; instead, Eritrean 
independence came as the last in the continent toward the draw of the 20
th
 century. 
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On the one level, then, an essential (if partial) theme arising from this material bespeaks of 
injustice and victimisation endured by Eritrean society historically as well as in the 
contemporary period. As a result, Eritrean development in its conception and application 
integrates the obtrusions of the external (and only at times the internal) world. At the same 
time, through its irreverent, assured and upbeat air, almost the entire material has the 
obvious (positive) effect of shoring up the resilience and unity of the Eritrean people to 
potentially achieve common goals. And so, on another level still, the very material captures 
unremitting Eritrean yearning for political self-determination and egalitarian economic 
development as a continuing mission. The ensuing narrative about future development 
comes thus couched within the language of unity, patriotic ardour, ingenuity, self-help and 
related offshoots of radical Eritrean politics. In any case, custodian vigil toward a sovereign 
homeland is billed as the ultimate condition.76  
To recap then, in terms of its thematic tendency, the Eritrean development narrative seems 
to hinge on a dual premise; an internalisation of a near-absolute view of the depredatory 
character of foreign power (in its many guises) and a recalling of Eritrean wisdom and 
agency, all as part of a comprehensive strategy to avoid falling into a state of dependency. 
That, more or less, is the core of the Eritrean active strategy for dealing with the hegemonic 
threat to the desired objective of fostering a viable national community. In the end, if there is 
a constant lesson or consideration that can be drawn out from the Eritrean literature, it is 
this: naturally, the development text reflected in everyday representations of Eritrea’s 
patriotic culture/ history summarises the aspiration of a small ‘developing’ state grappling to 
free itself from the shackles of the dominant system despite the cost. So, based on the 
presentation up to here, what we have been able to fulfil is catch the general drift of the 
Eritrean narrative. However, to develop a more particular or fuller picture, it is important to 
address the following (exhilarating) question: how does this whole Eritrean strategy involving 
collective memory, resistance and reconstruction supposedly work? What are the 
ramifications for development in the practical sense?  
 
4.4 Eritrean development: drawing together the past, the living and posterity 
That diverse, deeply interwoven and cross-cutting material epitomises the standard or official 
Eritrean discourse of development. It frames the nature of the relationship that binds Eritrea 
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 Eritrean literature abounds whose focus is on the centrality of a sovereign homeland to a people’s 
capacity to continue surviving. In addition to Et Sheferna, other compositions such as the recently 
released Hager (Motherland) and the by-now classic Eza Merety (This Land of Mine) and Embel 
M’der Y’eneber H’na (Can’t Live without an Eritrean Homeland) impress that specific message.  
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and the forces of global capitalism and imperialism as fraught, involving Eritrean desire for 
genuine self-determination and external hegemonic compulsion.  
Analysis of forms of Eritrea’s national culture points to some interesting revelations about the 
choices relating to development. In terms of its implication, what this material broadly 
demonstrates is that there is a distinctive context for thinking about and practicing 
development in Eritrea’s case. This context is described by a historical and dialectical 
understanding of change, symbolised through Eritrea’s contemporary quest for self-
determination more widely considered. A key measure of Eritrean development accordingly 
is its holistic, rather than fragmentary, approach to change. More specifically, we realise that 
in practice the Eritrean development process responds to the interplay of a dominant 
structure in (chiefly) the guise of global capitalist interests and subaltern Eritrean agency 
designed to guarantee maximum autonomy. Additionally, from the perspective of the current 
study, the representation on a cultural platform of the contested spirit of Eritrean 
development possibly constitutes a novel step which invites proper exposition. Following is a 
summary of what the subtleties are of Eritrea’s strategy in this respect.  
 
 
 
Berekhet Mengisteab in concert, singing Ma’ekeb (source: YouTube) 
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Culture, politics, economic activity: freeing development from simplistic ad hoc policy   
Relative to development initiatives elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa, there seems to be a 
‘curious’ aspect to how Eritrea intends to actualise its preferred development plan. As far as 
the core of the development question goes, what makes the Eritrean approach somewhat 
distinct is a conception of the integrated nature/ framework of change.  
Careful analysis of the Eritrean development discourse demonstrates that economic, political 
and cultural influences ought to be concurrently exerted (in the same and/or in an opposite 
direction) to produce change. Or, to put it differently, not any one influence needs to be 
reduced to, nor isolated from, the effects of the other determinants of development. It also 
shows that for Eritrea’s development program to be successfully implemented, it is 
incumbent that the country’s past and present be linked with the future in a dialectical 
manner. Here, it appears as though the Eritreans have heeded Amilcar Cabral’s broad edict: 
we must act as if we answer to, and only answer to, our ancestors, our children, and the 
unborn.77 And most importantly, we learn that the sort of cultural traditions that grew directly 
out of Eritrea’s historic struggle and are fully maintained today hold the key to future Eritrean 
development. I believe these notations carry vital information and as such call for some 
unpacking.  
 
Culturalism and materialism: not-so-odd bedfellows in reality  
Apparently, in the Eritrean case we encounter the classic example of the deployment of 
cultural traditions in a way that buttresses the actual social, political and economic struggles 
of the people. Despite being incredibly elaborate and ever adaptable, such traditions 
commonly coalesce around the singular philosophy of self-reliance. Eritrea’s cultural 
traditions have been systematically worked out to thus give the Eritrean people a 
determinate identity as forged through a long and continuing struggle for freedom from 
domination. Empowering Eritreans to see themselves as resourceful and in charge of their 
own future appears to be the ultimate purpose to this identity reconstruction exercise.  
If nothing else, the Eritrean case then arouses interest in the relation of culture and 
economic development. Its placing of the issue in the spotlight likewise depends on imputing 
a materialist slant to the concept of culture; cultural input as comprising the other side of the 
development coin, so to speak. Specifically, what makes the Eritrean development process 
somewhat ‘particular’ is the way cultural, social, political and economic forces work 
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 See https://www.azquotes.com/quote/808697  
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alongside, as well as against, each other in an integrated and reciprocal mode to transcend 
internal and external challenges. The model of development followed in Eritrea therefore 
appears to be expedited by a dynamic, as opposed to static, understanding of culture and 
cultural processes.  
In line with this, the Eritrean Government, like the EPLF in former times, has been able to 
render the form and substance of the many existing local cultures susceptible to 
experimentation. Such adaptation of culture has allowed the government to articulate its 
economic and political objectives in ways that contradict the free market doctrine. 
Furthermore, to set in place a cultural milieu commensurate with national development has 
necessitated that the government concocts potentially constructive ideas and values to be 
subscribed to by the population. Using a proactive strategy, the desired culture-development 
nexus is brought into existence by scouring the Eritrean past for relevant traces and 
reworking these into a unitary cultural matrix on behalf of all the Eritrean people. Analysis of 
what those traditions consist in, how they came to be and why they appear fundamental to 
Eritrean development practically conflates with the story of this country’s complex postwar 
political trajectory and its possible future(s). From a political and economic angle, focusing 
on the past as a launching pad seems to trace out for the Eritrean story of development its 
subsequent course. This last point is taken up in some detail below and with reference to 
some of the ascertainable features of Eritrean development.  
  
Rudiments of a radical Eritrean tradition: political self-rule, living within one’s means 
There seems to be good reason to think that the Eritrean Government is unlikely to 
discontinue the development program it has initiated. If anything, it is hard to imagine future 
Eritrean development as drastically different from the presently known form, and evolving 
into something resembling capitalism instead. Of course, this judgement obtains from the 
distinctive nature of the Eritrean approach itself which depends on a historicised/ dialectical 
consciousness to effect development. But in looking for explicit clue, it can be claimed that 
the assessment follows directly from the way the Eritrean Government uses cultural 
traditions to promote development.  
As they carried on with the national struggle, Eritrea’s iconoclasts seemed to believe that 
genuine change presupposes autonomy in both political and economic term at all time. 
Based on this understanding, certain cultural traditions have been wilfully crafted to push 
forward the cause of Eritrean self-determination and statehood. Being resolute, diligent, 
optimist, non-ethno-centric, altruistic and even warlike are just some of the values animating 
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that culture. Among others, Mehherbay Asa-kara, or Battle Cry sang by Hamed Idris Jabara 
sometime in the 1980s stands as a typical example which communicates the attitude in 
question.78 Also, what you tend to observe in this instance is that such social mores continue 
to be viable, not redundant, as time passes by. You only need to situate side by side some 
of the pre-independence era audio-visual sources (for example, Akhlilu Tefeno’s Tsnat/ 
Stoicism and Estifanos Abraham Zemach’s Biddho/ Ultimate Showdown) and the recent 
material to recognise that thematic unity. Often, they continue to be moulded and remoulded 
in the framework of the struggle that impels itself from the Eritrean past to an imagined non-
capitalist (purportedly bright) future. To understand how the relevant traditions are made 
amenable to development, it becomes therefore necessary to analyse Eritrea’s historical 
narratives of struggle.     
Exceptionally, those traditions have the effect of making us picture the dynamics of Eritrean 
development like the work of a pendulum in a way. Like a pendulum that swings from one 
end (through a centre) to the other and back again, social conflict as anchor to the Eritrean 
development process appears to traverse time; it joins without disjuncture the past, present 
and the future. Obviously, the demands and conditions of the pre-independence struggle 
necessitated measures to deal with the centrifugal tendency of Ethiopia’s colonial policies 
and practices. Along with active armed resistance, careful political and ideological input 
during that earlier stage helped guarantee the integrity of Eritrean society against the odds. 
You can moreover argue that what has been sown then impacted the outcome of the 
Eritrean struggle positively in that it paved the way for national independence. If I read the 
official Eritrean position correctly, I would be inclined to think that the current leadership 
seems to believe that being truthful to EPLF heritage can unlock current and future Eritrean 
national political and economic problems. As I have stated previously, the Eritrean struggle 
is to be credited for ushering in fundamental political, economic and social transformations. 
For example, in its wake, the hitherto mostly traditionally self-identifying ethno-linguistic 
groupings accepted to take on a unitary Eritrean national identity (without necessarily 
renouncing their individual cultural heritages). The various components of Eritrean society 
were made to feel a sense of common purpose in the form of fighting for national liberation. 
From the Afar to the Tigrinya and any one group in between, the population was made to 
see that power concedes nothing without demand, and that only through careful 
organisation, unity, self-discipline and hard work can oppression be reversed. We might here 
mention too that the roots of the popular Eritrean slogan, hade hizbe hade libi, or simply 
unanimity about the common interest, so vital to Eritrea’s post-independence development 
                                                          
78
 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0VOiuM7-kKY 
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drive lie in that earlier effort; its frequent invocation is meant to ensure all of Eritrea’s socio-
cultural groupings participate in and contribute to national development.79  
What also seemed to have played into the evolving scenario was the fact that Eritrean 
independence was viewed unfavourably within much of Africa and beyond. Whereas, for the 
majority of Africa’s then political leaders, the Eritrean cause represented an attempt at 
secessionism of the sort that undercuts pan-African unity, elsewhere, especially within the 
internationalist Left, Eritrea was seen as breaking with the logic of the Cold War to draw 
possible sympathy. Even as Ethiopia benefited in turn from the backing of one or the other 
superpower, the Eritreans missed out on any substantial outside support and had to fend for 
themselves instead. Yet, not only could the EPLF survive, but also the movement continued 
to gain momentum and to achieve real success without being beholden to others all along 
(cf. Connell 1997). It went on scoring important victories against the Ethiopian State, at the 
time one of the most powerful in sub-Saharan Africa. As has been reported in the Press 
Statement (2015), “few supported [Eritrea] during [her] legitimate struggle for freedom. The 
powerful tried to denigrate [Eritrea’s] cause and bomb [the country] into submission. 
[Eritreans] were routinely written off. And yet, by dint of [their] determination and humanity, 
[they] emerged victorious.”  
And parallel with the military effort, vital civilian development initiatives were also 
implemented which would cater for the needs of the EPLF itself and the population at large 
(cf. Hollows 1997). In Sahil, the EPLF’s fortified sanctuary in mountainous northern Eritrea, 
the movement managed to set up underground factories, schools and hospitals that 
delivered basic goods and services. In particular, pharmaceuticals were produced and 
distributed, as were other essentials such as tampons (remember females made up a third 
of the Eritrean fighting force and that their sanitary needs had to be met) and Shidas (those 
trademark plastic shoes worn by all fighters). For their part, hospitals and schools provided 
much needed health care and educational services. While the war raged on, medics working 
in underground hospitals treated not only war wounded fighters, but also civilians. At the 
same time, through the Bet Timhrti Sawra system (Schools of the Revolution) and the many 
Adult Literacy programs thousands of Eritrean children, men and women were able to 
receive important education. And so we follow the planting of seeds of a culture centred on 
political sovereignty as well as the need to harness internal Eritrean resources to accomplish 
social and economic goals during the historical period in question. 
                                                          
79
 But so as not to idealise the Eritrean nation-building process, I shouldn’t perhaps discount the fact 
that, despite the country being socially diverse, culturally and linguistically Tigrinya indeed 
predominates within the Eritrean body politic today; often the invention of nations involves deciding 
through some sort of a pre-emptive strike as it were the question of official language at the hands of 
the nationalist leadership which in Eritrea’s case chiefly comes from the Tigrinya social group. 
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Shida, an Eritrean plastic sandals, a symbol of the long- and arduos-journey to Independece, 
adorning a major roundabout in the capital Asmara (source: internet) 
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Igla–Demhina bypass in the Southern Zone, Eritrea (source: internet) 
 
 
Filfil–Solomona road (aka Northern Red Sea road), outside Asmara (source: internet) 
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Gergera Dam, Eritrea (source: internet) 
 
Now, we can’t possibly work out the importance of the culture at the centre of current 
Eritrean development policy without tracing the whole thing back to the Eritrean struggle that 
went before. Or, more correctly, we need to be able to identify what has been actively 
selected for consolidation into an essential culture whilst eliding anything peripheral or 
supposedly non-instrumental. In particular, the basic configuration of this culture seems to 
point to clear precedents in modern Eritrean history. For the reader’s benefit, it is essential to 
allude to some of the salient features of the culture under consideration here.  
Accordingly, to vacillate, back away and otherwise entertain defeat under testing 
circumstances, for example, is typically frowned upon and consequently the attitude has to 
be expunged; since resilience proved the winning Eritrean formula in the face of those 
repeated large-scale Ethiopian military campaigns of the 1980s to crush the Eritrean 
insurrection, its place in contemporary Eritrean political culture seems to have been secured. 
In Eritrea, the state of ‘lacking spirit’ has come to be judged as negative culture precisely 
because it is thought to risk weakening the willpower of the people to pursue development 
as underdog. Unless people can demonstrate courage, the official line holds, they don’t have 
to expect to prevail in a political contest. Eritrea’s rather bold rhetoric and her more or less 
matching actions consequently appear in line with its tradition of political and economic 
independence. And so any ‘aberrant’ posture whatsoever becomes the subject of censure, if 
not outright derision.  
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It is no mere accident then that, in the light of the imperatives of post-independence 
development, the tendency has been to discard all that is unflattering in this nation’s history. 
Accordingly, 19th century and subsequent collaborationist history of Eritrean forefathers with 
Fascist Italy against Ethiopia’s anti-colonial wars, while hard to deny completely, has to be 
scanted nonetheless. Similarly, the in-retrospect discreditable record of another Eritrean 
group from the 1950s, that of Mahber Andnet (Unionist Bloc), which strongly campaigned for 
unification with Ethiopia seems to be treated as of no consequence. The same tends to 
apply in the case of Eritrea’s current political opposition which is thought of as having no 
physical presence whatever, let alone a stake, in the nation’s affairs. In its place, what we 
have is the fostering of specific cultural traditions that are then duly celebrated at a national 
level. A culture of resistance to injustice (reflected through the Eritrean slogan of nihh, or 
staying power), gets hailed as a correct stand against perceived neocolonial encroachment. 
Again, the honouring with much gusto of the record of Eritrean self-determination pioneers 
like Abdul-Kader Kebire, Ibrahim Sultan and Woldeabe Woldemariam follows in this vein. All 
three (not to mention the countless fallen Eritrean combatants remembered on Martyrs Day 
every June) are considered national symbols and their politics has been whole-heartedly 
embraced as fundamental to independent development. As the quote by Simon Schama80 
which opens the present chapter impresses, Eritrean society apparently uses history “not to 
revere the dead, but to inspire the living … to lament what ought to be lamented; and to 
celebrate what should be celebrated.” This is what Yaret Gona Min Ta Hale, or Wish You 
Were Still Among Us, a recent homage by the renowned Eritrean musician Ahmed Wad 
Shek actually encapsulates. In the piece, the Eritrean artist both laments the physical 
absence of the fallen freedom fighter and celebrates his/her legacy to posterity.  
Meantime, on the practical development side, recent major infrastructural undertakings such 
as the Filfil–Solomona Road, the Igla–Demhina Bypass and the myriad of rural schools, 
clinics and other social services also seem to take cues from the self-reliant attitude 
commonly associated with the era of the armed struggle. Despite the difficult conditions 
during those years, the EPLF was noted for setting up a network of roads that became its 
life-line. As the ruling Party’s representative in the Southern Zone, Saleh Mohamad Omar, 
says of the Igla-Demhina Bypass (a tortuous stretch of road built by an Eritrean construction 
company and which drops some 2500 meters in a very short distance to connect the town of 
Adi Keyih in Eritrea’s Southern Zone with the Red Sea Zone), the project brings to memory 
earlier ventures such as Tsirgiya Aynemberkikhn (Will Never Kneel Down Road) and 
Tsirgiya Biddho (Tenacity Road) completed amid the war of independence. Even if modest 
                                                          
80
 See http://homepage.eircom.net/~odyssey/Quotes/History/Historians.html  
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say by Swiss or Japanese standards, what seems to matter from an Eritrean perspective 
about these sorts of development projects is the aspect of wushtawi a’qmi, or homegrown 
capacity. The Eritreans themselves seem wont of reiterating this factor which in an original 
sense encapsulates the whole Eritrean policy of post-independence development. 
 
 
Adult Literacy class, Eritrea (source: internet) 
 
4.5 Conclusion  
In this chapter I presented the details of the process by which Eritrea envisages to forge an 
independent development path in the face of the dominant forces arrayed against it. To 
render a robust account, my starting premise has been that the development process in 
Eritrea needs to be treated as an experiment in counter hegemony. This approach was 
considered advantageous for the capacity to affirm the many challenges the country and its 
people have faced and continue to face from (mainly but not exclusively) without and the 
resulting Eritrean formal response. In particular, strategies of socialising the Eritrean 
population as per certain acclaimed political and cultural imperatives have been singled out 
for proper study as the designated mechanism of nation-building and development by the 
Eritrean Government. A conceptual framework combining Marxist philosophy of nature with 
historical materialist understanding of social change has been identified as the core 
influence for the entire Eritrean self-determination and development effort. 
The Eritrean narrative was shown to be largely about alienation as the underlying theme in 
this nation’s historical and present reality. Here, the question of alienation tends to present 
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as typological if we also recall how the challenges to development across sub-Saharan 
Africa appear closely related. It was noted that alienation in Eritrea’s case concerns colonial 
and post-colonial coercion whose effect has been the stalling of the nation’s aspiration as 
popularly expressed. Again, it is perhaps plausible to see this as the broader trend 
characterising contemporary sub-Saharan Africa realities. The source of the problem was 
located in all those factors that have impeded and appear to be complicating now the 
process of self-determining Eritrean development.  
From within the official Eritrean literature, evidence was dug out which amply explains that 
victimhood/ oppression is a sentiment held in common among generations of Eritreans. This 
too turns out to be something which other Africans, for example the Congolese, the 
Saharawi people and the South Sudanese, could relate to. At the same time, the analysis 
showed the Eritrean people as having the capacity to undertake self-redemptive action 
based on optimism about a better future. It was pointed out that almost the entire Eritrean 
material has as its hallmark these two antithetical facets in tandem. In some respect, it is 
thus possible to think of this kind of awareness as a broad basis for practical development in 
the sub-Saharan Africa context. Analysis of aspects of the material has shown that the 
development project in Eritrea is conceived and implemented as an ongoing active process. 
Central to the reconstitution of Eritrean development is the role given to experience in the 
wake of social conflict. The mode of expressing this experience moreover is through vital 
cultural forms that directly reproduce the people’s living reality. Finally, it was implied 
Eritrean development may not witness major reconfiguration in form at least for the 
foreseeable future. Or, the development trend in Eritrea is likely that the collective interest 
gets prioritised over individualist ambition. That prediction too is about the Eritrean 
development program remaining consistent with its roots in historical materialism which 
confirms that the coordinates of the (Eritrean) journey into the future lie in the country’s 
present and past. In the end, there seems to be certain significance for sub-Saharan Africa 
in the way the Eritrean Government puts a historical materialist twist on the development 
process. 
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5. THE COMMISSION AND THE NEOLIBERAL 
CONSTRUCTION OF ‘AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT’ 
A word or concept cannot be considered in isolation; it only exists in the theoretical or 
ideological framework in which it is used: its problematic … which determines not only 
the questions posed and the answers given, but also the problems omitted …. Given 
that this theoretical “unconscious” is present in, yet absent from, any particular 
segment of the text, only a symptomatic reading can (re)construct it.  
- Louis Althusser 
                                                            
   
In chapter three we saw how the Commission approaches the topics of culture and the 
background African political history to argue the ‘novelty’ of its development program. Based 
on the earlier discussion, I came to speculate on the purport of the Commission in the long-
run. The presentation in this chapter takes up from where the previous investigation left off, 
and develops the analysis as necessary. I draw on an inclusive historically and politically 
centred approach to outline viable African development outside all dominant and improvised 
trends.  
 
The point of the analysis is to determine the scale and scope of the Commission’s plan 
relative to the prospect of change on the ground. In mapping the course of the analysis, 
there are a number of tasks I intend to accomplish: I proceed first by echoing a specific fact 
about ‘development’ to prefigure the main argument about the voluntaristic, as opposed to 
prescriptive, essence of African political and economic transformation. This relates broadly 
to how we may possibly, indeed meaningfully approach the study of development, and as 
such concerns the Commission, its assumptions and methods. The idea of a prelude of 
course is to ease the reader into what follows next. In the main body, I construct a detailed 
account centred on the implication for African development of the Blair Commission. I treat 
more systematically the model of development that the Commission for Africa touts as its 
vision for the continent. Strictly, I explore the conceptual apparatus in the light of which the 
Commission views Africa’s development crisis as ‘anomaly’. The analysis revolves around 
the system of knowledge presupposed by the Commission to understand how a specific 
rendition of reality elevates (arbitrarily) capitalist development to an ideal. Also, as I ponder 
the Commission’s theoretic premises, I equally allude to the consequences for practicing real 
development. Or else, I unpick how its abstractions tend to underwrite certain substantive 
interests at the expense of others—by rationalising a known version of reality and a 
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corresponding course of transformative action. So, by combining these two facets 
(proposition and practice), the goal is to state how internally consistent the Commission’s 
development template appears. Once we match the ‘language’ with facts on the ground, we 
could appraise more realistically the significance of the Commission’s proposals. Having set 
forth the basic configuration of the presentation, I would now like to consider the relevant 
parts in order. Accordingly, I commence with a brief note on the basic characteristics of the 
approach I plan to continue on with. Next, I turn my attention to the primary business of 
describing and analysing over two consecutive stages the Commission’s blueprint.   
 
5.1 In search of a comprehensive theoretical approach 
Approaches to development differ based on the underlying agendas of those to whom the 
prospect matters. Depending on whether the focus is a conservative or a progressive social 
order, it is customary to come across disparate ways of conceptualising ‘development’. 
Taking the Eritrean case largely as versatile, in my opinion, a sound analysis of the 
Commission’s blueprint ought to draw two key principles together: acquaintance with how 
this particular model of development came to be in the first place, and; recognition, in 
parallel and otherwise tacitly, of the possibility of other legitimate forms of development. For 
the purposes of this review then, history and politics needs to be placed at the forefront—to 
clarify the significance of the Commission’s proposals.    
 
There seems to be grounds to believe that a substantial account of how the Commission 
handles the topic of development both reaches into the past as well as highlights the 
question of heterogeneity. On the one hand, development as concept and practice need not 
owe its origins exclusively to the Commission for Africa in the new Millennium; manifestly, 
the phenomenon predates Tony Blair’s interest in Africa by decades, if not centuries. Most 
notably, inasmuch as the Commission follows in the footsteps of a long-standing Western 
development doctrine, it can be more fruitful to consider the initiative in a retrospective spirit. 
So, due attention instead needs to be given to the West’s comparative ascendency, 
scientifically, economically as well as politico-militarily, in the modern era. In particular, it is 
important to retain a sense of the evolution of conventional intellectual thought and practice 
during the intervening time-span. And, even more explicitly, what deserves possibly greater 
scrutiny within that wider trend is the way leading theories and ideologies about human 
beings, society and change have been periodically invoked and the ramifications thereof 
generally. So, there clearly seems to be an advantage to moving with one’s account forward 
historically to get to the present moment. For one thing, the strategy makes it possible to 
follow the inception of the Commission’s neoliberal agenda against the backdrop of earlier 
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development philosophy. This also points to potential flaws that originate with forms of 
synchronic quasi-scientific interpretation which we must discern and oppose. 
Correspondingly, we can view in the proper context the existing relationship between the 
Western powers and the continent of Africa. Thus, if it is true Africa’s present relationship 
with these powers appears unusually one-sided, it is also possible that the source of the 
problem goes back to the (colonial) past. Or, reference to the past shows that the way that 
relationship came to be structured and acted out can’t be preordained. A historical/ 
genealogical rendering of the concept of development thus seems to represent one 
important tier of what a viable approach should be like.  
 
On the other hand, nor perhaps can a generous treatment come from missing the 
multifarious and contested essence of development. Often, forms of development embody 
group interest of one sort or another. As such there tends to be disagreement as to what 
counts as ‘development’. The model heralded by the Blair Commission for example can’t be 
expected to accommodate the interests of all Africans. In the same way, a different model 
(brought forward say by the South Commission) may not appeal to the Commissioners and 
anyone else in favour of neoliberalism. Ultimately, any effective approach to development 
ought to reflect the discrepancy that is part and parcel of the phenomenon. It is important 
otherwise that researchers and practitioners give particular thought to the politics of 
development as a matter of course. And so, by being mindful at once of the genesis, range, 
politics and ideology involving ‘development’ can we hope to study the subject in its full 
dimensions. What I have tried to explain about the development process so far represents 
the (all-round) strategy that I will use to analyse below the Commission and its Report. 
 
Making the most of such an eclectic definition of development, in the remaining space I will 
focus on the Commission’s potential for promoting African development. As I speculate over 
its likely promise, I call up the notion of a ‘paradigm’ as originally elaborated by Thomas 
Kuhn and readapted as ‘discourse’ in the case of succeeding scholars, for example Michel 
Foucault. My task in this case is to illuminate concurrently the interim and ideological root of 
social thought and action. So, initially, by referring to the underlying concepts and practices, I 
shall point out the Eurocentric pedigree of the model of development being foisted upon the 
African continent. This obliges looking at certain claims made in the name of ‘science’ and 
‘modernity’ together with the successive revisions and re-presentations of ‘Liberalism’ as 
umbrella framework. Next, rather than accept at face value the universality/ timelessness of 
the Commission’s version of development, what I hope to reflect is the quite localist and 
temporal triggers for its rise. Or, I will try to expound that the neoliberal moment simply 
signifies a transient phase called for by the crisis-ridden but very adaptative dynamic nature 
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of the capitalist system itself. To that end, I shall retrace how the switch to neoliberalism as 
the latest chapter in the long-drawn out saga of conventional development thought and 
practice has been facilitated. And, finally, as well as conceiving of neoliberalism as an 
impermanent juncture within the totality of bourgeois thought and praxis, I intend to unmask 
any inherent ideology that is the manifestation of vested economic and political power. 
Moving on, I begin with a descriptive summary of the evidential basis for the analysis of the 
Commission and its Report, including the key assumptions and related methods. In this 
regard, I relate how ‘omniscient’ the Commission comes across given its putative avowals 
concerning African development which also conditions its practices in search for solutions.   
 
5.2 The Commission, ‘rare’ vista into the continent, devising potential 
solutions  
The Commission’s stance on how to stimulate African development provides an opportunity 
to once more mull the ramifications of donor-instigated programs for the region. Generally, a 
review of the Commission’s blueprint brings to light a few different things in relation to the 
conception and actual propagation of development. In the context of the present analysis, 
accordingly, two correlated issues in particular deserve noting; its classic assumptions 
concerning the prospect of society and the modelling of ‘levels’ of social development and 
supposedly any requisite action owing to this. These mutually complementing elements 
(covered under the subdivided parts of Argument and Analysis respectively) furnish the 
Report with a distinct sense to therefore be the focal point of the analysis. The discussion 
that follows thus seeks to unpack the ideas and practices underlying the Commission whilst 
pointing the real signification for African development. 
 
Confronting a lapsing sub-Saharan Africa: current state and future direction 
It is not hard to see that a galvanising factor for the Commission for Africa is the basic notion 
that Africa’s regression for such a long time not only is anachronistic, but also morally 
indefensible. The prevailing view seems to be that, with the onset of the new Millennium, no 
other region but Africa remains in the doldrums contrary to ‘our common humanity’81. In 
encapsulating the enormity of present-day African socio-economic conditions, the 
Commission for Africa (2005:21-22) notes:  
       
                                                          
81
 That is the phrase the Commission for Africa invokes to highlight both the urgency as well as 
inappropriateness of the situation prevailing in the continent. 
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The world is awash with wealth …. Yet … in Africa millions of people live 
each day in abject poverty and squalor …. We live in a world where new 
medicines … have eradicated many diseases and ailments … yet in 
Africa [millions of] children … die each year … from illnesses which cost 
very little to treat …. There is a tsunami every month in Africa. But its 
deadly tide of disease and hunger steals silently and secretly across the 
continent …. The eyes of the world may be averted from their routine 
suffering, but the eyes of history are upon us … future generations will 
look back, and wonder how could our world have known and failed to 
act? [Africa’s contemporary misfortune] is the greatest scandal of our 
age ….  
 
It would appear that, for the sponsors of the Africa Commission, the optimism about social 
progress which accompanied African political independence has long since dissipated. 
Likewise, they seem to reckon that subsequent ‘possibilities’ that begun to open up following 
full-blown ‘globalisation’ have failed to stimulate Africa’s revival. Now, it is in that precise 
regard that the region is presumed (by them) to have therefore bucked the expected trend of 
change elsewhere around the world. Even if not directly talked about, we can still educe the 
likely intention is the embedding of the capitalist order in Africa. Such turns out to be the 
background belief, residuum of a distinct paradigm of development, in accordance with 
which the Commission unveiled its plan of action to resolve the deadlock of African 
underdevelopment. But, to remind the reader, the idea of transforming Africa ostensibly into 
a better place itself may not however signal a concern unique to the Commission. Rather, 
the attitude sounds quite common in that apparently it is what has helped shape Europe’s 
dealings with the continent from the beginning. Of course, the roots of the mission to ‘civilise’ 
Africa go back a long way. However, in its more contemporary informal form, we can trace 
this back to the postwar development project as has been conceived to ‘modernise’ the then-
decolonising states of Africa. Those seem to be the conspicuous and not-so-conspicuous 
assumptions of the Commission for Africa that we must keep in mind when assessing its 
potential.  
  
The Commission for Africa: operationalising the fact-finding mission 
Meanwhile, the way the Commission went about addressing the problem has also been 
influenced by the requirement for Africa to ‘catch up’. Based on the preconceived notion of 
what Africa’s setback consists in, the Commission appears to have systematised its effort to 
achieve its projected end result. This seems to be the case in respect of the personnel 
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makeup of the Commission as well as the type of evidence considered, the ensuing analysis 
and the findings.      
 
My reading of the Commission for Africa suggests that the manner in which its membership 
was worked out involved carefully recruiting (a certain breed of) candidates. The 
Commissioners totalled 17-members, more than half of whom were Africans both from the 
public and private occupational circles. Naming some names and identifying member formal 
titles and career records can be a useful indicator as to why these particular Africans may 
have been invited to join the Commission for Africa.  
 
It appears that the various African Commissioners tended to carry the correct neoliberal 
credentials; each and every one of them could have been scouted for their (solid) efforts to 
further neoliberal globalisation in one way or another. Beginning in the 1990s, both Benjamin 
Mkapa and the-now-deceased Meles Zenawi (then-heads of state of Tanzania and of 
Ethiopia respectively), for example, were known to have deferred to the Bretton Woods 
institutions on the question of sovereign national development decision-making. The same 
can’t however be said of their respective predecessors, Julius Nyerere and Mengistu 
Hailemariam, who have been adamantly opposed to the policies coming from the IMF and 
the World Bank. Or, of Eritrea, as the following (extended) quote from an interview with its 
president suggests:  
 
I remember in 1994 … when experts from the World Bank came and said, ‘We’ll 
write the country programme for you’; we never had any experience, we were a 
new nation, but the question came to my mind, so I said, why do we need someone 
else to write our country programme? Why can’t we write our own one? We know 
our reality better than anybody else. We can identify our needs and specify what 
we need to change in reality; we may not have the resources but we want to 
develop institutions and the capacity to write our own programme. If we need 
someone else’s support then we can outsource but ultimately we would be owners 
of our own programme. I remember the discussion we had with those experts, they 
couldn’t even explain or give an answer to the question. They said the World Bank 
writes country programmes for everybody and particularly in Africa. That led to a 
very controversial discussion, and finally we said we have to write our own 
programme.  
        (Afwerki cited in New African, November 2011)  
 
In addition to those two former statesmen, some of the other members also seem to have 
been judged suitable nominees given their positive professional affiliations as far as the 
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neoliberal globalist agenda goes. The line-up here includes bureaucrats like Trevor Manuel 
(at the time South Africa’s finance minister and chair of the IMF/ World Bank Development 
Committee), the Ghanaian Kingsley Amoako (former high-ranking civil servant at the World 
Bank and the Economic Commission for Africa) and Linah Mohohlo (Botswana’s then-
Central Bank Governor who also liaised with the IMF on behalf of African countries). Still 
others, such as Tidjiane Thiam, Fola Adeola and William Kalema, could have caught the 
Blair Government’s eye considering their prominent roles within the private sector as 
businessmen or as major company directors. To be sure, visibly absent from this list though 
are any persons or groups who could have disagreed with the potential of capitalist 
globalisation to reduce African poverty; advocacy groups such as the Africa Social Forum, 
Jubilee South and the myriad of grass-roots organisations found across Africa concerned 
with fighting poverty; politicians, activists and academics (for example, contributors to the 
Alternatives Commission for Africa Report and others) who have dedicated the best part of 
their lives demanding justice for Africa. And as to the Commissioners from the North and 
their supporting crew, these, not unlike their African counterparts, too mainly consisted of 
politicians or career bureaucrats with professions in the finance and development sector. 
Further, the real power wielded by Tony Blair, his then-deputy Gordon Brown and the 
Minister of Development at the time, Hilary Benn, presumably smacks of the UK 
Government’s effective control of the mandate of the Africa Commission. Despite 
appearance, it can be claimed that outside actors, not Africans committed to the continents 
real interest, who seem to be calling the shots. That is the structure of the Commission for 
Africa in terms of quantity and quality. 
 
Being especially selective seems to account for the work of the Commission in some other 
ways as well. This aspect can be discerned from the evidence and the analysis which issued 
in those policy proposals featured in the Report. So, whilst the Commission seemingly 
included ‘evidence’ that aligns with the hoped-for change, it probably saw no need to burden 
itself with ‘peripheral’ information. We could see this being followed throughout the 
Commission’s research process; in resolving what appears to be relevant or irrelevant to 
future African development, and why. The Report contains ample clues in many of its parts. 
A case in point can be the way the Commission casts the African crisis and its resolution as 
regards economic growth and political governance. For the Commission, growth and 
governance encompass the two areas which impact the prospect of African development 
most significantly. So, the issue of growth and governance deserves taking up further to 
check the link with the basic agenda of the Commission. 
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On account of its set assumptions about development as Westernisation, evidently the 
Commission approves of no other force but the private sector as the primary driver of 
economic growth. Its sounding a call for Foreign Direct Investment to compensate for 
Africa’s seeming lack of internal resources moreover appears in line with its perceptions 
about the ‘correct’ path to economic success. And the same apparently goes with regard to 
the issue of governance whereby the Commission collapses good governance with the 
Westminster parliamentary system. Other determinants of development, as is maybe asking 
different questions and offering alternate solutions, however turns out to be beyond the 
Commission’s methodological orientation. Given the level of “theoretical unconsciousness” 
characterising the Commission’s text, we might not know what other possibilities and facts 
relating to development there are. It is almost impossible to tell, for example, if any non-
capitalist pathways to economic prosperity exist, or else quantifying economic output in GDP 
terms glosses over worker exploitation by corporations. Included below is a quote that could 
illustrate the sort of problem I am referring to:  
 
Last Thursday evening, Amazon’s billionaire CEO Jeff Bezos made $3.3 
billion when the tech giant reported its eighth consecutive profitable 
quarter  ... To acquire $3.3 billion, a US Amazon worker making the 
average $12.41/hour would have to work 133,064 years—roughly the 
length of time modern humans have lived on Earth. It would take 
Amazon workers in China, Brazil, India, and Mexico who are paid even 
lower wages much longer than that.  
 Blake (2017)
82
 
 
Or still, it remains unclear what a fair business contract between a foreign investor and an 
African state ought to be like, and the environmental protection standards that must be 
observed as part of those same deals. I raise this last point in light of some of the major 
accidents responsible for the destruction of sensitive ecosystems and peoples’ livelihoods in 
Africa and elsewhere in the global South; Shell’s catastrophic oil spills in the Niger River 
delta in southern Nigeria (cf. Pegg and Zabbey 2013); Texaco/Chevron’s reckless conduct 
that resulted in the contamination of parts of Ecuador’s Amazon rainforest, dubbed the 
‘Amazon Chernobyl’ (cf. PR Newswire 2012) and; the environmental disaster wreaked by the 
Ok Tedi Mine in New Guinea, causing untold harm to nearby river systems and the people 
who depend on them (cf. Swales et al 1998). So too the synonymity between good 
governance and representative democracy seems to leave no room for any diversity in 
modes of political organisation and rule. According to the Commission’s assumption, China 
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with its one-party political system (just like Eritrea) can’t be considered to be following 
standards of good governance. This fact alone should make it truly problematic for China to 
develop. Yet, rather than lagging behind, China today ranks as the second economy in the 
world, before the likes of Japan and Germany. We infer, consequently, that in the end the 
governance agenda may prove to be simply an ideological conception. 
 
In parallel with that kind of bias, and where the Commission’s research method is at stake, 
here too the Commission seems to have favoured investigative techniques that go along 
with what has been originally premised. We tend to see this in the Commission largely 
valuing quantitative, rather than qualitative, means of analysis. This appears to be the case, 
for example, with the key issue of ‘poverty’. Concerning the prevalence of (economic) 
poverty in Africa, the Commission’s principal focus is on the incidence and scale, as 
opposed to the underlying causes, of the phenomenon. Or, as the Commissioners 
themselves seem to believe, Africa remains mired in poverty “ultimately because its 
economy has not grown” but not perhaps for some other ‘oblique’ reason (Commission for 
Africa 2005:15).     
 
To sum up then, what we tend to get upon analysing the Commission and its Report is a 
fractional story, a truncated version of an otherwise intricate reality. That, in brief, also 
appears to capture the text of the Commission’s core proposition which then regulates its 
practices. Nevertheless, it pays to remember that there is more to the development process 
than has been suggested through the Commission’s approach. And that is because the 
Commission’s account turns out to have been advanced from within the closed domain of a 
particular discourse. But before bringing the current section to a close, we must realise that 
the Commission has outlined a broad and detailed plan (albeit of a certain classification) in 
an attempt to speed up African development. So, it becomes important to explain why the 
Commission views the problem of African development the way it does, and what its 
solutions may bode eventually. I address what the Africa Commission’s vision of 
development consists in over two mutually-augmenting stages; first, by introducing the 
overarching theoretical paradigm by which the Commission seems to be guided given its 
portrayal of the fundamental nature of reality and its processes. This obliges coming to terms 
with the abstract pronouncements, theories, ways of doing research, as well as the criteria 
for verifying knowledge implicit to the system of knowledge in question. It also implies that 
we think through here the import to future African development. Second, by explaining that in 
the case of human society specifically, there tends to be a link rather between knowledge, 
power and particular social practices. With reference to the Commission’s approach 
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therefore, it is necessary to revisit the ideological, in contradistinction to scientific, basis of 
the actions it has proposed in order to see what (unspoken) interest is likely being served.   
 
5.3 Conformist ideological overture or levelling the development playing 
field?  
The Commission for Africa centres its plan on a vital premise from which seem to ensue 
other auxiliary propositions. Typically, it is granted capitalist economic development (plus 
individual political freedom) not only is inevitable, but also universally desirable. At the same 
time, it is assumed that the Northern states remain the exemplar in terms of how the South, 
including Africa will have to potentially develop. That being the case, the African states are 
supposed to work out the ‘formula’ that will see them attain full-fledged capitalism (together 
with ‘democratic’ rule) and eventually close the developmental gap. However, since sub-
Saharan Africa has yet to sort out the relevant ground rules of development, the hypothesis 
seemingly goes, the Commission under the patronage of the UK government can show it the 
way forward by outlining what needs to be followed and done. Such, in a few words, appears 
to be the overall tendency with which the question of African development has been 
approached. In all of this, the Commission turns out to be commanded by the twin verities 
about ‘man’ and society which typifies Liberalism in its political and economic guises. 
Equally, the Commission seems to have also taken the reins from those whose mission was 
to theorise, on behalf of the US government, the economic and political modernisation 
process for the decolonising world in the mid-20th century. Regardless of all other things 
hence, the essential validity of that proposition looks as the default position; it can’t 
otherwise be controverted by any distinctive manifestation of social reality within the many 
individual African states. Throughout its operation, the Commission tends to rest its case on 
the unflinching assumption about the ineluctability of capitalism and democracy. It also 
appears to think that capitalism/ democracy is in the interest of all societies and that there is 
a tried and tested universal code by which (acceptable) change may come about.   
 
Homogenising the development experience and the view from the other side  
On close inspection, the Commission’s mandate to ‘oversee’ African development therefore 
appears the product of some transcendent underlying principle. In terms of key thematic 
feature, a normative agenda, in contrast to a radicalist impulse, thus tends to symbolise its 
remit.  
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As with any normatively-grounded policy pronouncements, the Commission is all for 
continuity—even as it ‘advocates’ change. Consequently, its approach sounds as quite 
formulaic, and the focus turns out to be on technical questions in the lead up to a known 
outcome. This seminal choice evidently comes at the expense of a discursive analysis that 
could have been possible by expanding the terms of reference of the enquiry. Ultimately, the 
Commission, by virtue of its definition of what a ‘prototypical’ society looks like, tends to 
believe that it can readily and even definitively account for ‘dissonant’ trends such as African 
underdevelopment. At the same time, the Commission seems to consider it entirely within its 
means to come up with measures that can steer sub-Saharan Africa towards a ‘normal’ 
course of development. Especially though, it emerges, the Commission appears to be about 
rationalising to the African states the status quo, expecting that they accept capitalism as fait 
accompli.  
 
Practically, you can argue that it mattered not to the Commissioners what the peoples of 
Africa might actually think and desire re the future. Or, you could further make the claim that 
the Commission has been unwilling to consider whether oppositional internal and external 
forces have a part to play. As I have alluded previously, this self-evidently paternalistic 
posture vis-a-vis Africa appears to be symptomatic of the longstanding relationship between 
a politically weak continent and a strong Western world. We could add, given the impression 
that the continent’s development has been assigned to others, that the initiative sounds 
determinist. Or else, the apparent denial to the African peoples the option to be the authors 
of their own futures might render, by design or accident, the Commission’s blueprint 
decidedly anti-humanistic. Arguably, the plan may even hold a potential to compound, not 
lessen, the problem of economic alienation across the sub-Saharan Africa region. Lastly, the 
likelihood of continuing the subjugation of the continent and its peoples by outside forces 
can’t be underplayed given the proclivity for the capitalist status quo in this instance.  
 
That, in general, turns out to be the immediate impression that the Commission produces 
when approached from a certain (dissenting) angle. But, most tellingly, we observe that the 
attempt to justify the status quo as norm seems to result from a distinct mode of conceptual 
thought and problem-solving practical strategies involving reality itself. Notably, the 
Commission appears to carry on from a simple yet entrenched premise about how the world, 
human society in particular, really looks and functions. As such, the expectation apparently 
is for sub-Saharan Africa development to pan out commensurately. But whence possibly 
does such a normative thesis come? What exactly can its essential distinguishing features 
be, including the assumptions about reality and the specific ways and means by which 
change may be instigated? To deal with this key question, it seems important to scrutinise 
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the constitutive presuppositions underlying the Commission by chronicling their genesis and 
continuing clout. Offering a plausible answer to this question helps to appraise the potential 
of the Commission and its various proposals.     
  
5.4 Development in the modern era, origin in West’s socio-cultural and 
historical experience  
Certain details about the Commission and its proposal facilitate a better picture as to its 
insight concerning change or development. First, by its own reckoning, the Commission sees 
the process of revitalising sub-Saharan Africa as both extraordinarily ambitious and truly 
achievable still. Its stated aim thus turns out no less than the complete overhaul of the 
economies of the 40-plus countries in one attempt. What is more, it took the Commission 
only one year to come up with a sweeping plan that would promulgate the intended changes. 
As a grand and possibly peerless gesture, you could even say the scheme comes with a 
degree of uncanniness.  
 
Be that as it may, it is important to realise that the sense of overconfidence on the part of the 
Commission anticipates excessive generalisation and simplification. Or, to put it another 
way, the Commission sounds rather oblivious that it can be problematic to speak notionally 
of ‘sub-Saharan Africa’ when in actual fact the region spans the alphabetical gamut from 
Angola to Zimbabwe through the many countries in between.83 Ultimately, at no point does 
the Commission seem to doubt its potential, or shows any inkling about the appropriateness 
of its development framework. Now, to fully comprehend why the Commission approaches 
sub-Saharan Africa as a generic space facing generic problems to which can be tailored 
‘one size fits all’ type of borrowed solutions, it becomes important to get a measure of the 
paradigmatic core of conventional development thought. It also turns out imperative to try 
and assess the scope of the Africa Commission by thinking outside the bounds of the 
dominant development discourse.  
 
The intellectual and methodological moorings of conventional development policy 
Although you may not get the idea straightaway, following an in-depth reading of the 
Commission’s Report, it is possible to note that a distinct theoretical tradition underlies the 
text. Consequently, its case for African development appears to hinge on some inherent 
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 This is not to suggest that the commission is unaware of the diversity of Africa, nor is it to claim that 
it treats its recommendations as a ‘uniform template to be applied to all countries” (Commission for 
Africa 2005:95). The point rather is that the commissioners don’t appear open to a program other than 
theirs. 
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assumptions about the meaning of reality in general and the historical process and 
seemingly its end-point. In terms of source or inspiration, meanwhile, the underlying thinking 
turns out particularly Western in character. More instructively, when you critically review the 
Report, you can realise that contemporary mainstream development knowledge and practice 
lays claim to distant lineage in ideas about progress as elaborated from within the 
Enlightenment project and onwards. And just as significantly, you could also make the point 
that this manifestly Eurocentric outlook appears of ambiguous relevance to the situation in 
Africa. Having pointed that fact out, I shall address below the essential streaks of the 
relevant paradigm in the form of the postulates about reality and in regard to the process of 
change/ development.  
 
Idealism, sub-Saharan Africa and the development question      
Conventional knowledge, not least the Commission’s approach to sub-Saharan Africa 
development, seems to be nurtured by a specific orientation towards its object of study. This 
tends to be true not only of sub-Saharan Africa and the concept of development, but also 
practically everything else in the universe. The fact that the heterogeneity of sub-Saharan 
Africa (and what this might hold for the development process) receives little or no attention 
from the Commission thus probably bespeaks a set doctrine vis-à-vis the fundamental 
nature of reality.   
 
In the first place, we may have good reason to think that the Commission has chosen not to 
premise its development agenda on a sub-Saharan Africa out there having prior absolute 
existence. That could be because, more than the physical world itself, what seems to count 
(from the Commission’s standpoint) is the representation of that world through mental 
constructions without coming into actual contact with it.  
 
Anyone who subscribes to this philosophical doctrine, and the Commission can be said to be 
on board here, becomes prone to assuming our knowledge of reality is a matter of 
consciousness. Given its particular logic, the view taken by the Commission seems to be 
that the only reality that can probably truly be ascertained is the mind itself and the 
perception the latter makes possible. Likewise, to the extent that objects have absolute 
reality, this for the Commission cannot be independent of, but rather contingent on, our 
thinking faculty. In the end, where conventional development thought is at stake, the 
depiction intuitively of the fundamental nature of reality apparently serves as a necessary 
first step from which issues forth other attending speculations. So, having thus perceived the 
basic meaning of reality, the next logical move in the Commission’s process could have 
146 
 
involved learning about the actual ‘constitution’ of things which make them what they ‘are’. 
And that would seem to have entailed forming definite ideas about the ‘characteristics’ of 
what the Commission was dealing with in order to articulate the best possible policy 
outcomes. I find it sensible here to think it might well be the Commission’s supposition that 
entities (living and nonliving) are made up of essences that they hold in common with other 
entities that fall under the same broad ‘classification’. More precisely, the category of ‘sub-
Saharan Africa’ as applied by the Commission (and by others with a similar turn of mind) to a 
significant part of the continent appears in line with this kind of extrapolation. So too the 
characterisation of what is called sub-Saharan Africa as a ‘developing’ region could have 
much to do with viewing the world in terms of possessing essences. The affirmations of a 
monolithic singular reality, self-same development in all situations, the attempt to duplicate 
the West’s experience elsewhere around the world and how this ultimately clears the way for 
the formulation of blanket policies, all of that needs to be appreciated in the light of those 
very much loaded (and in reality dangerous) propositions.  
 
Reductionism and the African development process 
The other thing to keep in mind is that this particular form of conceptual thought also gets 
extended to the processes by which complex phenomena or systems work. With reference 
to the Commission as such, that point seems to find resonance at two intersecting levels: 
firstly, in the approach that assumes of sub-Saharan Africa development as reducible 
basically to the North’s own experience, and; secondly, in relation to what the ‘big push’ 
seems to be all about and how it is supposed to materialise.  
  
To begin with, you may be aware that in much of what I have tried to say up to this point, I 
sought to convey how moulding Africa in the image of a ‘developed’ West appears to be the 
abiding proposition. In this vein, the sweeping endorsement of market-led economic growth 
and representative democracy hence sounds an allusion to the policy of envisioning African 
development through the prism of the West’s peculiar line of development. That of course is 
the position doubled down on by Blair and his Commissioners in the face of other possible 
explanations. For example, an account could be rendered of the predominance in the West 
of liberal political and economic formations that attributes the whole thing to the vagaries of 
history; a liberal capitalist West as an arbitrary rather than inevitable historical outcome. But 
it would in any case be a long shot to expect the Commissioners positing this type of 
argument for that can prove counter-normative and thus politically problematic. So, from 
without the dominant narrative framework, it can be almost impossible to justify liberal social 
formations on a transcultural/ pan-human scale.     
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Second, and in close association with the above observation, it may help to recall that the 
Commission has undertaken to bring about aggregate or full-scale transformation by 
focusing on the individual factors that presumably contribute to African development. 
Similarly, we also ought to remember that the Commission has counselled about the need to 
push at once from all fronts as it were. That is to say, the Commission has been quite clear 
about the fact that anybody willing to promote African development cannot afford to, for 
example, concentrate on improving governance whilst possibly neglecting to stimulate the 
economy or else tackle the continent’s debt problem.  
 
When you take stock of the reasoning and the practical policies typifying the Commission for 
Africa, you tend to develop a sense of how this Commission sees the gist of social 
development, beside its replicable quality, as a complex process having its own autonomous 
logic. At the same time, it becomes apparent that the solution to Africa’s development 
problem depends on getting each and every aspect of the process to work in a mutually-
complementing fashion to have a concerted full effect. The very idea of trying to understand 
how a complex phenomenon works by reducing it to another more readily explicable 
phenomenon and to the interactions of its component parts seems to come with a long 
history to boot. It certainly is an example of the reductionist school of thought that marked 
the scientific revolution which emerged in Europe before and around the time of the 
Enlightenment. So, what could the implications of this epistemology be in relation to the 
development process in Africa? I think there are a number of pertinent issues that need to be 
teased out here.  
  
Mainstream development script and Africa’s future: a transplanted largely parodic 
enterprise  
The main thing that ought to be stated in this case is that we are dealing with manifestations 
of a Rationalist, as distinct from Historicist, approach to what African development may 
ultimately signify. Also, considering the process by which natural and social phenomena 
such as development tend to unfold, we could again be contending with the lingering dregs 
of what one suspects is a positivist (quite blinkered) mind-set. Now if this reading of the 
Commission’s fundamental approach turns out to be correct, then a number of important 
lessons relating to African development can be drawn from it.     
 
First, based on the appraisal thus far, the central thesis I am willing to impute to the 
Commission for Africa is the following: that it is somehow possible for it to tackle the 
148 
 
question of development purely at the level of intellectual and deductive inquiry whilst totally 
sidestepping sub-Saharan Africa—as a real place teeming with a myriad of communities and 
their equally miscellaneous life styles. This, in turn, hints the Commission probably saw no 
wisdom to include experience as it designed the relevant policies. In other words, what got 
omitted from the development picture in the race to come up with a narrowly formalistic 
argument seems to be the (historical and cultural) realities intrinsic to ‘sub-Saharan Africa’. 
What is more, the representation of reality along an idealist line seems bound to raise some 
profound questions as to the Commission’s fundamental claims. Being evidently the 
outcome of intuitive, rather than experiential, judgement, it is doubtful for example to 
guarantee a correspondence between the Commission’s development blueprint and the 
external world that is ‘sub-Saharan Africa’. Naturally, a disjuncture of this sort may have 
much to do with the very nature of deductive reasoning implied by the Commission’s 
methodology. The many interlocking and mutually-anticipating premises accepted by the 
Commission (the inevitability of capitalism; the dichotomous classification of a developed 
West as exemplar and a developing Africa as oddity; the belief in a game of catch-up) 
themselves can’t possibly be upheld outside the closed ‘theoretical and ideological 
framework’ in which they tend to be invoked. As such one might as well dismiss them as 
superfluous to the everyday concerns of the peoples inhabiting a real Africa. Or, in more 
substantial term, it may not be an exaggeration to think the solutions on offer will in most 
(all?) likelihoods fall foul of the needs of sub-Saharan Africa. Ultimately, the key concern in 
the Commission toying with the idealist tradition can be that its account appears to risk 
upending reality. Alas, it often is this warped version of reality, not that lived by the subjects 
of development themselves, that the Commission’s effort seems to be all about. And yet it is 
vital to realise that perhaps this whole tendency of portraying Africa in an idealised fashion 
could be far from a fortuitous misstep. We suspect that this tends to be the case by the 
demonstrable negative effects on African development in the everyday sense.  
 
In addition, the act particularly of essentialising entire peoples itself ought not to be seen in 
isolation from being a justification for practices that do not always involve benevolent or 
altruistic intent. Those with a desire to colonise and otherwise control other peoples’ lives 
and resources often deploy essentialising, that is pejorative, language as cover for their 
exploitative actions (cf. Said 1994). Speaking of Africa, we observe that the exact labels with 
which the continent came to be described may have changed over time though not the 
adverse consequences of doing so. In earlier times, the category of a barbarous dark 
continent undoubtedly cleared the way for the transatlantic slave trade and the colonisation 
of Africa. Meanwhile, usage more recently of subtler variations of that epithet has provided 
the pretext for continued neocolonial meddling in Africa’s affairs. The historical and 
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contemporary record tends to be such that many in Africa are likely to take a dim view of the 
Commission and the solutions it elaborated. That is one side of the argument on the 
‘importance’ of Blair’s Commission for Africa. I would like to add below its other and related 
part, centring specifically on the concept of change assumed by the Commission for Africa. 
 
On vulgarising a vital process to formalise the status quo  
My comment here pertains to the basic meaning of development, or more exactly to how the 
development process tends to play itself out. When you think closely about how 
development is supposed to come about as far as the Commission for Africa is concerned, it 
can be interesting to know that the process takes place in the same way across cultures and 
histories. Ultimately, the Commission advocates African development in line with what it 
obviously imagines is the design and purpose underlying all societies.  
 
Human society is believed to advance linearly along a line from what you might call a less 
developed to a more complex stage on the basis of an ever-increasing rationality. This 
passage from a simpler state of being to a more advanced phase comes as a consequence 
of amassing ‘knowledge’ over time. In addition, the conclusion can be drawn (given the 
West’s example) that what normally bolsters the cause of development is, beside scientific 
and technical know-how, the cultivation of ‘optimal’ economic and political ideas and 
practices. And together with progress on those two specific fronts also goes another 
qualitative transformation; diffusion within society of a culture of consensus. A discordant 
posture, on the other hand, would have to be mitigated and otherwise repressed using 
available ideological channels. In a word, for the architects of the postwar development plan 
to which the Commission is a faithful heir, Africa appeared to them to be sitting somewhere 
along a line that the West itself has passed through at a particular point in its history. And 
here it is perhaps impossible to miss the imprints of modernisation theory in the 
Commission’s analysis of development. Underlying its thesis thus appears to be the kind of 
grand-narrative about the way traditional societies develop into modern ones that is the 
highlight of early postwar development literature. Ideas of ‘economic take-off’ and ‘modern 
political culture’ elaborated by American social scientists in the 1950s and 1960s seem to 
have been reproduced in more contemporary discourses about ‘growth’ and ‘improved 
governance’ for example. So, what makes the development project rather complex and 
seemingly contentious is that its forerunners have been an integral part of the American 
foreign policy establishment. Prominent theorists of the modernisation school, for example 
Walt Rostow, Lucian Pye and Samuel Huntington, collaborated closely with the US 
government, enabling the latter to project power abroad typically at the expense of the 
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wishes and desires of the peoples of the Third World. That the Commission turns out to be 
the beneficiary of work originating with ‘scholars’ who doubled as agents of power may 
suggest that the development agenda also proves to be about the making and remaking of 
hegemonic power. But what precisely does such a reductionist vision tell us about the 
possibility of change or development broadly understood?  
 
A case of misplaced objectivity and its (negative) fallout 
As you ponder the Commission’s purposes, you start to suspect that the dominant model of 
development gets peddled on the basis that general laws underlie all phenomena. Further 
scrutiny reveals that this in fact is something reminiscent of how the natural world presents 
itself to us. It can also be indicative of the mode of inquiry we commonly employ to 
understand its dynamics.  
 
Again, it seems to be the case that the story of modelling social inquiry after the methods 
observed in the natural sciences goes a long way back to the likes of August Comte, Herbert 
Spencer and others who followed in their footsteps, for example Emile Durkheim and his 
disciples. The point that needs to be made about these thinkers is that their works was 
essentially motivated by a desire to maintain societal cohesion and stability; they were not, in 
other words, committed to bringing about radical transformation of a grass-roots type which 
(a thoroughly exploited) African continent could have found potentially useful. So, the 
Commission had the benefit it seems of referring back to these early exponents of 
conservative sociology to ‘understand’ Africa’s problems and to ‘map out’ its future. It meant, 
accordingly, the Commission had to discern the causes that brought the continent to the 
state it is in by appealing to the (impeccability of the) scientific approach. And because the 
natural sciences are thought to provide the ground for social research, the Commission 
moreover could have been satisfied with constraining its effort simply to observing and 
explaining what lay immediately before it. By the same token, there seems to have been no 
need for the Commission to be too inquisitive about more ‘intractable’ causal factors.  
 
In terms of theoretical predisposition, this is the system of belief we associate with positivist 
philosophy and its offshoot functionalist social analysis. As a result, questions emphasising 
power imbalances between the North and Africa plus the legacy of a disruptive colonialism, 
instead of being paid due attention, are treated as irrelevant. In all of this, the vital point to 
bear in mind is that in the process of extrapolating the scientific method to the workings of 
human society, the concept of social change ends up being explained away. Rather, what 
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we seem to have is a social evolutionist trend from a lower to a higher stage of being based 
solely on the argument about instrumental rationality-cum-organic solidarity.  
 
Now, you don’t need to question the fruits of science in furthering our knowledge of the 
natural world to argue against the claim that social change too must follow from applying the 
scientific method. This is because, unlike the case with natural phenomena, people are 
capable of making their own social and cultural worlds through active choice, hence the 
imperative for an altogether different (hermeneutic) approach to studying society (cf. 
Thompson 1966; McClelland eds. 1990). It therefore proves not only reductionist, but 
possibly also tautological to suggest that this higher state of development represented by 
today’s Western society is where sub-Saharan Africa history seems destined to end.84 In the 
end, for the Commission to insist on such an exclusive line of development, one suspects 
that there could be a different rationale to its stated mission. So, to uncover the ideological 
kernel of mainstream development policy which gets obscured by the appeal to scientism, I 
shall present below a social constructionist alternative reading of the concept of 
development. This can be achieved by discussing how the West rationalised its experience 
by creating a model of social development for all, and by arguing simultaneously how 
untenable this whole process could turn out to be. 
  
5.5 The reified discourse of development and really existing world 
capitalism 
In the first part of this chapter, I mapped the conceptual system underlying the Commission’s 
work. My intention was to see where the Commission might ultimately be coming from on the 
question of change broadly and African development more particularly. I implied that its 
approach thus points to the influence of the model of inquiry followed in the natural sciences. 
The casting by the Commission of the capitalist order as the only and true human reality was 
recognised as in line with the scientific convention of having certainty in a conception of 
reality through necessary propositions. I also touched on some of the problems that could be 
traced back to its (mute) assumptions, including its ‘theory’ of historical development. In the 
following component, my concern is with the practical side of African development; I reflect 
on how this could possibly be realised given not only the Commission’s intellectual 
orientation, but also the character of really existing capitalism, or the global political 
economy. So, contrary to the tendency that African underdevelopment constitutes an 
awkward state whose causes can be remedied using (positivist) scientific analysis, I interpret 
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the development agenda as a social construct. The idea of development as social construct 
means we no longer can afford to think of ‘development’ on a par with inert things out there. 
Rather, constructionism alerts us to the fact that the concept of development signifies a man-
made myth, an ingenious step originating with particular social agents. The analysis that 
follows hence focuses on uncovering how neoliberalism as an inclusive economic and 
political doctrine came into being. This necessitates looking at the ways through which the 
neoliberal phenomenon was invented, institutionalised and made into a dominant tradition. 
The same task also involves pointing how the unravelling of postwar capitalism amid a 
complex international political order allowed an ascendant US to push ‘development’ as a 
universal project. Simultaneously, the analysis needs to show that the neoliberal order 
cannot, in and of itself, represent reality and should instead illuminate that in practice the 
project serves exclusive ends of which the popular masses may not always be clear about.  
 
A reflexive strategy for inducing African development: prospect and problem 
In order to ground the analysis on the substance of the Report, I begin by conveying how 
exactly the Commission envisages African development to come about in realty. It is vital 
thus to emphasise a key claim the Commission makes about its plan for inducing African 
development.  
Precisely, the Commission touts its initiative as being about a “new kind of partnership” 
between two equal sides. At the same time the Commission presents this as a move away 
from previous failed contractual and conditional approaches. As the Commission for Africa 
(2005:88) states, its inquiry into Africa’s challenges and its recommendation at once for a big 
push “imply that success will dependent on [a robust] partnership between Africa and the 
world community.” Consequently, fostering mutual understanding, cooperation and even 
solidarity is thought indispensable to any bi-lateral dealings between the North and the 
African states.85 Meanwhile, because we are speaking about African and not the North’s 
future, for the Commission due process also means that the continent’s development must 
be mandated by Africans themselves. And so, right on the first page of its Report, we hear 
the Commission enunciating that its “starting point was the recognition that Africa must drive 
its own development” while the North simply has to lend a hand in this.  
No doubt, that is the language the reader intermittently comes by as far as the Commission’s 
argument goes. In light of these definite claims, and against experience, the immediate 
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challenge therefore is to check whether what the Commission has set out is a realistic 
proposal. Beyond the rhetoric of partnership, equality and a resurgent Africa in full control of 
its future development, I argue that the dominant agenda doesn’t appear completely 
removed from the logic of capitalism, or of expansion, troughs and the need to reinvest 
surplus profit. Eventually, this is likely to cast doubt on the significance of the Commission’s 
policies to practical African development. 
 
The making and dissemination of neoliberalism: issues and their bearings 
Needless to say, the dominant development policies of our time which the Commission for 
Africa embodies are those of a neoliberal type. So, attempts to judge the Commission’s 
potential should show the relevance of its policies to promoting real African development. In 
this regard, it is important to begin by summarising first what distinguishes the neoliberal 
model of capitalism whilst thinking about the practical actions recommended by the 
Commission. Secondly, as part of the focus on the neoliberalist caste of the Commission’s 
policies, it is important to state when and where neoliberalism appeared, who has been 
behind its rise and why. To grasp the essence of the neoliberal project, the time and place of 
its inauguration along with the background of those responsible and their reasons, implies 
adumbrating the overall trajectory of the capitalist system. Likewise, this enables us to sort 
the different models the capitalist system adopts along the way. Accordingly, we could report 
more accurately whether neoliberalism represents a universal approach which makes its 
espousal by the African states unavoidable. 
  
Coming up with a timely program: who benefits at whose expense and in what way  
I made the point that the Commission for Africa appears inspired by neoliberalism. What this 
says about the Commission is that its development program has been drawn up around a 
philosophy of the rule of the market. The idea of the hegemony of the market ordains that 
the economy be completely liberalised—in the interest of the private sector (cf. Friedman 
2007). Typically, economic liberalisation policies tend to be pursued in the name of 
increasing efficiency, or to boost growth from which supposedly all members of society 
benefit. The relevant policies seem designed to impact the way the capitalist political 
economy operates in a number of interrelated ways. Ultimately, at the root of the neoliberal 
vision can be located intense distaste for communal ways of being and a predisposition for 
individuals to think and decide for themselves as autonomous agents. Against the backdrop 
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of the broader neoliberal agenda, the section below looks critically at some of the actual 
policies enumerated in the Report itself.    
Above all, neoliberals like Tony Blair officially and unofficially argue for freeing private 
enterprise from the state’s controlling arm. The drive to maximise profits through unregulated 
markets is something they strongly endorse no matter the human, social and environmental 
costs. Yet, whilst seemingly uncompromising on the sovereign and self-promoting character 
of markets, neoliberals also call for ‘good governance’ to keep markets dynamic. The 
question for anyone studying neoliberalism, and hence the Commission, then is to clarify 
what this combinatory proposition usually entails, that is, how the market-governance nexus 
manifests in concrete situations. Are the neoliberals being incoherent in simultaneously 
championing the market and allowing for a semblance of public control, or can there be 
some logic to the story?  
To make sense of the issue, it is useful to look at things from the vantage point of the 
neoliberals themselves. Ultimately, what appears at first as a paradoxical policy in fact turns 
out to be a conscious choice. It can be interesting to realise hence that ‘good governance’ as 
commonly perceived by the neoliberals appears to signify a code: arguably, it implies a 
political framework or system that has the potential to foster global capitalist interests. The 
reason for stating this comes from the understanding that it can be quite problematic to 
specify objectively what ‘good governance’ represents. Apparently, the proponents of 
neoliberalism take good governance to mean only one thing out of many possible 
considerations. Accordingly, they mostly wind up manipulating the concept for their own 
ideological needs. In general, the neoliberals’ subjective stance leads to the selective 
application of what passes for good governance or ‘democracy’ in various real world 
scenarios. Examples abound whereby the type of governance and the prospect for capitalist 
growth manifest in inverted ways. Often, what most people are likely to view as bad 
governance may not matter as capitalism finds the opportunity to flourish. Meanwhile, where 
the push for global capitalist expansion meets political opposition from some country, the 
question of ‘democracy’ may become all the more urgent. Bolivarian Venezuela, first under 
the democratically-elected Hugo Chavez and more recently under Nicolas Maduro, can be 
considered as a case in point here. As Etler (2017) 86 explains: 
Talk about ‘democracy’ and ‘human rights’ in Venezuela is trotted out 
whenever the US wants to remove a thorn in its side. But when US 
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surrogates attempt to seize or consolidate power, all those concerns 
fly right out the window.  
Eventually, the governance agenda appears aimed at excusing or scorning national politics 
as “good” or “bad” depending on the orientation towards capitalism. The logic of capitalism 
remains such that the entire political field encompassing the Right tends to get affirmation 
over the political spectrum represented by the Left. This could explain why the overseers of 
global capitalism seem to also have no scruples in coddling to the worst political rulers (the 
Pinochets, the Suhartos, the retrograde Saudis …etc.) while helping oust popular leaders 
(like Allende, Árbenz, Mosaddegh, Sukarno, Zelaya and the like) opposed to the imperialist 
game (cf. Chomsky 1999; 1992). In the case of the Commission, this kind of ideological 
straitjacket appears responsible for how its discourse on governance ends up distinctly 
placing the ‘cart before the horse’ as it were. One can isolate specific evidence of this in 
parts of the Report. You only need to follow how the Commission assumes African 
development can truly come about if the continent gets its systems right through improved 
capacity and accountability. To my mind, the idea of coming up with enhanced capacity and 
accountability from almost nothing sounds like a complete inversion of the meaning of 
development. It can strike one’s senses as odd to think the African states might achieve 
greater capacity and accountability without the benefit of the necessary material foundation. 
Isn’t the absence of capacity, accountability and related resources and skill-sets likely a 
symptom of underdevelopment, rather than its cause perhaps? And that by no means should 
be an argument against the need for better capacity and African (and all) governments 
becoming accountable to their peoples. My point is simply about making clear the order in 
which development commonly transpires.   
Another related feature of neoliberal ideology also underlined in the Commission for Africa is 
the principle of global free trade and investment; the unrestricted movement of goods, 
services and financial capital. Commentators like Martin Wolf argue that globalisation works 
for all, for those in the South as well as the North (Wolf 2004). But the globalisation thesis 
tends to be contentious too given the impact of the process on the majority (cf. Driscoll and 
Clark eds. 2003). In practice, the promotion of this specific policy goes against the interests 
of local producers and against the rights and occupational health and safety of workers 
worldwide (cf. Robinson 2004; 2014).  
Even though the Commission makes a call for ‘more trade and fairer trade’, it is important 
then to remember that there are real problems with the idea of ‘free trade’ as currently 
understood and practiced. Given the inequitable and exceptionally rigid setup of the global 
political economy, it is perhaps simplistic to think of international trade as free. The reality 
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seems to be that trade and crude power go hand in hand as the policies of the World Trade 
Organisation, a vehicle for the rich, tend to illustrate. For example, while preaching free 
trade, the rich nations do engage in protectionist practices and they don’t even have to 
answer for it. Of the many measures within their disposal, we understand that they not only 
subsidise their own industries, but also they typically impose forbidding tariffs on African 
goods, the better to shield their own national markets. The African states may be permitted, 
consistent with the so-called (Ricardian) principle of comparative advantage, to export those 
commodities that the Northern markets don’t provide locally. So, under the existing 
arrangements, Africa finds itself usually producing what it doesn’t consume (for example 
flowers) and consumes what it doesn’t produce (for example military hardware).87 And even 
when any limited trade is possible, the price of whatever products the continent exports 
normally gets set by the importing (Northern) side. The late Tanzanian president, Julius 
Nyerere, summed it all up when he spoke to a congregation of European audiences:    
 
This year the rains in Tanzania were quite good. The peasants in 
our major cotton-growing regions have more than doubled their 
cotton compared with that of last year. We are desperately short 
of foreign exchange with which to buy essential imports, and 
cotton is one of our major exports; we were therefore pleased 
about this big output increase. But the price of cotton on the 
world market dropped from 68 cents a pound to 38 cents a 
pound on a single day in July this year. The result for our 
economy—and the income of the peasants—is similar to that of 
a natural disaster: half of our crop, and therefore of our income, 
is lost. Our peasants—and our nation—have made the effort, but 
the country is not earning a single extra cent in foreign 
exchange. That is theft!   
                                        (Nyerere, cited in George 1989:99) 
 
There is also the requirement to follow fiscal austerity measures to ‘accommodate’ the 
demands of markets. A direct result of any budgetary cut-backs of course is a reduction in a 
government’s capacity for public expenditure and social services. The education and health 
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157 
 
care systems together with other vital services tend to therefore suffer considerably as a 
consequence (cf. Giroux 2015). In this connection, it is important to point that the 
Commission urges the African states to treat the educational and health services needs of 
the poor as basic human rights. It certainly is a positive gesture for the Commission to take 
interest in the welfare of poor people in Africa and to insist that all are taken care of. Despite 
such good intention, neoliberalism’s demands for austerity calls into question the 
Commission’s recommendations about “leaving no-one out” by investing in people. Again, 
not only does the proposition sound rather redundant, but judging by the actual record of 
neoliberalism in Africa, it seems ingenuous to think that this development outcome can be 
met. To give an example, the 2017 Grenfell Tower blaze in London that killed so many and 
the curtailed capacity of the emergency services to do their job properly in containing the 
disaster comes as a pertinent reminder of how neoliberal policies undercut the public safety 
of those marginalised by capitalism. This tends to be even more the case if we recall how 
neoliberals use financial capital to indebt the countries of the global South in order to 
influence their future political and economic ‘development’. According to the New Statesman 
(February 7, 2005):  
During the cold war, the developed nations lent willingly to Africa. No 
worries then about how corrupt dictators might misuse the money or 
line their own pockets: the US gave millions to the notorious Mobutu 
regime in Zaire. The fear was that, without cash, these countries 
would go over to the other side. Once the cold war ended, the debts 
were smartly called in and, if countries hadn't got the money, they 
had to borrow again at higher rates. That essentially is the origin of 
the developing world's debt crisis. We dug ever deeper holes for 
these countries throughout the 1990s.  
In numerous cases, debt servicing therefore has helped erode the capacity of the African 
states to meet the social and public needs of their populations during the last four decades. 
So the rhetoric about the autonomy of markets coming from the Commission can be one 
thing and the way real capitalism operates tends to be quite another.88 This makes it hard to 
envisage meaningful African development under the current global political and economic 
order. Having outlined how unsuited to Africa the neoliberal model looks like, in the following 
section I intend to emphasise the provisional and politically-motivated character of neoliberal 
development policy and practice. In this case, I see a particular need to frame the discussion 
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about the significance of the Commission’s development policies within a bigger picture that 
is the progress of capitalism over the decades and centuries.  
 
Capitalism: the wider historic and structural context 
Typically, neoliberalism emerged some four decades ago in Western Europe and North 
America owing to limitations intrinsic to the capitalist system. In terms of its inception thus 
the model has no roots whatever in the realities of Africa. If this says anything about 
neoliberalism, it possibly highlights the model’s dubious footings ultimately. And that, in my 
opinion, can be the decisive question when considering the significance of neoliberalism 
generally. This particular observation deserves elaborating to understand what neoliberalism 
might portend for African development.  
Furthermore, history records that the background to the rise of neoliberalism saw the ending 
of a preceding era of intense capitalist growth and prosperity known as the Golden Age (cf. 
Hobsbawm 1995). Meanwhile, the 1970s global energy crisis has been also cited as further 
justification for the shift in a new direction. So, not only is neoliberalism foreign to Africa, but 
more importantly the model appears to have been conceived to transcend a ‘crisis of excess 
capacity’ basic to the capitalist system. As anyone can possibly tell, Africa (and indeed the 
overwhelming majority of the populations in both the North and the South) has neither a 
hand in nor control over the turn of events in question.   
Again, the story of the neoliberal moment cannot be complete without also saying who its 
protagonists happen to be. It can be interesting hence to follow how the conjuncture brought 
together numerous players in a spectrum encompassing pro-market ideologues and groups. 
Those who came to champion this latest chapter of capitalism included economists, political 
theorists, hitherto obscure neoconservative elements and leading state figures—collectively 
referred to as the New Right (cf. Harvey 2005). What united them all seemingly was their 
commitment to untrammelled individualism that directly translated into strong antipathy 
toward (the role of) government. Undoubtedly, both Friedrich Von Hayek and Milton 
Friedman of the Chicago School of Economics have had a major (academic) impact in the 
institution of neoliberalism as a political and economic project. Like the modernisation 
planners before them, this second-batch of theorists also proved to have been closely 
implicated with power. Theirs was a strictly ruling class agenda that run contrary to the 
interests of workers in terms of decent wages and working conditions. Similarly, the 
ascendance to power in the US and the UK of Ronald Reagan (1980) and Margaret 
Thatcher (1979) has been just as momentous. Both these politicians chose to throw the 
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weight of state power behind the evolving neoliberal consensus at a crucial junction. Under 
the Reagan administration and the prime ministership of Thatcher, the neoliberal project 
came to have a staunch enforcer at the politico-military level. In terms of self-mandate, the 
neoliberals’ collective desire was (and still remains) nothing less than the radical 
reconfiguration of the existing political and economic order in western countries. It appears 
that they were totally frustrated by what they saw as the inability of capitalism to move 
forward under a dominant statist model. Not only did the advocates of neoliberalism manage 
to push the boundaries of classical liberalism in new and extreme ways, but they also 
seemed prepared to downgrade some of its key features. That, in general, is the genesis 
and context for this most recent form of capitalism which again only obliquely involves the 
African continent and its peoples.  
With regard to the Commission for Africa, what this tends to impart is that its program has 
been guided by the pressures of the market; the peoples of Africa and their social needs 
thus seem to come second to the diktats of a market-based economy. That history and the 
social forces implicated in its making however ought to be treated as tangential. On the 
whole, those changes remain extraneous to Africa and indeed to the bulk (99%) of humanity. 
Ultimately, the remarkable thing about neoliberalism seems to be that, despite its fringe and 
localist beginnings, the phenomenon nonetheless has spread far and wide. Before long, the 
neoliberal influence would filter through to the countries of the global South via the policies of 
the relevant multilateral financial and development bodies. In reality, hence, neoliberalism as 
the figment of the capitalist class had to be enforced through coercive means by this class’s 
political proxies and inspite of the majority. Now, in presenting this rather rudimentary 
account about the genesis of neoliberalism, my point obviously is: even if neoliberalism 
appears to be widely accepted at the moment, this doesn’t however preclude that the model 
stands as a perfect gambit by a privileged minority for the project to have any world-wide 
lasting application. This latter point in fact invites further exposition. Accordingly, the 
generally tenuous character of neoliberalism can best be explained if we take into account 
the evolutionary course of capitalism as defined by continual expansion and recurrent 
contraction. 
  
Neoliberalism as interim phase in the development of capitalism   
To come to grips with capitalism and its various expressions—as a contingent rather than 
lasting reality—it is important to have a sense of the internal logic of the system as a whole. 
It is this same logic which in turn influences the adoption of specific national and 
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transnational economic and political policy at any one moment in time. Amin (1998:29) for 
example teaches us that:  
Among the entirety of conceptions making up bourgeois thought, 
that one which responds best to the demands posed by the 
particular phase of capitalist development under consideration 
easily wins its place of intellectual dominance; it becomes the 
‘single thought’ of the moment.  
As I have tried to explain elsewhere in this study, we need then to reflect on the genesis and 
context of the Commission’s program to know the import to African development. And so, to 
find out whether the Commission can impact African development positively, it becomes 
necessary to take a longer-term view of capitalist development while paying specific 
attention to its shifting fortunes in the postwar period.  
It is perhaps common knowledge that throughout its history capitalism has been dogged by 
self-repeating cycles of growth and slump. This alternation of expansion and contraction is a 
systemic/ structural condition that can’t be wished away for good. Given the prevalence of 
this unresolvable contradiction, the many policies the capitalist class may hatch instead 
seem akin to a coping mechanism; generally, policies tend to be conceived and enacted 
reactively and in ways that facilitate the next round of expansion and profits generation. In 
that sense, the development of the South needs to be considered as of secondary 
importance. Prior to the neoliberal juncture, capitalism underwent significant crises on 
various occasions in its development course, a fact outlined below.   
One of its earliest crises occurred around the turn of the 19th century as capitalist 
development then couldn’t be confined to the European central territory. In order to 
overcome that initial impasse, the leading European powers set out on another round of 
imperialist expansion and conquest. In particular, following the Berlin Conference (1884—
1885) and the subsequent ‘Scramble for Africa’, the African continent was divided up and 
was turned into a source of raw material and a market for goods made in the metropole. A 
policy of formal colonialism therefore was crucial for national capitalism to overcome its 
internal limitation at that particular juncture. Even if somehow rationalised as a positive 
development, the indisputable fact is that Africa had to live through the physical, cultural and 
psychological ravages wrought by the colonial encounter. Colonialism thus was far from the 
civilising mission it is sometimes claimed to be; it was instead a low point in the continent’s 
history that left in its wake a lasting cost, namely an arrested development. This shows that 
the rhetoric coming from those in positions of power as justification for external intervention 
and the experience of the dominated don’t normally match up. And so for the next four 
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decades, capitalist growth proceeded more or less steadily by exploiting the colonies till 
another hurdle in the form of the Great Depression of the early 1930s brought that expansion 
to an abrupt halt.  
The Great Depression led to the immiserisation of vast numbers of the American population 
in particular. To deal with the resulting crisis, the US as the leading capitalist powerhouse 
adopted the Keynesian approach to economic recovery. Under the model, the US 
government oversaw the national economy and was able to offset the negative social and 
economic consequences of the preceding laissez-faire capitalism. Not only did the economy 
picked up fairly rapidly due to greater input by the state, but also the provision of welfare was 
made an integral part of the public policy of the day. The US of the late 1930s and 1940s 
lived through the success of that model, which heralded immense national economic riches. 
This was also around the time when the US emerged as a major political power following its 
participation and subsequent victory in World War II with comparatively minimal loss and 
destruction to itself. The achievement of unprecedented economic wealth together with 
manifest political-military supremacy led to the US reorienting its place globally. Instead of 
carrying on with the somewhat isolationist pre-war foreign policy, the US now saw an 
opportunity to play a bigger role in world affairs. Such a comparative position of strength 
made it possible for the US to contrive a plan for the reconstruction of war-torn Europe. The 
idea of the US taking responsibility for transforming the futures of other nations gained 
increasing currency among policy decision-makers subsequently. Beyond Europe, the same 
policy would soon be extended to the countries of the periphery in the name of modernising 
their political and economic structures. Such was the constellation of some of the key events 
and forces which culminated in the institution of the development project. If we consider that 
history as contingent rather than inexorable, it becomes possible to look at the development 
project as perhaps reflecting some other (unstated) interest. This last point calls for 
clarification.  
For the US, the development project was a means by which to uphold its position of power 
vis-à-vis its rivals, in particular the former USSR and a rapidly-transforming new China. So, 
in the context of the Cold War, development was used by the US government as lever 
against its ideological nemeses. By promoting economic development with liberal political 
values, the US sought to contain what it saw as a threatening expansion of world 
communism radiating mainly from the Sovietist camp. And so ‘development’ was to be 
particularly targeted at the newly decolonised states of Africa and Asia in an attempt to woe 
them away from the spell of socialism as it seemed. In turn, development proved an 
instrument of US imperial power masquerading as an economic and political program for the 
entire world. On balance, the development agenda therefore appears, even if cloaked in an 
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intellectual and moral discourse of eradicating Third World poverty, the product of real 
concerns the US had about its global position in the immediate postwar period. It was 
articulated strictly in response to the exigencies of the period and in a manner that can serve 
the US at the expense of the rest. However, given the very nature of capitalism, the postwar 
economic dispensation couldn’t last of course. As I have tried to illuminate previously, the 
long postwar boom ended in the crisis that cleared the way for the onset of neoliberal 
globalisation.  
Globalisation in this case acted as conduit for surplus financial capital to tap into new 
markets. Through offshoring, manufacturing was relocated from the original home of 
capitalism in the West to where it would be possible to reduce the cost of production 
elsewhere around the global South. Outsourcing and the exploitation of cheap labour have 
to go hand in hand to facilitate once more the re-expansion of capitalism. I guess therein 
seems to lie the essence of Blair’s Africa Commission as one more channel for the 
promotion of capitalism in the contemporary moment. But common sense tends to show that 
any form of expansion whenever appears bound to prove a temporary remedy, so much so 
that following the Global Financial Crisis (2007/2008) we could already be witnessing the 
unravelling89 of neoliberalism as a distinct episode in the long saga known as capitalism. The 
GFC is of course the outcome of unsustainable lending, itself dictated by a compulsion to 
overaccumulate at a time of unsteady employment. Accordingly, it becomes really interesting 
to guess how capitalism regenerates next time round if this most recent crisis doesn’t deal it 
a final death blow. As Feffer (2018)90 writes: 
Such an unwarranted economic boom was hardly something 
new, so it was easy to predict what would happen next. Periods 
of irrational exuberance—whether the dot-com expansion, Dutch 
tulipmania in the 17th century, or the housing bubble in America 
of the 2000s—have always led to a sudden crash and a serious 
hangover.  
At the time of writing, a sense of foreboding fills the air as the early signs of what might 
follow sound unencouraging indeed. A rapidly escalating trend featuring radical forces of 
reaction, for example xenophobic nationalists, fascists and neo-Nazis, is the manifest 
outcome of the crisis of neoliberal capitalism. Aggravating this identity-based type of political 
atavism also are newer wars of plunder, mass migration and acts of wanton terrorism. All 
this turmoil has now become synonymous with imperialism in the age of neoliberal 
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globalisation. Amidst all of this, it is important that we try to find another path forward not 
only for the African peoples but also for all of humanity. This I will be focussing on in the next 
chapter and as a way of rounding off the study.  
 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter looked at the Blair Commission and the development roadmap it authored on 
behalf of sub-Saharan Africa. The analysis focussed on the potential of the Commission to 
bring about the announced development outcomes. Having closely studied the physical 
composition of the Commission and the text of its findings, I noted that the initiative to 
promote African development betrays a normative concern. Based on the sense that 
preserving the status quo is the underlying agenda, I thus questioned the Commission’s 
promise to fundamentally transform Africa. 
I argued in more detail that there exists a considerable gap between what the 
Commissioners avow and what can possibly be achieved on a practical level. This 
discrepancy was believed to result from limitations specific to the development paradigm 
employed by the Commission. In particular, I alluded to how a combination of conceptual 
baggage and correlated practice, not to mention lasting ideological inertia, renders the 
Commission’s program unviable in African contexts. 
On the one level, the analysis found that the Commission’s vision to be unrealistic because 
of the ‘incommensurate’ nature of its approach. The original misstep has been that the 
Commission assumed capitalist development to be natural and indeed the only reality. In 
addition, the portrayal of African underdevelopment as an aberration to be accordingly 
resolved appeared deduced from the dubious notion of capitalism as norm. To get to the root 
of this exclusivist viewpoint, the analysis thus was targeted first at the constitutive 
presuppositions underlying the Commission’s way of operating. It was shown that behind the 
Commission’s account of development lay the influence of a long-established Western 
intellectual tradition of thought and practice. From this perspective, as Comte’s positivism 
and then Durkheim’s sociology foreshadow, human society can presumably be studied in 
exactly the same way as the natural world. In accordance, the Commission was thought to 
have (unduly) drawn on the methodology of the natural sciences to diagnose and remedy 
Africa’s economic and political challenges. Most of all, the analysis revealed the 
Commission’s approach as being simultaneously idealist as well as reductionist, and 
ultimately lacking in terms of the capacity to contribute to real change.         
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On another level, when the development agenda otherwise was reviewed from a social 
constructionist standpoint, the inquiry resulted in an altogether different understanding. Here, 
as the focus of the analysis shifted to the genesis and context of the Commission’s program 
in place of the absolutism of the market, it became possible to see the strictly ideological 
groundings of development as advocated by the dominant capitalist powers. Likewise, 
submitting development to a social constructionist analysis led to the realisation that self-
interest, more than perhaps anything else, seems to blinker its advocates to empirical reality. 
Based on what I have recounted, this applies for example to the choice of the 
Commissioners who seem to have been vetted as loyal neoliberals whilst shunning anyone 
who might have other views. The same self-serving ideological impulsion seems to explain 
too why the Commission remains keen on the neoliberal project despite the worldwide 
discontent extending over its 40-year long (ruinous) history.  
Finally, the gist of the analysis has been that neoliberalism runs counter to the prospect of 
autonomous African development in about every respect. So, more than proving a step in 
the right direction, the neoliberal model has been interpreted as a truly backward-looking 
response to Africa’s ‘development’ challenges. Whether known to those seeking its 
imposition on the continent or not, neoliberalism’s demonstrated tendency has been to stall 
radical change. As Africa however needs more of the latter to break free of a vicious status 
quo, the question of meaningful change ought to be given due attention. It is the subject of 
my next chapter.  
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6. THE BROAD DESIGN OF A ‘HETERODOX’ 
DEVELOPMENT THEORY  
Think global, act local - World Social Forum 
 
Chapter six, the final component of the inquiry, focuses on the implications for sub-Saharan 
Africa development of the Blair Commission and the Eritrean case. The aim is to figure what 
a sound development framework for Africa should encompass, and how this could work in 
reality. Besides, given that neocolonial domination remains a key factor in African 
underdevelopment, a coherent development policy and action should therefore come along 
a broadly anti-imperialist line. The chapter is divided into three sequentially organised areas: 
to keep track, I start out with a short summary of the key findings made over the course of 
the investigation; next, against the backdrop of the Eritrean story, I (con)test the veracity of 
the Commission’s thesis on African development, and; finally, and most consciously, I 
venture some tentative thoughts and strategies toward a plausible development theory and 
practice within sub-Saharan Africa contexts.  
 
6.1 Recapturing the spirit of the Commission for Africa and the Eritrean 
experiment  
Based on the analysis of the two sets of material, it has been shown that the Commission 
and the Eritrean example express diametrically opposed approaches to development. The 
Eritrean Government’s radically autonomous position stood in reverse to the Commission’s 
normative theory of development. In each case, a discrete conceptual and practical frame of 
reference justified the (conflicting) meaning of development. Also, in both instances, the 
attitude to development arose as a result of specific historical conditions and political 
exigencies.   
 
The Eritrean vision of development was found to have been inspired by the Marxist 
philosophy of nature and socio-historical evolution. In this particular case, the development 
process thus proved to be undifferentiable from social conflict—over material resources or in 
the wake of social oppression generally. Also, in opting for a policy of integrated and 
dialectical change, Eritrea’s modern history came to be the bedrock for the current 
development experiment. Having grown directly out of the preceding problematic 
experience, now as then the Eritrean bid has typically been for fully sovereign economic and 
political development. Here, the ideal of self-development presents as so paramount, which 
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is why Eritrean development today entails central-planning at the hands of the sole ruling 
People’s Front party, thereby signalling the extension of the socialist revolution launched by 
the EPLF. The Eritrean Government’s perception of development accordingly features a 
political discourse necessitated by the (perennial) quest to offset the complications of 
hegemonic power. In contrast, it turned out that the development plan concocted by the 
Commission for Africa owes to concepts of the individual and society intrinsic to Liberalism 
more generally considered. The whole question of development therefore appeared 
predicated on, not to mention dictated by, the imperatives of the so-called free market. 
Again, just as a revolutionary tendency dominates the Eritrean approach to development, the 
development agenda on this occasion presupposes consensus around a pre-defined 
framework of change. Accordingly, not only does development anticipate a particular kind of 
rationality, but also the entire process has to be technically directed and regulated in ways 
that ensure global capitalist interests.  
 
To sum up, we could categorically state that the disparities between those two approaches 
to development remain completely unbridgeable. But, beyond the mere sense of mutual-
incompatibility, there could be something more fundamental at stake for Africa here. Indeed, 
the two initiatives bear differently on the practical question of how Africa may oversee its 
own political and economic transformation. Distinctly, the mechanistic ‘copy and paste’ style 
of the Commission comes out as misemployment of the concept of development. Or else, 
the attempt by the West to typically superimpose its experience of (capitalist) development 
hardly works in an African context. The Commission’s problem seems to be that it assumed 
wrongly that what ensued in another place and time will replay itself in the Africa of the new 
Millennium; history normally doesn’t eventuate in such a fortuitous manner. On the other 
hand, it may perhaps be difficult to deny the more spontaneous ‘by trial and error’ mode 
underlying the Eritrean approach to development.  
 
From an alternative development standpoint, the likely merit in the Eritrean strategy then is 
its indigenous and transcultural credentials to an equal measure. This seems to render the 
Eritrean case somewhat versatile—despite its problems. We could accordingly argue about 
the adaptability (not transplantability) of Eritrea’s self-determining development policy to 
other cases across the African continent. Finally, in contrast to the Commission’s evidently 
absolutistic and redundant outlook, the Eritrean story possibly deserves spotlighting if only to 
check its import to African development outside and against the status quo. 
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6.2 Peering into the Commission for Africa through the lens of Eritrea  
The objective behind the present study is to draw attention to the African peoples’ potential 
for self-development. In that regard, the priority has been to augment the self-consciousness 
of the African peoples as agents of historical change. In view both of the Eritrean case and 
Blair’s Africa Commission, this task necessitated highlighting the multiplicity and unity of 
social reality. The analysis thus has been guided by the combined interest of unmasking the 
contingent character of the dominant neoliberal reality while lending credence to other 
(marginalised) ways of being and knowing. Specifically, it is considered that real 
development comes with recognition of the pan-human side of African knowledge and a 
rebuttal of the claim of universality concerning capitalist development.   
 
The canard of an exclusive neoliberal reality  
It has been suggested how the Commission for Africa believes in the transcendent idea that 
there is only one optimal development track before all societies. At the same time, the 
analysis has shown that this core premise comes as the by-product of a Eurocentric 
intellectual tradition vis-a-vis reality and its dynamics. The categorisation thus of African 
underdevelopment as ‘objectionable’ reality to be accordingly resolved is seen as being 
anticipated by that grand myth. Inevitably, we saw the Commission for Africa preoccupy itself 
with ways of finding certainty in a representation of reality by means of propositions. 
Similarly, behind its practical effort to ‘solve’ African underdevelopment lay the residual belief 
that positivist analysis uncovers the true causes of any type of problem. The argument in 
favour of capitalist reality as natural and therefore mandatory is thought to be rooted in that 
sweeping claim. But lest it be forgotten, the Eritrean Government’s indigenous and otherwise 
discretionary way of doing things meantime has been recognised as lending a different 
meaning to ‘development’. The case demonstrated that there can exist other (contrarian) 
ways of effecting economic and political change. As will be explained below, the assumption 
then that capitalist development is inevitable and obtains from following a designated 
template remains far from the (whiggish) case that it is made of.   
 
In order to counter the notion of a singular neoliberal reality, it was essential to problematise 
the concept of development, including the accepted wisdom of a developed North as model/ 
patron for a developing Africa. This led to a discussion about how the whole saga of 
development came to be normalised, whilst allowing for other ways of organising society 
politically and economically. So, by treating the development phenomenon as a social 
construct, it was possible to realise that ‘development’ actually takes place within, not 
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outside, human history and real power relations. Accordingly, it turned out no longer 
problematic to distinguish the ideological side of what goes for mainstream development 
policy and action. Moreover, it became apparent that development arose as a historical- and 
cultural-phenomenon with a geographic epicentre somewhere in the Western world. 
Ultimately, it was resolved that the pursuit of so-called development can’t be a definitive 
answer to whatever the rest of the world including Africa presumably lacks.  
 
That is the general tenor of the argument informing the present study. It censures the 
dominant development framework as being contrary to meaningful African development. Of 
course, we ought to keep in mind that interest in the broader question of power, knowledge 
and social practice goes a long way back. Typically, the problem (of dominant 
representation) has been widely studied from within certain left-leaning perspectives, 
resulting in a pool of theoretical knowledge.   
 
For example, there is that substantial body of thought symbolised by postcolonial and 
postdevelopment theory, poststructuralism and (a portion of) Subaltern Studies which has 
shown great promise for the capacity to identify the ideological foundations of hegemonic 
knowledge and practice. Since the central premise of this study partially consisted in 
theoretically challenging the dominant development model (as first step in the overall 
objective of eventually moving beyond capitalism), it is hardly possible to discount the 
relevance of this form of abstract analysis to the present study.  
 
When taking stock of what this project originally sought out to accomplish, it is probably true 
then it mostly aligns with much of what has been captured through this closely 
interconnected but varied literature. As initially Foucault, then Said and more recently some 
of the postdevelopment writers have speculated, the secret in systematically analysing the 
Commission and its development text has been the tendency to also view knowledge 
produced by those in positions of power as mere discourse. In this case, discourse analysis 
as a distinct mode of inquiry has proven advantageous for tracing the essentially Western 
character of the narrative of development highlighted in the Commission’s Report. A 
theoretical critique of the Commission’s development text hence made it possible to 
underline its non-organic underpinnings. Likewise, this has translated into an opportunity to 
unmask the vested political and economic interests promoted by the Commission at the 
expense of the peoples of Africa. More than that, the analysis capitalised on the insight 
deriving from that broad body of knowledge to dispute the entrenched subject position of the 
African as far as the dominant development discourse goes. In the process, it became 
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possible to think, based on the present researcher’s personal experience, of opening up 
space for an alternative beyond orthodox approaches to African development.  
 
The conclusion that could hence be drawn was that, generally told, there are plural realities, 
all of which jostle for truth and legitimacy. As such, the capitalist political and economic order 
can’t be said to represent reality in the absolute sense. Not only does capitalist development 
not represent reality, but also the development project itself reeks of being fictitious 
apparently, a complete invention at the hands of its advocates. Contrarily, it made sense to 
see that people (anywhere and at all time) as active subjects do make their own social and 
cultural worlds, which in turn influence their thought patterns and practical actions as well. 
That is what turns out to be positive about analysing dominant knowledge as discourse; we 
can see that the push for an exclusive reality becomes untenable due to moot ideological 
factors. But then in stressing the provisional character of the neoliberal order and the facts of 
diversity, one needn’t have to be a complete relativist. In other words, it is important to avoid 
making the (ultimate) contention that reality is in flux, arbitrary or even countlessly 
reproducible; it is better advised to think otherwise. So, regardless of how theoretically 
incisive discourse analysis proves to be, there is limitation to what can be fruitfully achieved 
through the approach.  And, as far as this study is concerned, herein possibly lies the 
importance of adding Eritrea as an empirical case. Its incorporation into the present study is 
intended to buck the idealist trend that constructionism and the emphasis on discourse is 
bound to foster. 
 
Of historical materialism and its spatiotemporal latitudes 
No doubt, submitting the dominant model of development to critical discourse analysis 
taught us some important lessons about the basic nature of ‘development’. By focusing on 
development as discourse, it was possible to penetrate the artificial, but potentially impactful, 
reality that results from the manipulation of language. We thus saw how discourse plays a 
not-so-negligible part in empowering some groups as it disempowers others, often 
representing the majority.  
 
All the same, it was deemed sensible to venture beyond the limitation that the use/ misuse of 
language imposes when discussing real economic development, a life-and-death question 
for the poor all over the global South. Unlike the discourse analysts, it was therefore felt that 
it can be a disservice to the African peoples to purport that their problems (however 
portrayed) will cease once we dissect the dominant development discourse for what it is. It 
was never considered to be wise and otherwise satisfactory to address concrete 
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development in a manner that is simply reactive—to what Africa’s detractors have said and 
written about the continent, its peoples and their future. A deep-running (theoretical, 
methodological and political) concern forces the serious Africa advocate to desist from going 
along too far in that course. That is why, in commencing the present study, it was thought 
useful to have a dual mandate in mind—of not just critiquing the Commission’s development 
text, but also outlining a suitable alternative by including empirical evidence from the real 
world of the African continent itself. Perhaps uniquely among the sub-Saharan African 
states, Eritrea in this case tends to be an opportunity to look at the dominant paradigm of 
development in a totally different way, using the ABCs of political economy.  
 
Despite the Commission’s avowals, the Eritrean case appeared relevant to tackle crucial 
questions about the nature of development thought and action. Following the Eritrean 
example, we could infer that in a none-egalitarian world like ours development is suggested 
universally by the dialectic of desire and coercion. And here too, the study recognises that 
the topic of African and ‘third world’ economic and political development in the context of 
unequal relations with the dominant powers has its own expansive history. In that respect, 
the present study shares common ground with the more formal Marxist empirical analyses of 
unequal social development centring on the capitalist political economy. In particular, the 
contribution by such diverse Africa scholars as Lionel Cliffe, Colin Leys, Giovanni Arrighi, 
John Saul, Patrick Bond, Issa Shivji, Ray Bush and Samir Amin is what this research also 
sought to build on. Over many decades, this collective’s on-the-ground generated accounts 
have helped shine an important ray on the various dimensions of the African development 
crisis. Indeed, it is possible to see some overlap between the present (empirically-informed) 
study of Eritrea and the way many of these Africa specialists have approached the 
continent’s development problem. But at the same time we could also point to where the 
argument somewhat diverges from the standard set by the political economy writers. The 
main point of difference (particularly with the overly materialist among them) is that they tend 
to be economic determinists who downplay the obscuring power of discourse and any 
oppression which isn’t grounded on social class. In the end, and despite its many limitations, 
the Eritrean model of development therefore served as a lens for interrogating the dominant 
approach to development. It has done so in the following specific way.   
 
Accordingly, a more accurate account of development instead is set to capture a people’s 
struggle for freedom from domination (subtle or crude) as timeless and universal human 
experience. Against this all-encompassing principle, the Commission’s position that sub-
Saharan Africa transformation is bound to come only from free market economics and a 
liberal political culture tends to be fallacious. Such a monolithic approach to development is 
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shown to be antithetical to the fundamental right of self-determination of the peoples of 
Africa. It reinforces the view that imperious external tutelage and meaningful internal 
development inevitably run a collision course. In other words, the very step of a Northern 
state patronising an African development commission means that such initiatives detract 
from the organic and popular underpinnings of the development process. In particular, it can 
be cause for scepticism when the Commission insinuates its development paradigm is of 
universal validity. It is contended that the mix of assumptions, methods and conclusions all 
of which endorse a free market development model for the region sounds like no accident. 
The analysis pointed to the fact that the whole initiative tends to be a facade for the 
cultivation of material interests on behalf of a very tiny minority of transnational elites, not the 
African masses. Ultimately, the Commission for Africa could be explained as peddling a 
dominant global order that intensifies the grip of neocolonialism in the continent. 
 
This study thus was conceived to support the right of the sub-Sahara African countries and 
their peoples, of which Eritrea is just one example out of many, to resist and transcend the 
neoliberal global order heralded by the Commission for Africa. Most importantly, the study 
reclaims the meaning of development in the interest of the subjects of development whilst 
simultaneously corroborating the latter’s culture, consciousness and agency. The 
endorsement, not in absolute terms to be sure, of the Eritrean take on development 
meanwhile served as a reminder of what possibilities there seem to be before the majority 
world—were it to renounce the model of development specific to the West’s historical and 
cultural experience. In the Eritrean domestic experimentation with development tends to be 
present rudiments, and only rudiments, for a different form of African development, and 
indeed universality. Rather than being constrained like the capitalist approach to 
development by the misapplication (at the hands of the bourgeoisie) of Enlightenment 
rationality and the positivist methodology, Eritrea’s (historical materialist) definition of 
‘progress’ through struggle against natural and social hurdles reflects a pan-human way of 
being and knowing. The case appears useful to show the universal value of local knowledge 
where alternate African development is question. So, in light of the story that emerged 
following a discussion of the Commission for Africa and the Eritrean model, how possibly 
can we redraw future African development? 
 
6.3 Beyond past and present actualities: towards a realistic African 
development framework 
The comparison between the Eritrean approach to development and that of the Commission 
for Africa engendered some important questions about the nature of development thought 
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and practice. In the wake of the analyses, we have been obliged to reconsider the 
correlation between: endogenous versus exogenous, bottom-up versus top-down and 
holistic versus reductionist approaches to development. Equally, what loomed large was the 
question of power in development and the agents responsible for effecting change.   
 
The essentially prescriptive policies contained in the Report gave the impression that the 
Commission’s recommendations may have been made on an ad hoc basis, in turn mirroring 
the underlying concern of pushing capitalist globalisation. By contrast, what came to light 
following the analysis of the Eritrean ‘discourse’ was this; first, that it is possible to dissent 
from the status quo and to pursue instead development that is in one’s self-interest; in 
addition, that there tends to be at all time a more practical, if by no means ideal, path to 
development before any one country despite the apparent immanence of the capitalist 
system. As has been noted already, the question then is to clarify what lessons the Eritrean 
case possibly offers vis-à-vis sub-Saharan Africa development. In this regard, there are a 
number of interconnecting issues that we should try to resolve. In the first place, the search 
for an alternate development obliges stating what type of development could be appropriate 
in African contexts. Equally, it becomes important to discuss the means for carrying through 
the required change together with the spatial reach or scope at which this may have to take 
place.  These concerns are addressed in succession below. 
 
Envisioning a congruous development model  
Typically, the belief about the organic makeup of the development process means any 
realistic African development has to originate from within the continent itself as key player. 
Also, according to this criterion, it becomes important to specify the essential features of the 
relevant development theory and practice. Following is a rather seminal note on how future 
African development can be conceptualised and practically implemented. But, before we 
hope to map out the necessary development framework, we must clear the ground first by 
reviewing the continent’s present broad economic and socio-political state. So, the focus 
initially is on why the neoliberal model should be denied a place in Africa’s future and on 
certain pitfalls (intellectual and political) that have to be simultaneously addressed.  
 
Shelving the neoliberal model as irreformable   
As a matter of practical necessity, any vying theory of African development should be 
endorsed based on its capacity to prevent the African peoples resigning to their present 
lamentable fate under neoliberal globalisation. This turns out to be even fundamental 
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knowing how the advocates of neoliberalism present their case in the most complex 
language (ahead of direct physical coercion as the case can be).  
 
Often, the rhetoric of neoliberal globalisation comes across as highly persuasive for it is 
coated in rather benign-sounding terminologies. It is hard to say much against such clichés 
as ‘growth decreases poverty’ or that ‘good governance is the precondition for all-round 
development’. This may explain why many governments as well as non-governmental 
bodies around the global South have been co-opted by the seductive discourse of neoliberal 
capitalism. And that is why too this study doesn’t downplay the power of discourse as part of 
the current analysis of the African development problem. If we were to succeed in our task of 
charting a better future for Africa, possibly the first step is to unpick the underlying agenda 
involving capitalist globalisation. That is to say, we have to be able to see into the thicket that 
the reified jargon of capitalism really stands for. Think here of how ‘the market’ gets 
portrayed as a self-enclosed congenial domain and as if independent from (negative) 
external influences such as those which gave us the GFC. It is even claimed an ‘invisible 
hand’ structures its operation. And to cap it all, its exponents assume the market has a life of 
its own when they talk about it in anthropomorphised ways (markets were nervous this 
morning but settled down later in the today). That of course doesn’t necessarily reflect the 
way markets actually work. As Curcio (2017) argues, it is not the “invisible hand” but rather 
the “foreign visible hand” of the market that has the most decisive role when speaking of the 
economies of the South.  In reality, this thing called the market then appears designed to 
cater primarily for the interests of powerful groups who don’t have to abide by its ostensive 
rules. The Commission’s delicate articulations stand as a clear illustration of this problem. 
Through vague generalities (growth rates, improved governance, balanced partnerships, 
debt review … etc.) the Commission hopes to normalise the record of neoliberal capitalism 
in Africa, but evidently the real legacy speaks quite for itself. And it is this latter point with 
which I concern myself for now. 
 
Time and again, the neoliberal model has proved incapable of furthering prosperity and 
human happiness. It has been shown to contribute to the enrichment of the very few and 
then only so at the cost of immiserising the multitudes. Wherever it has been applied, the 
general trend has been predictably the same globally—even if the absolute poverty found in 
parts of the global South remains starkly incomparable to the relative poverty levels 
prevalent in much of the North. The reason for this apparently is the yawning gap between 
the rhetoric of neoliberalism and the way the model operates in reality. One routinely hears 
the common refrain in favour of neoliberalism that in the end ‘all boats will be lifted’. Instead, 
it can be argued that the worldwide impact of neoliberalism has been felt more like a tsunami 
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tide that washes everything in its path into undifferentiable debris. Judging by its track record 
in Africa and elsewhere around the world, it is perhaps natural then to reject the neoliberal 
model as something not liable to reform. Even the IMF itself, in a 2016 paper titled 
Neoliberalism: Oversold? has come to wonder about the ‘potential’ of neoliberalism to usher 
in economic growth and prosperity. Now, if the IMF seems to be willing to revisit its long-held 
stance, this ought to be reason enough for the African states to also rethink the significance 
of neoliberalism as a suitable development model.    
 
Post-independence Africa has fared badly under the grip of neoliberalism. The problems of 
neoliberalism in Africa became even more acute following the weaponisation of financial 
capital in the era of so-called globalisation. From the early 1980s onwards, debt has given 
Africa’s creditors a rare lever to determine the continent’s economic and political trajectory. 
Through the Fund and the Bank, the major powers have been able to pursue intrusive 
policies vis-à-vis the continent that came to be (euphemistically) known as structural 
adjustment programs or SAPs—probably aptly acronymised for sapping any vitality the 
region previously had. The indebted African countries have been forced to place their 
economies at the mercy of a capricious system whilst the demand for austerity helped 
further exacerbate the already regrettable social conditions. At the same time, the few 
African states (for example, Libya before 2011, Zimbabwe under Mugabe, Sudan and 
Eritrea) which refused to fully play by the rules of the game were made to live with the 
debilitating effects of economic sanctions and other forms of punishment. That is the 
neoliberal actuality that the African continent would do better to forget. But what could the 
solution to the problem of African underdevelopment be in the end? Here, it is important to 
distinguish between false pathways that almost immediately run into dead-ends and more 
realistic strategies as we think about the continent’s future. I begin with what we must avoid 
as inadequate responses to Africa’s economic and social difficulties before thus saying 
something about a possible way forward. 
  
Traps in misemploying the past  
The rejection of the neoliberal order and the pursuit of alternative development strategies 
ought to be one and the same project. That certainly can’t be any easy, knowing how 
deeply-running the internal and external challenges to ‘African development’ turn out to be. It 
is nevertheless essential to retain ideological clarity along with radical economic and political 
praxis to get Africa closer to that final destination. In this sense, the focus particularly is on 
the types of responses that the enduring crisis of African underdevelopment may tend to 
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elicit. The discussion at this point then relates to what we ought to rule out as incompetent 
responses and resolutions to the problems faced.  
 
Basically, it is incumbent upon Africa’s advocates to censure all regressive measures rooted 
in an insular perception of the past and of oneself. Occasionally, the past witnesses a revival 
in some unwelcome ways, wherein it interferes with on-going efforts to build a more inclusive 
and promising future. In case there is residual tendency to hark back to the past, the pursuit 
of development that is apparently in Africa’s interest may not permit recreating what was 
once. There seem to be a couple of complicating factors that we should particularly be 
aware of and do all we can to limit. On the one hand, Africa can’t anticipate restoring its pre-
colonial ways as antidote to her post-colonial woes. Nor, on the other hand, should the 
continuing African development predicament be exploited by outsiders for this continent’s 
potential re-colonisation. In the end, the quest for veritable development obliges that the 
African continent sets its gaze firmly on the future. It can also mean that Africa has to be 
cautious against being physically reconquered which seems possible at this point in her 
history. These two key themes about the past and the present are taken up in turn below. 
 
Against atavism  
At one level, the injunction not to go against the current of history comes from the specific 
understanding that the world has undergone an irreversible shift since the so-called Age of 
Discovery. The end of the 15th century marked a major milestone, ushering in its wake 
unprecedented changes that have swept the entire globe over the intervening five centuries. 
All hitherto autonomous and semi-autonomous societies were suddenly engulfed by that 
unforeseen development. Needless to say, things have never been the same again for the 
non-European world. 
 
Since taking effect that very long, globalisation drew humanity forever closer, at more cost to 
some than to others. Like the other parts of the world outside the European circle, a 
flourishing (but far from idyllic) pre-colonial Africa got emasculated by the uneven contact 
with the classical European empires. Although a legitimate claim can be made about pre-
colonial African development, that erstwhile path to progress has permanently now being 
blocked. Today we all live under a world system constituted as an objective reality owing to 
the forces of globalisation. That is why the formulation of a credible theory of African 
development ought to anticipate this new global reality. It is to say that any viable approach 
to African development has to be free of all fundamentalist/ primordialist trends. A call like 
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this seems all the more urgent at a time when (unthinking) identity politics is in ascendance 
everywhere in both the South and the North.  
 
Accordingly, we must reject as throwback to medieval times certain distinct phenomena that 
have become largely a familiar feature of the African social and political landscape. To be 
more specific, the emphasis here ought to be on ‘opposition’ to foreign economic and 
political domination which draws inspiration from a religious fundamentalist tendency. Also, 
we must include in this connection that variety of African ‘national politics’ which tends to be 
practiced along a deliberately sub-national line.  
 
To be sure, it makes no sense to be against people self-identifying as who they are in 
everyday life setups. However, it seems proper to have reservations against personal 
affiliations becoming the basis for public affairs. Identity can best be seen as a double-edged 
sword in the sense that it can be a force for good or bad depending on how it might be 
invoked and for what sort of reasons. It would be helpful to the reader to explain here how 
identity politics in Africa tends to be hijacked for negative purposes in certain contemporary 
situations. Whatever the underlying grievances, it is hard to see anything positive accruing to 
Africa and her peoples for example from the putative beliefs and actions of the Boko Harams 
and the Lord’s Resistance Armies. The same goes for outfits like Al-Qaida in Mali and 
surrounding areas. Their particular brand of politics only tears at the social fabric of the 
nation which then undermines its unity and therefore its capacity for development. The fact 
that they are especially virulent as their arbitrary violence makes clear has a further 
complicating dimension beyond the immediate suffering of their local victims. The bigger 
danger for Africa seems to be that their very presence and activities has given munition to 
outside forces to intrude into the continent’s affairs in a post-9/11 global environment 
dominated by a heightened sense of anxiety and fear. Ultimately, their perceived dogmas 
and the political actions inspired by it tend to be self-defeating. By choosing to step outside 
of history, those espousing a fundamentalist worldview often end up confusing the real 
sources of the African peoples’ exploitation. They are condemned to fighting marginal battles 
and on the wrong side of history to boot. Their exclusivist tendency makes it impossible for 
them to reach out to others who otherwise might have better understanding of Africa’s social 
and economic problems, and who could have wound up being their allies in a common 
secular struggle for Africa’s second and final liberation. If religiously-motivated ideas and 
practices are to be effective, there seem to be some conditions under which this might be 
possible, as I discuss below.  
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When religious thought and action is given a progressive spin, its adherents can be 
expected to have a positive input into society’s affairs. Indeed, beyond the virus that the 
Boko Harams and co. symbolises, apparently there are live examples from around Africa 
and elsewhere of how religion can play a constructive social role. This often comes about 
when faith causes one to engage with the real world, not retreat from it.  
 
The liberation theologians of Central and Latin America, who bridged religion and revolution 
in the form of a preferential option for the poor, seem to provide a succinct example here. 
Even if the phenomenon of liberation theology proper may be missing from the African 
context, we could still think of what appears an African equivalent of deploying religion as a 
generally helpful social resource. Both Desmond Tutu and the late Mahmoud Mohammed 
Taha, for example, possibly come in this line. Tutu’s Anglicanism didn’t stop him from 
actively campaigning against apartheid in his native South Africa, just as Oscar Romero and 
Ernesto Cardenal did then against the repressive Salvadoran and Nicaraguan regimes 
respectively. Presently, Tutu stands as an uncontested moral authority on matters relating to 
human rights in particular, the very same cause for which Archbishop Romero gave his life. 
For his part, Taha sought, through his project of New Islamic Mission during the 1980s in 
Sudan, to confer a radical humanist tone on the Muslim faith. Taha was concerned and was 
quite unhappy indeed about invoking Quranic scripture in its literal sense some 15 centuries 
on. In particular, he was averse to the hijacking of Shari’a law by today’s political authority 
whilst consistently calling for a more pragmatic re-reading of the Islamic texts. Taha was 
accused of corrupting the minds of Sudan’s youth and of being impious. Also, reminiscent of 
Socrates during his own plight, Taha refused to disavow his stance despite the dire 
accusations he faced. Although Taha himself was executed for his ‘heretical’ beliefs, and the 
movement he inspired has subsequently lost momentum, his legacy lives on through the 
scholarship of the contemporary thinkers Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im and Nasr Hamid Abu 
Zayd. More than any time before, the predominantly Muslim part of Africa needs the ideas 
and insights of Taha, An-Na’im and Abu Zayd if it were to counter the fanaticism of an 
expanding Salafist/ Takfiri influence and its negative repercussions on development.   
  
Against the spectre of re-colonisation  
At a related level, the objection to the thought of re-colonisation seems to derive from the 
conviction that it can be impossible to solve Africa’s development problems by also going 
back in time. On the face of it, talk of Africa’s recolonisation by the West and in the 21st 
century may be odd-sounding. But judging by the turbulent state in which global capitalism 
finds itself in today, such a concern needs to be taken seriously and not just as 
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overstatement. There seem to be intersecting economic and geopolitical reasons for why the 
question of Africa’s physical recolonisation can perhaps no longer be talked about in the 
abstract or hypothetically. Of course, this latest project of domination over Africa may not 
come across as a patently vulgar scheme. Rather, it represents a venture that appears to be 
proceeding under a subtle strategy, one typically involving claims of security, 
counterterrorism, failed states, human rights, illegal migration … etc.     
 
Starting a decade ago and continuing on neoliberal capitalism has run into a deepening 
structural crisis of its own making from which it has hitherto failed to free itself. The Global 
Financial Crisis of 2007/2008 has been particularly decisive in causing the current worldwide 
economic and political confusion. The crisis has dented the ‘normal’ operation of global 
capitalism as overseen by the traditional parties within the major Western powers. 
Meanwhile, what has tended to complicate the present crisis further are apparently certain 
specific factors. Compared with previous experience, this latest crisis comes at a time of 
shrinking possibilities for further capitalist expansion and in the context of intense 
competition for resources and markets from powerful players (US, EU, China, India, Russia). 
And, underlying this whole picture one finds the neoconservative political-military agenda of 
world domination in which the principles of international law and state sovereignty have been 
subordinated to American exceptionalism. So, in terms of the ramifications for Africa and the 
rest of the world we could be talking here about an extraordinary historical conjuncture.   
 
It is under this fraught global reality that the system’s guardians must somehow find a way 
forward, since stasis spells the end of capitalism. Again, the structural nature of the current 
crisis means capitalism can possibly only go forward by instituting drastic measures. So far, 
the political fallout from the GFC has been particularly unsettling in both the North and the 
South. As the system continues to writhe from its self-inflicted wounds, we simultaneously 
observe Western political culture regressing into its most unpleasant forms. In the case of 
Africa, evidently the shift in the fortunes of global capitalism has translated into an 
increasingly militarised policy toward the continent. Consistent with the nature of capitalism, 
already wars and conquests have proven effective in mitigating the crises of the system. 
Given Africa’s comparative political weakness and considering the topsy-turvy state of 
current global politics, the very same option appears unavoidable this time around. This 
seems to be the gloomy prospect faced by many nations around the world as a 
consequence of the neoconservative/ liberal interventionist agenda in the 21st century world. 
As early as the first half of the 1990s, the neoconservatives, through their Project for the 
New American Century, made it clear that nothing will stand in the way of raw American 
power. This composite group, which counts itself as the (self-appointed) overseer of the 
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global order, appears intent and indeed willing to stamp its authority by whatever means 
necessary as the destruction of Yugoslavia (1999) and the invasion and subsequent 
occupation of Iraq (2003) for example have demonstrated. Presently, the on-going conflict in 
Syria represents one of the clearest and deeply disconcerting examples of the way this 
interventionist policy operates. Even though the Syrian nation has so far managed to 
weather the assault against it by the jihadist proxies of western imperialism, the US, NATO 
and their regional allies couldn’t resist throwing every obstacle in the way of the Syrian State 
asserting its full independence. These external aggressors even went as far as trying to 
physically insert their militaries on Syria’s sovereign soils as a way to thwart a Syrian full 
victory. As Giraldi (2018)91 comments:  
 
… the United States presence in Syria is completely illegal both under 
international law and under the U.S. government’s War Powers Act. 
Syria is a sovereign state with a recognized government and there is no 
U.N. or Congressional mandate that permits Washington to station its 
soldiers, Marines and airmen within the country’s borders. The argument 
that the recent Authorizations to Use Military Force (AUMF) permitted the 
activity because groups linked to al-Qaeda were active there and the 
local government was unable to expel them is only thinly credible as the 
U.S. has also attacked Syrian Army forces.... 
 
It seems clear then that we could be on the cusp of a unique point in world history in which 
the use of ‘soft power’ has likely been eclipsed by the threat of violent aggression and 
reoccupation due to the exacerbating state of global capitalism. And, as Con Sal (cited in 
Telesur 2018)92, adds:  
 
These vicious, cynical assaults to destabilize—and, if necessary, 
destroy—whole countries cloak the inescapable global economic 
reality that Western corporate capitalism is hopelessly uncompetitive 
compared to emerging rivals Russia and China.  
 
So, the reconquest of certain parts of the global South in the new Millennium seems to be 
still on the agenda. In the end, how we conceive of and intend to act upon the problem of 
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African underdevelopment should force us to take into account the new global reality of 
militarised imperialist intervention and expansionism. We should be able to know what might 
be required as a post-GFC neoliberal capitalism looks to fundamentally reorganise itself all 
over again, and right at a time when talk about, and indeed concrete moves at, recolonising 
Africa seems to be already in the air (cf. Gilley 2017).  
 
An intelligent synthesis of Africa’s past into a contemporary outlook 
But all shouldn’t be doom and gloom. In fact possibilities abound as to how to forge ahead. 
Africa on a local scale and humanity on a more universal level may embody what it takes to 
bring about balanced/ abiding development. Similarly, the point about the new type of 
development has to be that it does not have to be defined by unlimited growth and mindless 
consumption. Such ‘development’ may not be sustainable over the long run. 
 
Instead, development in the future has to be based on ideals of social justice and 
environmental protection with the long-term survival of humanity itself as the ultimate goal. In 
an earlier notation, it was pointed that the past is unalterable, which is generally true. Still 
this doesn’t mean that there can be nothing interesting or valuable in the African continent’s 
history which could have relevance for the contemporary world. Those who portray the 
African past in negative light don’t seem keen on giving minimum thought to real history; 
their ideological blinkers tend to stop them from trying to understand Africa and its peoples 
objectively. Certainly, the African continent has been home to a range of civilisations that 
dotted its vast territories. As the Guyanese scholar, Walter Rodney, has meticulously 
documented, these were made up of a number of vibrant empires and kingdoms like the 
Aksumite Empire, Ashanti Empire and the Zulu Kingdom, to name just a few at random. In 
their wake, some of them have left invaluable legacies. So what possibly is there that is 
quintessentially an African heritage and which can be taken on board for the purpose of 
working out a contemporary development outlook?  
 
Throughout Africa, from Cape to Cairo, Mombasa to Monrovia, one comes across certain 
vital concepts and practical everyday behaviour patterns that are part of the cultural reservoir 
of the continent. It is not improbable that the existing trove of African knowledge and 
practices can be harnessed to outline a more appropriate development theory and practice 
for our times.  
 
Among other things, we should be able to tap into such time-honoured African philosophies 
and ‘customs’ as Ubuntu (southern Africa, cf. Hailey 2008), Ujamaa, Harambee and Shama-
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Shama (eastern Africa: Tanzania, Kenya and Eritrea respectively) and Takaful (northern 
Africa). In particular, the definition of humans as socially anchored implicit in these concepts 
could offer a genuine alternative to the in-ward looking socially unmoored (gluttonous) homo 
economicus who is the centrepiece of economic theory. And then again why maybe confine 
one’s search to what can only be located within the territory of Africa proper. Indeed, other 
opportunities seem to present themselves from outside the African world. In this connection, 
it suffices perhaps to mention the Quechua concept of Sumac Kawsay, or Buen Vivir and 
Well Living in Spanish and English respectively (cf. Philipp 2017). The interesting aspect 
about these closely related paradigms of being may be the notion that for development to be 
well-balance it has to feature several things simultaneously. Precisely, the harmony in this 
form of collective development seems to come from seeing individuals, society and the 
natural environment as an integrated whole in which no single dimension takes priority over 
the others (cf. TeleSur 2017).93 It is thus hard to overstate the value for a more practical form 
of development associated with such distinctly non-Western perspectives amid the 
continuing crisis precipitated by a rampant capitalism. The observation probably makes even 
more sense if we consider how capitalism has given us alienated individuals (or cheerful 
robots according to C. Wright Mills), communities rife with social ills and environmental 
pollution and destruction. As Rockstroh (2017)94 explains:   
 
… a greater number of Americans died … from drug overdoses, last year, 
than were killed during the course of the Vietnam War …. All part and parcel 
of capitalism’s war against life itself. The emotional and physical pain, 
anxiety, and depression inflicted by the trauma inherent to a system 
sustained by perpetual exploitation has proven to be too much for a sizeable 
number of human beings to endure thus their need to self-medicate.  
 
It is clear from Rockstroh’s and others’ accounts that capitalist development seems far from 
guaranteeing the health and wellbeing of individuals, society and the ecosystem. But what 
could the alternative to capitalism be? And how might we build on existing indigenous 
knowledge and practices as we try to unlock the future? 
 
Since these community-based and -inspired beliefs and practices run counter to the 
acquisitive individualist mentality so central to capitalism, incidentally that seems to sit well 
with the basic tenets of socialism in which the needs of human beings are given precedence 
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over the economy and profit-making. So, socialist development has to be seriously 
contemplated here.  
 
Yet, what sort of ‘socialism’ can we possibly be talking about this time around? As Levine 
(2018)95 would have it, “the ambiguities and imprecisions that have clustered around the 
notion … are especially severe nowadays.” Clearly, experience shows that the idea of 
socialism could be problematic in practice; socialism tends to degenerate into 
authoritarianism in the absence of due checks and balances. We know for example how 20th 
century state socialisms such as those which emerged in Eastern Europe and in Russia 
itself under Stalin have proven themselves too bureaucratic and politically oppressive to be 
viable in the long run—despite the many real social and economic achievements. It is to be 
noted too, in parenthesis maybe, the following in reference to Eritrea’s economic and 
political model. For all its appearance of unconventionality, post-independence Eritrea 
closely echoes the sort of political reality associated with the socialism of that era. A 
significant anomaly about the Eritrean version of socialist development is the total absence 
of democratic space due to dogmatic centralism. Being a late starter in the race for national 
development may have contributed to the rather limited form and character of the Eritrean 
and some of the previous socialist experiments. Also, in the context of a global order 
controlled by the major imperialist powers, the idea of socialism in one country, never mind 
in an underdeveloped one like Eritrea, means political pressure and economic difficulties 
could leave such countries prone to losing their initial revolutionary momentum and even 
becoming corrupted. Eritrea’s recent alignment with the reactionary politico-military agenda 
of the Saudis and the Emirates to subjugate an impoverished Yemen can be a good 
example of how the banner of ‘socialism’ doesn’t always guarantee what goes on in reality. 
So without necessarily abandoning the idea of socialism altogether, it is important to 
understand how the concept might be adapted to have more practical relevance for our 
present time. Again in the words of Levine (2018), “because ‘socialism’ can mean all kinds of 
things or nothing very specific at all, there are a lot of possibilities.” The African countries 
thus should take seriously how far socialist economic policy in combination with participatory 
political democracy can go in bettering the conditions of their peoples. 
 
Another type of development: its means of delivery and its spatial configuration 
Having roughly outlined what sort of development might be appropriate in African contexts, it 
is necessary to discuss its other integral aspects. We should be able to work out the ‘at what 
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level and by whom’ part of the development equation. When it comes to saying which force 
or pool of forces could have a role in advancing meaningful African development, one’s 
reflex is that all entities (African and non-African) impacted by the capitalist system have a 
stake in countervailing and in helping with its supersession. Similarly, capitalism being the 
world system that it is, the expectation is that lasting development needs to also have a 
universal dimension. Even so, such a transnational project can’t be imagined to go against 
the diverse modes of struggles that exist in the many parts of the world. Of the various types 
of struggles involving distinct protagonists, the following section looks only at the role of the 
working class, progressive states, social movements and lastly intellectuals.  
 
Working class 
No doubt, the working class remains a major contender in the struggle to overcome 
capitalism. The universal question relating to the human need of earning a living through 
labour makes class as a distinct category the most qualified force of change. The decisive 
advantage in working class politics could be that the class struggle bridges more of what 
unites than separates those impacted by the capitalist relations of production. Class, by its 
very definition and nature, proves blind to race, culture, locally distinguishable and frameable 
allegiances and the like. As such, organising along class lines enables working men and 
women in Africa, the South as well as the North to mount serious challenge to the interests 
of the ruling classes that stymie egalitarian development. Because of this far-reaching 
potential, no wonder the labour movement has been subjected to intense pressure from the 
state as the agent of capital. In the so-called Third World, including Africa, leaders of trade 
union movements are often targeted for their role in defending the interests of workers. In 
the North itself, in places like France for example, the working class has come under 
sustained attack lately following the introduction of emergency laws to stem ‘terrorism’. 
These same laws can of course also be exploited to achieve other goals of the capitalist 
state, like pushing in austerity measures domestically and waging wars of choice abroad.  
 
So, definitely the working class has a significant part to play in the struggle for a different 
society, one based on economic justice and political equality. It can therefore be looked 
upon the working class anytime to mount effective global anti-capitalist resistance. Yet, in 
highlighting the central role of the working class, it is also important to grasp that today the 
labour movement may not be as influential as in its heydays during the 1960s, 1970s and 
even 1980s. Similarly it helps to cognise that in Africa (excluding South Africa perhaps) the 
working class lacks in pronouncement which is a sign of the underdeveloped state of the 
African countries. Finally, even in assigning greater weight to class and class-based politics, 
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we need not reserve exclusive privilege to this particular mode of social struggle since the 
push against capitalism can also come in other equally legitimate forms and ways.  
 
States 
States too tend to play a major role in development. That is true for the North as it is for the 
global South. The development of the Western European countries, Canada, the US, 
Australia and Japan, all came under the aegis of the state. More recently, the impressive 
development achieved by the Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) has also been credited 
to the active role of the state.  
 
The state in Africa thus can be central in achieving development. Libya, before NATO turned 
it into a failed state in 2011, seems a good example of how the state can have a significant 
hand in the promotion of development. Whatever one thinks of Gaddafi, under his rule the 
North African country witnessed a level of development not encountered in much of the 
African continent. The then-leader of the Jamahiriya made a point of reinvesting Libya’s 
huge oil revenues into national development projects, like the Great Man-Made River which 
brought freshwater supplies to a number of Libyan cities and towns. Libya’s national wealth 
was immense that, outside Libya itself, it could be shared with the less affluent sub-Saharan 
Africa sister nations. If we were to venture further afield, we are likely to come across similar 
examples of state-led national development experiments in the global South. Cuba, and 
despite the implacable blockade for almost six decades now, has been able to register 
important development in key areas. The tiny island nation’s achievements in the field of 
education and the health sector stands as a source of envy for a greater number of countries 
in the global South, if not the North. Meanwhile, Bolivia’s and Rafael Correa’s Ecuador 
(2007-2017) 21st century socialist-oriented development strategies have been instrumental in 
reducing poverty and overall social deprivation. One of the deepest impacts of the 
Ecuadorian model of development under Correa has to be the enshrining of the rights of 
nature in the national constitution. Clearly, individual states are in the end anticipated to 
have a role in development. The bigger the state in terms of its political and economic 
muscle, the more it can hope to achieve its development goals with relative ease. But the 
road forward can be tortuous and bumpy; the threat of reversal always lurks in the 
background. This last point is taken up below.   
 
Experience indicates that individual states, however progressive and otherwise commanded 
by popular will, may not be a match to capital and the US military as its preeminent enforcer. 
Numerous African and non-African countries have been harshly dealt with for daring to 
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follow an independent political and economic path. This has been catalogued extensively 
already to perhaps require retelling here (the reader is encouraged to consult Noam 
Chomsky’s massive oeuvre on the subject). But to give an overall sense, the recent and on-
going conflicts in Iraq, Libya and Syria, in which NATO and its regional allies chose to 
engage in unprovoked wars of aggression, confirm what may generally happen when 
individual states try to pursue independent policies.  
 
At the time of the assault against it, Libya was on its own, which made it an easy prey; the 
country’s huge treasures, both cash and gold, now are gone, that is to say, stolen. 
Consequently, if states can come together into blocks they stand a better chance of 
defending themselves, and can continue to develop in ways that are meaningful for their 
populations. The BRICS bloc, its neoliberalist tendency notwithstanding, is one 
contemporary example. But a more appropriate approach for the countries of the global 
South to organise collectively could come in its own specific guise.  
 
Indeed, there exists already one notable experiment in how to pursue shared political and 
economic objectives that can possibly be adapted in the African context. Specifically, the 
example of the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) might offer a sound alternative 
development framework for sub-Saharan Africa. The ALBA alliance was initiated in 2004 by 
Cuba and Venezuela and over the intervening years it succeeded in attracting more 
member-states to its ranks. ALBA was launched in response to the wide-spread economic 
and social stagnation that has befallen Central and Latin America after years of neoliberal 
policies. ALBA envisions freeing the Latin American continent from the despotism of 
neoliberalism through regional economic and political co-operation. As an alternative 
strategy to NAFTA, ALBA seeks to promote development based on the needs of the people 
using barter-like trading. The whole ALBA initiative centres on the principle of socialist 
solidarity among equals, as opposed to competition, exploitation and profit-making. This 
regional development scheme has expanded further with the establishment later on of the 
Bank of the South and a television channel, Telesur. In contrast to the IMF and World Bank, 
the Bank of the South provides loans to ALBA members on favourable terms. For its part, 
Telesur acts as antidote to the propaganda waged against the global South by the Northern 
corporate mass media.  
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Although the effectiveness of the Bolivarian alliance appears susceptible to the outcome of 
political developments within its member nations,96 this notwithstanding ALBA comes across 
as a very practical arrangement. ALBA’s lessons, both political and economic, for the global 
South hence can’t be overstated. Sub-Saharan Africa in particular could profit from an 
ALBA-like collective body. In its current titular identity and form, the African Union (AU) 
seems not ready to shoulder the historic responsibility involving the continent’s radical 
economic and political overhaul. Like the Organisation of American States (OAS), which for 
seven decades has been used by Washington as a tool for the subjugation of the countries 
of the hemisphere, the AU has been manipulated and otherwise co-opted to be an effective 
vehicle for African majority interests.97 On the other hand, Pan-Africanism, as the ultimate 
unifying vision, deserves to be resuscitated and accorded the central role it once played in 
ensuring the political sovereignty of the African states. It is worth repeating the point again: 
individually, most of the sub-Saharan Africa states lack the power to enforce their 
development agendas within the global system. And without political clout, sub-Saharan 
Africa’s development will always prove elusive. On the economic front too, the continent’s 
resources and the African peoples’ potential can be harnessed and channelled towards the 
goal of an African version of ALBA. As oil-rich Venezuela is obliged to cover the energy 
consumption needs of ALBA members deprived of this commodity, so too Nigeria’s and 
Angola’s considerable oil output be made accessible to the sub-Saharan countries which 
need it. Sudan’s vast agricultural output could be enough to secure the food needs of a 
number of the countries in its immediate radius. The same goes for livestock, whereby a 
country like Somalia could supply the meat demands of the Horn of Africa region. And for 
advanced technical and industrial expertise, meanwhile, sub-Sahara Africa could tap into the 
giant South African economy for cooperation in that field. In short, were Africa to adopt a 
development strategy of an ALBA equivalent, the potential development benefits that could 
derive from the initiative can truly be immense. In order to move forward, sub-Saharan Africa 
needs to seriously contemplate the implementation of an Africanised ALBA as one of many 
key development policies. 
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Social movements   
Even though ‘social movements’ come in a variety of shapes and forms, the types that 
should concern us most ought to be those that espouse a progressive agenda. In other 
words, our focus should be on the kind of movements that are engaged in struggles for 
fundamental economic and political change. Also, any movement motivated by a sense of 
environmental justice on behalf of planet earth should occupy an important place in the 
overall struggle to overcome capitalism. When you scout the global scene, you are likely to 
be faced with a myriad of movements scattered around the length and breadth of the place. 
Some of these operate on the global stage like the World Social Forum and Greenpeace for 
example. Others, such as the Landless Workers Movement (Brazil) and Landless Peoples 
Movement (South Africa), are known more for their focus on local issues and causes. It can’t 
be denied that all, local and transnational, have a stake in making the world a better place 
for everyone. That is because these social movements happen to wield the right ideology in 
that it is clearly recognised that international capitalism and its national configurations 
remains the main cause of economic and political injustice, not to mention environmental 
degradation. But the global anti-capitalist campaign can be made even more effective. At the 
moment, the apparent tendency is for compartmentalisation as different groups and 
movements seem to preoccupy themselves with particular agendas. That can even play into 
the hands of the oppressor classes who use strategies of divide and conquer to stay in 
power. Instead, all those forces on the opposite tracks to capitalist domination will need to 
coalesce into a single mass movement if we were to get closer to that other world.    
 
Intellectuals  
The role of the organic intellectual and all other intellectuals not co-opted by power in 
contributing to African political and economic liberation also deserves highlighting.98 During 
the colonial period and following independence, it is African intellectuals committed to the 
continent’s struggle who have been key in lifting the scales clouding the popular classes’ 
vision. Whether in the capacity of full time partisans, or as redoubtable academic scholars, 
their lives’ mission has revolved around this fundamental goal.  
 
Cabral and Fanon, for example, made it clear that Africa’s political salvation and economic 
development takes African sweat, tears and blood. They not only theorised but also 
undertook concrete steps to help set Africa on the path of economic and political freedom. 
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And judging by how they have paid the ultimate price, both of them lived true to what they 
preached. Chinua Achebe and Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o meanwhile have provided in their own 
ways a powerful anti-dote to the cultural/ ideological onslaught perpetuated against Africa 
from the usual imperialist quarters. In between them, the two embody the kind of self-esteem 
that Africa can’t afford to go without. Before he could be credited father of modern African 
literature, Achebe had to prevail over and make a sceptical (cynical?) British literary 
establishment reconcile itself to his point of view. His seminal Things Fall Apart was 
published after overcoming this earliest resistance; it has since been translated into over 50 
languages and had sold not less than 10 million copies. Throughout his ‘career’, Achebe 
came across as a tireless advocate of African knowledge and without sounding parochial or 
chauvinistic it must be said. So too the effort of Ngũgĩ has been equally instrumental. 
Perhaps Ngũgĩ’s lasting contribution has been his will to reinvigorate African agency, 
something reflected in his decision to drop the name James in favour of Ngũgĩ and then 
altogether abandoning the English language for Gikuyu and Kiswahili. This may be what 
Olufunke Ogundimu (2018) 99 had in mind when he wrote:   
 
Ngũgĩ’s enduring rallying cry has led Jalada Africa, a Pan African 
writers’ collective, to curate a translation issue in which Ngũgĩ’s fable 
“Ituĩka Rĩa Mũrũngarũ: Kana Kĩrĩa Gĩtũmaga Andũ Mathiĩ Marũngiĩ” 
(“The Upright Revolution: Or Why Humans Walk Upright”) was 
translated into thirty languages, making it the most translated short 
story in the history of African writing. Most of the languages were 
African [emphasis mine]. 
 
Ngũgĩ simply and logically stated his position by admitting that he couldn’t go on producing 
‘African literature’ using a foreign language while he has access to his own (splendid) 
cultural and linguistic heritage. The new crop of would-be African scholars and activists 
would do well in taking a leaf from the rich and encouraging legacy of this earlier generation. 
The latter’s thoughts and perceptions ought to benefit any future theory and practice of 
African development, even if it is true intellectuals as individuals cannot change society on 
their own. Finally, it is not the colour of their skin or birth-place but rather their moral and 
intellectual integrity and rigor which has to be taken into account when discussing the 
significance of the African intellectual’s contribution for a better Africa. And, as long as this is 
the case, no one can quarantine intellectual labour within any racial or geographic confines.  
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6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter presented the implications for African development of the Blair Commission and 
the Eritrean model. This objective was in line with the obligation to map a sound 
development framework for the continent vis-à-vis the immediate offensive by global 
capitalism/ imperialism.   
The chapter began by recapping the key findings of the research. Accordingly, it was stated 
that the Commission for Africa and the Eritrean case embody two mutually-opposed 
development strategies. The difference over the gist of development was shown to be due to 
the nature of the underlying conceptual and practical frame of references, which is itself a 
feature of discrete historical and political processes. The Eritrean approach to development, 
reflecting a broadly Marxist core, appeared as the direct extension of the country’s past 
experience centred on the quest for political self-determination. In terms of its basic 
character, it was related that the Eritrean approach not only demonstrated a materialist 
consciousness, but also benefitted from the assumption of integrated change following from 
social contradictions. In both form and substance, the Eritrean development model therefore 
totally contrasted with the Commission’s preference for the free-market, a position sustained 
by notions of the individual and society intrinsic to the ideology of Liberalism. In place 
perhaps of a due realist and dialectical premise, it was implied thus that the Commission 
adhered to an idealised account of sub-Saharan Africa and its political and economic 
conditions. In the process, the Commission not only abstracted the meaning of development, 
but also reduced the prospect for practical African development to a specific rationality, one 
typified by consensus around a pre-existing policy of change. It was further remarked that 
the manner in which development (as concept and practice) was operationalised and 
otherwise technically manipulated by the Commission had the distinct effect of ensuring 
global capitalist interests over the long-run. Finally, the Commission and the Eritrean 
example were said to hold different import for the African development process. 
As the next step, the chapter specifically dwelled on the importance of the Commission to 
stimulate the African development process. It was argued the Commission for Africa 
appeared to have been concerned mainly with perpetuating the dominant global order, 
irrespective of the aspirations of the majority of the African populations. This sort of 
perception made it also imperative to reconsider/ discount its potential. Again, the 
‘anomalous’ example provided by the Eritrean model of development was a factor in making 
this critical assessment. Having looked at the Commission through the prism that is the 
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Eritrean story, it was possible to reaffirm a twofold broad truth about the development 
process otherwise eclipsed and occluded from the dominant narrative.    
In the first instance, it bore clarifying that the neoliberal economic and political order was far 
from signifying reality in a definitive way. The attempt to negate the dominant order as 
absolute owed to the fact that ‘reality’ appears both contingent and provisional, comes in 
many possible guises and that all ways of being and knowing can be equally justifiable. Or, 
to put it differently, we could see that essentially it proves odd to conceive of human history 
and culture as homogenous. No one thus has the privilege to make categorical claims on 
behalf of a specific reality as legitimate at the expense of others. So, to assume differently, 
as the Commission ostensibly has done, only risks going against the grain of practical 
sense. Accordingly, it was admitted that the push for an exclusive neoliberal reality can’t 
therefore be isolated from the (tacit) fact of the capitalist classes wanting to uphold their 
interests. Further, the chapter regarded this as something that limits meanwhile the cause of 
development in Africa and the global South.  
In parallel, it was also necessary to go a step beyond limiting one’s responses simply to the 
dominant account of the development process. Based on the analysis, it was possible to call 
attention to another (probably less disputatious) form of universal reality despite the 
Commission’s assertions. Also, it was concluded that there seemingly was something 
positive about this other universal reality which could outstrip vying claims about the 
development phenomenon. Subsumed under this inclusive alternate reality can be located 
the sort of conditions that are pan-human which the rigid bourgeois version fails to consider. 
Most importantly, this illustrated that the pursuit of development can’t go on outside its 
proper context which typically spans history and power politics. And, on top of that, it was 
possible to work out that there is apparently a lasting lesson about how development 
transpires: rather than coming from adopting a specific foreign script, the reality tends to be 
that all societies develop properly when they successfully deal with various natural 
challenges and when they manage their internal equilibrium, despite any centrifugal 
influence. 
 
Finally, the discussion in this chapter was undertaken with the single most pressing intention 
of wanting to identify a practical development course for the African continent. In this 
connection, the focus came to be on two aspects; the form of development, including its 
fundamental character as well as the actual mechanism by which such development could 
be promoted.  
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The chapter detailed that the pursuit of sound African development depends on a clear 
understanding of the local African scene and the global reality of capitalist expansion and 
exploitation. Also, to outline a congruous African development, the chapter first touched on 
what Africa must simultaneously reject and embrace given its history and indigenous 
cultures. In particular, the analysis pointed to the need for a discerning attitude towards the 
African past whilst sounding alarm about the risks of exploiting the continent’s existing 
weaknesses by powerful outside actors. The chapter argued in favour of tapping into the 
positive aspects of indigenous African knowledge and practice. It also pushed for this to go 
with other human contributions to ensure the best possible development scenario. To round 
off, the chapter talked about the type of players that could be tasked with effecting the 
required development whilst specifying the site at which this change is meant to occur. In 
particular, it was decided to reserve a positive role for the working class, the progressive 
state, some social movements and intellectuals not beholden to power or driven by petty 
interests. The conclusion was drawn that given the global exploitative reach of capitalism, it 
is incumbent that the pursuit of change also be commensurate—on a wider scale linking the 
global South and North. That is how the present chapter saw the possibilities that could open 
up before the majority world beyond the model of development specific to the West’s 
historical and cultural experience.  
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7. CONCLUSION 
My study was prompted by a specific desire. I felt it was important to revisit African 
development in the new Millennium. I wanted to understand the factors affecting the course 
of African development. I needed to make sense of the interplay between the external and 
internal determinants of African development. In particular, I was interested to learn more, 
through case studies, about the dynamics of great power politics and African economic and 
political self-determination. I sought to know what the British Government-sponsored 
Commission for Africa and its report may signify for the continent’s development. Also, I was 
keen to find what the Eritrean State’s approach to development possibly means in terms of 
alternatives in African development contexts. In this way, I hoped to come to grips with the 
history and politics surrounding ‘African development’ before I could outline what I regarded 
(from the vantage point of my life experience) as a more realistic approach to African 
development.   
 
In terms of scope, I don’t purport to have addressed the question of African development in 
all its magnitudes. My study is in some way limited in that the focus exclusively was on 
African development in the context of this continent’s asymmetrical relation with the West. I 
chose to do so because of the clear link with my own life circumstances. Beyond the West’s 
role, there are of course other factors that bear on African development, if in somewhat 
different respects. For example, this study says nothing about the growing influence of China 
in Africa, or about the emerging South-South as well as intra-Africa relations. To have a full 
picture, I should have touched on all the relevant determinants of African development. For 
not being comprehensive, in the end, I could only point to the impossibility of encompassing 
all the issues within the body of a single academic thesis. Meantime, a possible reason for 
the relative neglect of China’s expanding role in the continent may still be historical. Without 
denying the element of self-interest about its current policies, China, unlike the ex-colonial 
powers, can’t be said to have played a part in the underdevelopment of Africa. In any event, 
it should be interesting to follow how Africa fares economically as a consequence of on-
going massive Chinese investments. Will China ‘fix' the African underdevelopment problem, 
or will it turn into another hegemon eventually? And in what ways will the intensifying global 
rivalry between a rising China and a visibly ebbing but militarily unmatched US empire likely 
affect the future of Africa? Similarly, it would have been sensible to allude to the South-South 
as well as intra-Africa dimensions when grappling with the question of African development. 
For example, would an ALBA-like project or a prospective African Continental Free Trade 
Area (AfCFTA) be in the interest of African development? And what would it take to come up 
with such bodies if one thinks that to be positive? This is a seminal area not covered by the 
193 
 
present study into the dominant Africanist discourse of development and in which there are 
possibilities for future research input. 
 
The literature reviewed for this project, the broader established literature as well as empirical 
evidence from inside the continent indicated that ‘African development’ was, in theory and 
practice, a strongly contested question. As chapter one illustrated, the main fault line runs 
through and separated two loosely aligned oppositional blocs and their specific appraisals. 
One side’s sense of African development arose from a generally conventional line of thought 
which contrasted with the other’s broadly progressive uptake. Some commentators seemed 
to insinuate that Africans themselves have somehow failed to achieve development. 
Conversely, others appeared to acknowledge essentially the role of non-intrinsic factors. My 
study demonstrated that ideology, not impartial scholarly interest, actually governs the way 
the continent’s development problem has been approached differently within the relevant 
accounts. Furthermore, my study underscored that, without forgetting the bigger picture 
entirely, reflexivity affords the African as the subject of development greater insight into the 
continent’s development problem and any likely ways out.  
 
For instance, the interpretations of African development by Africanists like David Booth, Tom 
Porteous and Zoe Ware, who turn out to have been constrained by their privileged/ 
bourgeoisie backgrounds and concerns, proved unreasonably deferential to the status quo 
which is what the Blair Commission also wanted to uphold. These commentators ended up 
providing what in effect were tautological explanations. By focussing exclusively on internal 
causes and by totally exonerating global capitalism, their ‘analyses’ confused effect with the 
cause of African underdevelopment. In addition, since the trio (and some others in their 
league such as Percy Mistry and Ian Taylor) considered Africa incapable of realising her own 
development, they reckoned that outsiders should be charged with that very responsibility. 
On the other hand, those looking at African development from the other side of the divide, 
like Ray Bush, Paul Cammack, Ankie Hoogvelt and Dot Keet, mostly correctly identified the 
underlying issues. Yet, telling by the example of Eritrea’s domestic development experiment, 
their accounts left much to speculation re the role of the African peoples in mapping out their 
own futures, as Fanon and Cabral readily granted. 
 
Speaking more generally or abstractly, there is a dominant consideration that goes with the 
study of development and that straddles all social inquiry which is that it is impossible to 
claim to be producing pure, as opposed to mediated, knowledge. In other words, subjectivity, 
along with the facts of politics, always bears on what those dealing with the social world and 
its processes (this author included) say or write. As my study has pointed out, this is the 
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reason that we have the diverse and conflicting narratives of ‘African development’ in the 
first place. Moreover, as chapter five and particularly chapter six showed, the rationale for 
questioning capitalist development as the absolute norm is provided by that same fact, as is 
the reason for endorsing alternatives. Eventually, although all the focus happens to be on 
the self-same topic of African development, the reality is that ‘development’ as a social 
construct indeed differs from naturally-occurring inert phenomena in that it does not have 
any exact or stable signification.  
 
In addition, the inquiry in chapter six into the history and politics of African development 
brought to the fore some complex questions. These centre on the nature of the development 
phenomenon as a specific form of knowledge and practice; whether or not development 
constitutes a science, and so whether or not development depends on universal ideas and 
practices. Similarly, my study raised questions about the status of ‘discourse’ in debates 
about history and change which typically involve the intellectual left. Can social reality simply 
be a matter of perspective and thus be thought of as relativistic, or is it helpful to recognise a 
more overriding external common human condition despite the prevalence of specific 
experiences? Would the focus on ‘discourse’ and ‘difference’ alone be enough to understand 
and reverse global capitalist oppression, or should meaning be sought in an external referent 
by adopting a more inclusive materialist approach to reality in all circumstances? 
 
Theorists like Rostow, Huntington and Pye approached the study of society, how it evolves 
politically and economically over time, as something liable to scientific study and 
experimentation. From their perspectives, all traditional societies must first satisfy given 
(modernisation) preconditions before a breakthrough could occur—as history presumably 
foreordains. As reported in chapter five, this putative universalism, a classic orientalist case 
of essentialising and lumping diverse groups of peoples together to justify sweeping policies, 
has been the central plank of mainstream development policy and practice ever. This is also 
indicative of the lack of any historically-informed explanations of social change. Albeit for a 
wholly different reason, many (classical) Marxists too saw society as following a clear 
evolutionary pattern that can be studied objectively—by focusing on the mode of production, 
relations of production and class-based social conflict. For both, the story of how society 
develops, according to certain teleological imperatives, also corresponded with a type of 
totalising knowledge, or metanarrative. Meanwhile, postdevelopment theorists like Escobar 
typically have been known for their antipathy toward the idea of development as science and 
for their objection to any overarching epistemological claims as well as broad historical 
trajectories while extoling local forms of knowledge and practices. Finally, there are also 
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those who like Ngũgĩ wa Thiongo’ (and possibly Achille Mbembe) tend to occupy the middle 
ground in that their projects simultaneously are about the local and the universal.  
 
I had to take into account these ambiguities concerning the meaning of development and the 
historical process as I tried to unpick ‘African development’ in the wake of the Blair 
Commission and the Eritrean case. Such attitudes reflect the kind of disparities that are part 
and parcel of the history and politics involving development in the modern era. I assumed, as 
the basis for my inquiry that the African peoples needn’t have to be the passive recipients or 
victims of history—because and in spite of the manipulating policies of their detractors who 
often see them as an unvaried and unvarying mass. Meantime, I anticipated those who do 
identify with the continent’s cause to join in the intellectual battle that has to be fought on 
behalf of the African peoples and against the smokescreen that is the dominant ideology and 
its local purveyors. It was this positivity if you will that prompted me to insist that Africa 
embraces a vision of change that isn’t in anyway imitative nor insular, but rather at once 
organic and transcultural. And that I believed was necessary for addressing the multifaceted 
question of future African development in the context of the enduring capitalist global order. 
Taking my cue variously from Marx’s philosophy of being, his theory of history, a neo-Marxist 
reworking of the relation between base and superstructure along with certain ‘home-grown’ 
radical approaches to African political self-determination, I drew on a conceptual and 
analytical framework that problematised ‘development’ as concept and practice. I learned 
consequently that at root African development is characterised by the dialectic of external 
domination and internal self-determination, that it features an unresolved tension involving 
the ‘local’ and the ‘universal’ and that how the continent ever develops is something of an 
open-ended question, reflecting the fluidity of the historical process itself.  
 
I make the claim that practical African development plays out in the context of two mutually-
opposed basic trends. On one hand, validated by its own Eurocentric experience, the West’s 
official policy has been to prescribe for Africa and the rest of the world capitalism as the 
universally desired economic and political system. On the other, knowing the truly 
heterogeneous and locally-definable African reality, it was doubted that this narrowing of the 
scope for development to just such a model could have any general validity whatever. In 
addition, I contend that ‘African development’ works out as a rather contingent enterprise, 
requiring a delicate articulation of the local and the universal in accordance with specific 
political ambitions/ priorities.  
 
As the discussion in chapter two as well as chapter five revealed, I found the dominant 
capitalist approach to African development to be in keeping with the liberal utopian vision 
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focused on a distinctive yet universalisable image of the human being and a type of social 
life that is a perfect foil for this a priori depiction of him (sic). This helps to clarify why then 
the propagation of development on the basis of this outlook enshrines ‘individualism’ as the 
essence of being and ‘self-interest’ as rational human behaviour. Likewise, we also get to 
understand why from this same perspective ‘success’ tends to be defined as the acquisition 
of material wealth whilst ‘happiness’ is presumed to derive from unbridled consumption. 
Perhaps naturally, we can further see how social reality takes its specific form supposedly 
after the market, and why social life also comes to be reduced to just a medium for the 
achievement of strictly individual projects. Or, in a word, we notice how everything revolves 
around a sovereign self-regulating market from which also social life derives its ultimate 
significance. 
 
I also found that the idea of Africa having no choice but to go along with the dominant 
version of reality to be far from a foregone conclusion, that therefore the search for 
alternatives by an Africa whose interest is not served by capitalism goes on regardless. And 
that is largely because the type of assumptions so integral to liberalism can’t be said to hold 
true in a universal sense. When speaking of development within an African context, as 
chapter four imparted, we need to remember that the philosophical musings of liberalism 
actually run contrary to enduring African norms of collectivism, sharing, ethics of being rather 
than of having, and admonitions against overconsumption. In other words, not only does the 
image of the individual sanctioned by liberalism turn to be controversial, but also a wilful 
reversal of the order in which the individual and society interrelate appear to have been 
committed in this case. For, despite the assumptions to the contrary, normally it is social 
being which for the most part has the greater effect on the individual’s life rather than vice 
versa.  
 
No doubt, ‘African development’ is far from a settled prospect since the existing conceptions 
and practices of it differ in fundamental ways. In its essential manifestation, the contest over 
the purport of African development today pits externally-designed visions of change against 
internally-inspired ones. This disjuncture in the perception of African development at the 
same time indicates the core stakes of those for whom African development matters in one 
way or another. As I highlighted early on in chapter three but also throughout the course of 
the study, the dominant development policy has been conceived in ways that align with the 
West’s underlying objective of moulding the rest of the world in its image. Now, knowing this 
means we can also tell if and when ‘development’ is being used to promote the powers of 
the few instead of liberating the majority from oppressive social, economic and political 
conditions in much the same way as sub-Saharan Africa currently hopes for. So, if we are to 
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witness the continent attain genuine social transformation, it is important to understand not 
only what ‘development’ denotes, but also how this whole process actually works in practice. 
We need to pay close attention to the determinants of African development, in particular the 
interplay between the external and internal forces. That becomes even more urgent at a 
time, like this very moment in history, of worsening capitalist crisis and amid arguably a ‘new 
scramble’ for an Africa rich in resources but alas poor in terms of the capacity to exercise 
political power to enforce her development interests. This study constitutes my humble 
contribution to the search for alternative approaches to African development and in which I 
attempted to draw distinctions between more promising and less practical strategies using 
the parallel and inversely-motivated development discourses of the Blair Africa Commission 
and the Eritrean State.   
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